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Abstract
This thesis analyses how the internal divisions occurring on the administrative 
level of the European Commission affect its capacity to prepare and propose 
legislation. It examines the consequences of the functional specialisation of 
different Directorates General (DGs) and the principles of mutual consultation 
on the ways in which the Commission sets policy agendas and formulates 
policies. Using the insights of the literature on policy coordination that 
perceives of decision-making processes in fragmented institutions as a process of 
coordination among semi-autonomous, but interdependent actors, the thesis 
analyses the interactions between different Commission DGs and the ways in 
which they seek to cope with conflict and competition. The research design is 
qualitative and uses process-tracing of major legislative initiatives taken by the 
European Commission in the telecommunications and the audiovisual sectors 
between the ^nid-1980s and the year 200(){The findings of the empirical analysis 
suggest that while conflict and debate are ever-present features of how the 
Commission operates, the extent to which Commission actors manage to settle 
or to overcome such conflict varies across policy sectors. Low fragmentation^ 
results in an ‘informal’ coordination scenario in which actors settle their j 
disputes. Legislative policy-making is rapid and consistent and usually results in 
the proposition of legislation ./In contrast, high fragmentation bears a tendency 
towards policy-making taking place in formal and more ‘politicised’ arenas in 
which actors multiply and find it more difficult to accommodate their 
differences. Hence, policy-making is slower, more prone to inconsistencies and j  
less likely to result in the proposition of legislation. The insights gained on 
fragmentation and coordination in the European Commission alter our existing 
views of the Commission. Challenging the notion that the Commission fulfils a 
pre-defined function or agenda, I argue that the Commission is capable of 
playing different roles, depending on the extent to which it is internally divided.
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Introduction
There are few governmental institutions that attract as many unfavourable 
comments as the European Commission. The powers and budgets administered 
by its ‘faceless bureaucrats’ have been despised and subject to heated 
controversies. Having chosen the European Commission as a subject of 
academic inquiry, you are most likely to encounter these controversies yourself. 
The chances are high that, whoever you are talking to and whatever the 
person’s social standing, national origin, and political views, you will have a 
difficult time defending yourself. You unwillingly enter an inquisitional court, 
urged to justify how you can possibly study a corrupt institution that is busy 
doing things no one will ever need and that is really nothing more than a big 
nuisance. The fact that very few people are aware of what the European 
Commission actually does (and what it does not do) only makes matters worse.
Things do not improve greatly when you enter academic circles where 
people, raising their eyebrows, point out that ‘so much has been written about 
the Commission already’. Indeed, contributions on the European Commission 
fill many more pages than do those on the European Parliament, the European 
Central Bank, or the Economic and Social Committee. After having been largely 
ignored for more than three decades, the European Commission has found 
itself facing a surge of academic interest since the mid-1990s.1 No one now 
seriously denies that the European Commission matters greatly for the course of 
European integration and that its activities determine much of our daily lives, 
including the ways we shop, work, smoke, eat and play. There is little indication 
that the fascination with its role and functioning will end any time soon.
For early contributions see  C oom b es (19 7 0 ); M ichelm ann (1 9 7 8 ); Spierenburg (1 9 7 9 ) .
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However, in spite of the wealth of contributions floating around, we
continue to know relatively little about what is going on inside the European
Commission. The ways in which the European Commission operates, formulates
policies and takes decisions continue to be subject to speculation and dispute.
For example, whether the Commission is a ‘supranationalist’ ‘competence
maximizer’ that constantly seeks to expand its powers or whether it is suffering
from administrative overload and inefficient management and therefore largely 
•  •  2incapable to act has remained subject to controversy. This is probably in part 
due to the fact that the European Commission is a complex institution with so 
much going on inside that it offers ‘a wealth of possible detail’ (Page 1 9 9 7 , p. 
18). Arriving at any kinds of generalisations is therefore a difficult task. The 
European Commission fulfils many different and sometimes diverse roles, such 
as being the guardian of the Treaties and proposing EU legislation, and its 
approximately 22,000 officials are engaged in very different day-to-day activities. 
Given the diverse if not contrary images of the Commission there is an ongoing 
need for more systematic research in order to uncover patterns of policy-making 
behaviour within the European Commission and to build testable hypotheses in 
relation to these. This thesis rests on the assumption that the European 
Commission is a key actor among those comprising the European Union as a 
political system. Moreover, it argues that the Commission is a highly interesting 
subject for academic research in and of itself, as it represents an excellent 
example of decision-making in a complex institutional environment.
The point of departure taken in this thesis is that the European Commission 
is not a unitary actor, but a fragmented institution representing a variety of 
actors and organisations. The fragmentation of the Commission has various 
dimensions, including divisions that result from the Commission’s 
organisational design and the procedures according to which it operates. Due to 
compartmentalisation, the functional specialisation of different organisational 
actors and the absence of a central authority, the European Commission often 
engages in internal conflict over policy problems and solutions rather than
2
S ee, fo r  exam p le, Cini (2 0 0 1 ); H ix  ( ig g g ) ;  Laffan (1 9 9 7 ); M ajone (1 9 9 6 );  M oravcsik (1 9 9 3  
a n d  1998 ); P eterson  (1 9 9 9 ); Pollack (1 9 9 4  and 2003 ); Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
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• 3pursuing a set of pre-defined preferences. An argument found in many 
empirical as well as theoretical contributions is that this organisational 
fragmentation is linked to a general tendency towards ‘fragmented’ 
Commission behaviour, i.e. incoherent, uncoordinated or slow policy-making.4 
In this context, fragmentation has lacked a precise definition and tended to be 
confused with its actual effects, often serving as a catch-all variable with little 
indication of how exactly it manifests itself and how it varies. In my thesis, I wish 
to address these shortcomings by selecting a single, but fundamental aspect of 
fragmentation and by analysing its effects in an in-depth cross-sectoral 
comparison of the Commission’s legislative policy-making.
Seeking to contribute to the body of literature that views the European 
Commission as a ‘multi-organisation’ (Cram 1994) which is characterised by 
divisions and fragmentation, my central research question is how the 
organisational fragmentation on the administrative level of the European 
Commission affects its legislative outputs, i.e. the ways in which it prepares and 
proposes EU legislation. Preparing and proposing legislation is widely 
acknowledged to represent a cornerstone of the Commission’s activities and is 
undertaken by the Commission’s Directorates General (DGs).5
In order to establish causal linkages between the Commission’s 
fragmentation and its legislative outputs I conceptualise legislative policy­
making in the European Commission as a process of policy coordination. The 
concepts of policy coordination are used to analyse decision-making in 
‘fragmented’ institutional environments that are composed of a plurality of 
organisational actors (such as government departments or ministries) 
maintaining different tasks, interests, goals and strategies. These actors are not 
autonomous, but interdependent, for example due to overlapping policy
3
S ee, for exam p le, Christiansen (2001a); Cini (1 9 9 6 ); C oom bes (1 9 7 0 );  E geberg  (2 0 0 2 );  
M ichelm ann (1 9 7 8 ); Page (1 9 9 5  and 1997); Peters (1 9 9 4  and 2001 ); P eterson  (1 9 9 9 );  S p en ce  
( i 9 9 7 )l Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
4
E.g. Christiansen (2 001b ); Cini (2 0 0 1 ); Laffan (1 9 9 7 ); M etcalfe (2 0 0 0 );  P eterson  (1 9 9 9 );
Schm idt (1998a); Stevens and Stevens (1 9 9 6 ); Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
5
E.g. Christiansen (2001a); C ini (1 9 9 6 ); Edwards and S p en ce (1 9 9 7 ); N u g e n t (2 0 0 1 );  Peters
(1 9 9 4  and 2 0 0 1 ).0
C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 ); H a n f and Scharpf (1 9 7 8 ); Hayward an d  W right (2 0 0 2 );  L ind blom  (1 9 6 5 );  
M arch and O lsen  (1 9 7 6 ); Peters (1 9 9 8 ); Rogers and W hetten  (1 9 8 2 ).
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responsibilities and decision-making rules that require collaboration. The 
existence of a plurality of interdependent actors inevitably leads to conflict and 
debate among them. In order to realise their goals and to produce policy 
outputs they engage in coordination, a process which is aimed at preventing, 
avoiding and repressing conflict and thereby overcoming a given situation of 
fragmentation.
In my thesis, I do not intend to make assumptions about how much the 
European Commission ‘matters’ in the course of overall EU policy-making and 
the process of European integration. Hence, I do not address the ‘European 
integration’ literature nor do I associate myself with any of its schools of
7
thought. Rather, I seek to demonstrate that conceptualising the European 
Commission as being composed of different organisational actors that engage in 
a process of policy coordination provides a useful lens through which to identify 
and analyse patterns of the Commission’s behaviour to prepare legislation and 
to explain variation on legislative outputs.
The research design is qualitative and uses process-tracing of central 
legislative initiatives undertaken by the European Commission in two policy 
sectors over a period of more than fifteen years, stretching from the early 1980s 
to the year 2000. The chosen policy areas are the telecommunications and the 
audiovisual sector. They offer interesting case studies for a cross-sectoral 
comparison because they both stretch across neatly defined sectoral boundaries 
and cut across various issue dimensions (e.g. technological and economic). 
They have been subject to long-term legislative efforts by the European 
Commission that have addressed similar themes of legislation, i.e. liberalisation 
and market opening as well as the regulation of market entry, user rights et 
cetera.
In the empirical analysis, the organisational actors (i.e. DGs) that operate 
on the Commission’s administrative level and prepare legislation are identified 
and the level of administrative fragmentation is assessed using three indicators: 
first, the number of DGs engaging in the preparation of legislation; second, the
7
S ee, for exam p le, A rm strong and  B ulm er (1 9 9 8 ); Haas (1 9 5 8 ); H o o g h e  and  Marks (2 0 0 1 );  
Marks, H o o g h e  and  Blank (1 9 9 6 ); Kohler-Koch (1 9 9 6 ); Moravcsik (1 9 9 3  an d  1998); Peterson  
(1 9 9 5 );  S tone Sweet and  Sandholtz (1 9 9 8 ).
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differences between these DGs on the need for and the primary objectives of 
EU-level legislation (i.e. the paradigm of legislation); and third their 
competition for policy authority. As will be shown, high levels of fragmentation 
are characterised not only by a greater plurality of DGs, but also by a situation of 
greater interdependence and complexity. They make the management of policy 
coordination more difficult and lower legislative outputs more likely. Legislative 
outputs refer to consultative documents, legislative proposals and legal 
instruments prepared and adopted by the European Commission and are 
operationalised by using three indicators: the duration of the process through 
which the Commission prepares and adopts them; the consistency of the 
legislative propositions; and the decision whether to propose legislation at all.
For each legislative initiative under study, the empirical analysis identifies 
distinct configurations of administrative fragmentation and examines how these 
translate into legislative outputs. Sectoral patterns of fragmentation and outputs 
can be clearly distinguished when comparing the telecommunications and the 
audiovisual fields, particularly over the long term. The empirical evidence 
uncovers significant variation in the two policy domains under study, the overall 
picture being one of high levels of fragmentation and low legislative outputs in 
the audiovisual field and one of low levels of fragmentation and high outputs in 
the telecommunications sector. Following an initial period during which both 
policy areas were characterised by similarly low levels of fragmentation, a central 
momentum of change occurred in the early 1990s. At that time, the number of 
participating DGs doubled from two to four in the audiovisual field whereas in 
the telecommunications sector there were only two DGs. Together with 
significant differences on the need for and the objectives of legislation and 
competition for policy authority, the situation was one of high administrative 
fragmentation. Managing policy coordination was intricate and resulted in low 
legislative outputs, i.e. slow and inconsistent policy-making that resulted in little 
legislative action. Quite the opposite was the case in the telecommunications 
domain where the number of DGs was smaller, the DGs consented on the need 
for and the primary objectives of legislation and on sharing authority over 
telecommunications issues. The low level of fragmentation facilitated the 
coordination process and enabled the participating DGs to overcome debate
A5
and conflict over the details of legislation. Legislative policy-making was fast, 
consistent and resulted in a large number of decisions to propose legislation. 
The different configurations of administrative fragmentation observed for the 
two sectors lasted until the year 2000, the end of the period studied, as did the 
distinct patterns of policy coordination and legislative outputs.
The main argument emerging from the analysis is that rather than pursuing 
a pre-defined agenda and a stable set of preferences, the Commission engages 
in internal debate on policy problems and solutions. While such debates are 
universal features of Commission policy-making, there is significant variation on 
how the Commission manages them and whether conflict can be overcome. 
This variation can be linked with the level of administrative fragmentation. In 
this context, the number of DGs appears to be the most crucial factor 
determining the level of administrative fragmentation. Differences in 
fragmentation result in distinct situations of plurality and interdependence 
between the actors involved and the emergence of different scenarios of policy 
coordination. DGs tend to respond to low levels of administrative fragmentation 
by using coordination of a more ‘informal’ nature (e.g. preliminary 
consultations), whereas they usually rely on more ‘formal’ procedures (e.g. 
hierarchy) when high levels of fragmentation prevail. The different routes vary 
in terms of their effectiveness to solve conflict and to accommodate 
fragmentation. Instead of simply assuming a given ‘role’ for the European 
Commission, be it a ‘competence maximizer’ or a blocked and incoherent 
policy-maker, we must acknowledge that it may take on different roles that are 
related to varying patterns of fragmentation and coordination.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter One reviews the literature 
relevant to the questions posed in the thesis and sets out the research design, 
including a discussion of key conceptual and methodological issues. Chapter 
Two presents the organisational and procedural context underpinning the 
preparation of legislative proposals in the European Commission, describes 
central features of the chosen policy areas and indicates variation on the 
explanatory variable, i.e. administrative fragmentation. Chapters Three to Seven 
contain the empirical analysis which is organised into three broad parts. Part 
One (Chapter Three) analyses the first stage of the Commission’s legislative
1 6
activities in the two domains under study, starting in 1984 and ending in 1989. 
Part Two (Chapters Four and Five) examines the preparation of legislation 
underway in the Commission between 1990 and 1996, a period during which 
Commission actors sought to refine and expand existing legislation. Part Three 
covers the most recent phase of legislative policy-making completed by the 
European Commission thus far, stretching from 1997 to the year 2000 and 
aimed at further refining and consolidating existing legislative frameworks 
(Chapters Six and Seven).
Chapter Three shows how between 1984 and 1989, in both 
telecommunications and the audiovisual field two Commission DGs engaged in 
proposing measures of market opening and regulatory harmonisation. Low 
levels of administrative fragmentation made policy coordination rather easy and 
resulted in high legislative outputs that were largely achieved by using ‘informal’ 
methods of policy coordination. Chapter Four presents an in-depth analysis of 
the Commission DGs’ efforts to refine and expand legislation for the 
telecommunications sector between 1990 and 1996 and shows how low levels of 
fragmentation created a coordination scenario in which informal consensus- 
building activities prevailed and enabled the Commission to act rapidly, 
consistently and to adopt a large number of legislative proposals. Chapter Five 
examines the legislative initiatives taken in the audiovisual field between 1990 
and 1996 and demonstrates how, due a significant increase of administrative 
fragmentation, coordination was troublesome and difficult and mostly took 
place in the formal arenas of the Commission. This slowed down legislative 
policy-making, made it more prone to changes of direction and the actual 
proposition of legislation less likely.
Chapter Six analyses the efforts of the Commission to take legislative action 
in the audiovisual field between 1997 and 2000 and shows how high levels of  
administrative fragmentation correlated with low legislative outputs that 
emerged in a ‘formal’ coordination arena. Chapter Seven demonstrates how in 
the telecommunications sector low levels of fragmentation facilitated the policy 
coordination process and how they resulted in high legislative outputs produced 
in largely informal coordination arenas. In Chapter Eight, the empirical 
evidence presented in the preceding chapters is assessed in relation to the key
conceptual issues and arguments raised in the thesis. Presenting conclusions on 
how administrative fragmentation impacts on policy coordination in the 
European Commission, I discuss how these challenge existing 
conceptualisations and alter our views of the Commission, its functions and 
roles.
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Chapter One: 
Analysing Fragmentation and 
Coordination in the European 
Commission
Using insights from the literature on policy coordination, this thesis seeks to 
analyse how the organisational fragmentation occurring on the administrative 
level of the European Commission affects its legislative outputs. This chapter 
presents the main questions addressed, introduces key arguments and sets out 
the research design. The first section reviews existing concepts of the European 
Commission that view it as a fragmented decision-making institution and 
discusses how they have inspired the key questions addressed in my thesis. The 
second section introduces the concept of policy coordination as a conceptual 
tool to analyse the ways in which the fragmentation of the Commission 
manifests itself and affects legislative outputs. The third section sets out the 
research design, defining the explanatory and dependent variables and 
establishing a cross-sectoral, qualitatively-oriented research perspective.
The European Commission  -  a fragmented policy-maker
The European Commission is at the heart of the EU policy process. During the 
1990s, its importance as a ‘motor’ of European integration, an agenda-setter 
and a political actor in its own right was widely acknowledged in the academic
! 9
•  8literature. A growing number of writers have argued that analysing how the 
European Commission works and functions is central to our understanding of 
the European Union as a political system. In this context, how the Commission 
actually fulfils its various roles that include that of a bureaucracy, executive,
• 9policy entrepreneur and an agenda-setter has remained much disputed. 
Questions such as why the European Commission designs legislation in a 
particular way and at a given time and why it sometimes refrains from doing so 
have largely remained unsolved. Hence, there is an ongoing need for more 
systematic research which uncovers and explains patterns of the Commission’s 
policy-making behaviour.
The point of departure taken in my thesis is that in order to advance our 
understanding of the Commission we must acknowledge its internal divisions 
and examine how they affect its policy-making behaviour. Many 
conceptualisations of the European Commission, particularly those derived 
from a European integration perspective, have been based on the assumption 
that the Commission is a ‘competence maximizer’ pursuing a ‘supranationalist’ 
agenda.10 According to this image, the Commission is a single-minded actor that 
constantly seeks to expand its powers, budgets and, more generally, EU 
authority and thereby wants to overcome its role as a mere agent of member 
states. Apart from rather general conclusions drawn about the European 
Commission being ‘permeated’ by national interests (e.g. Heritier 1999; 
Peterson 1999), these contributions have largely ignored the internal life of the 
European Commission and the fact that the Commission represents an arena 
composed of different actors and organisations (e.g. Dimitrakopoulos 2004). 
They have also left a number of important issues unaddressed, such as how the 
Commission’s internal life affects the use of its agenda-setting powers and why 
its policy-making behaviour varies quite significantly across different policy 
domains.
8
S ee, for exam p le, C hristiansen (1 9 9 6  and  2001a); Cram (1 9 9 4 ); D im itrakopoulos (2 0 0 4 );  
D rake (1 9 9 7 ); Ludlow  (1 9 9 1 );  M orth (2 0 0 0 ); N u g en t (2 0 0 0 ); Peters (2 0 0 1 );  P eterson  (1 9 9 5
an d  1999); R ichardson (2 0 0 1 ).
9
E.g. C hristiansen (1 9 9 6  and 1997); Cram (1 9 9 7 ); Laffan (1 9 9 7 ); Peters (1 9 9 4  an d  2 0 0 1 ) .
10
E.g. E ich en er (1 9 9 7 ); H ix  (1 9 9 9 ); M ajone (1 9 9 6 ); M oravcsik (1 9 9 3  and  1998); P eterson
( 19 9 5 )> Pollack (1 9 9 4  and 2 0 0 3 ); Radaelli (1 9 9 9 ); S ton e Sw eet and Sandholtz (1 9 9 8 ).
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My main interest is to further our understanding of how the European 
Commission operates and functions by analysing the ways in which its internal 
divisions affect the ways in which it prepares and proposes legislation. Rather 
than being interested in how much the Commission ‘matters’ in the course of  
overall EU policy-making and the process of European integration, I seek to 
demonstrate that, depending on the extent to which it is internally divided, the 
Commission may produce different outputs in its function o f initiating and 
proposing EU legislation. Hence, in my thesis I do not address the ‘European 
integration’ literature nor do I associate myself with any o f its schools of 
thought.11 Instead my thesis seeks to contribute to the literature which has 
emerged to address how the European Commission operates as a decision­
making institution that is characterised by internal divisions or ‘fragmentation’ 
(e.g. Page 1997; Peters 2 0 0 1 ) .
A growing body of literature has challenged the notion o f the European 
Commission being a ‘monolithic entity’ (Cram 1997) arguing that the
preferences and strategies expressed by the Commission must be regarded as a
12product of its internal politics. In order to explain how the European 
Commission operates, how it sets policy agendas and proposes legislation, a 
large variety of factors have been identified: together, they have been
13encapsulated in the term ‘fragmentation’. Since the resignation of the Santer 
Commission in March 1999 following allegations of mismanagement, nepotism  
and fraud and ensuing attempts to reform the internal management o f the
In sp ite o f  their d iffering accounts o f  the pace and scop e o f  E uropean  in tegration  an d  the  
ro le  played by th e E uropean C om m ission, liberal in tergovem m entalists, n eo-functionalists and  
p rop on en ts o f  alternative approaches (such  as that o f  m ulti-level governance and p o licy  network  
analysis) share a  fundam ental assum ption. T h e European C om m ission  is com m on ly  perceived  
as a unitary actor that, d ep en d in g  o n  w here o n e  stands, acts e ith er  as an agen t o f  m em b er states 
o r  an  au ton om ou s actor (e.g . A rm strong and B ulm er 1998; H aas 1958; H o o g h e  an d  Marks 
2001; Marks, H o o g h e  and Blank 1996; Kohler-Koch 1996; Moravcsik 1993  and  1998; Peterson  
1995; S ton e Sw eet and  Sandholtz 1998). U nderlying these p ercep tions is the assu m p tion  that 
th e European C om m ission  is an essentially ‘integrationist* or  ‘supranationalist’ actor an d  a  
com p eten ce-m axim izer in  the ‘D ow nsian’ sense (e.g . D ow ns 1967; M ajone 1996; M oravcsik 
1998; Pollack 1994 , 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 3 ). Little accoun t has b een  taken o f  the variation the C om m ission
offers in  term s o f  its policy-m aking behaviour.
12
A lso  see  C hristiansen (1 9 9 6  and 2001a); Drake (1 9 9 7 ); M orth (2 0 0 0 ); N u g e n t (2 0 0 0 );
Peterson (1995 and 1999).
13
S ee, for exam p le, Christiansen (20 0 1 ); Cini (1 9 9 6 ); E geberg (2 0 0 3 ); N u g en t (2 0 0 2 );  Page 
(1 9 9 7 );  Peterson and B om berg (1 9 9 9 ); R hodes, Peters and  W right (2 0 0 0 ).
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14Commission, the salience of fragmentation has increased significantly. 
Academics have raised questions about the European Commission’s ‘democratic 
deficit’, administrative overload and possible ways to improve its internal 
management and to achieve more effective governance.
Studies inspired by sociological and anthropological approaches have 
concentrated on factors such as identity, culture, and mentality that characterise 
the different actors and organisations the Commission is composed of.15 While 
these studies have offered valuable insights into the Commission’s life and the 
multi-dimensional character of its divisions, they have remained largely 
descriptive when it comes to explaining what is actually happening in the 
European Commission, for example how and why it produces policy outputs 
and how distinct patterns of policy-making evolve. Some of these questions have 
been addressed by public policy analysts using tools from bureaucratic politics 
and network analysis and concentrating on other facets of fragmentation, such 
as organisational divides and exogenous factors (e.g. the influence of interest 
groups and national interests).16 These studies have demonstrated that, rather 
than pursuing a set of pre-defined preferences, the European Commission often 
engages in internal conflict and competition over policy solutions and strategies 
and that the outcomes of these processes are not easily systematised.
My thesis takes up the insights gained from studies that see the 
fragmentation of the European Commission as a product of its organisational
S ee, for exam p le, Christiansen (2001a); Cram (2 0 0 1 );  D im itrakopoulos (2 0 0 4 );  E geberg  
(2 0 0 4  b ); M etcalfe (1 9 9 6  and 2000); N u gen t (2 0 0 2 ); Radaelli (1 9 9 9 ); S p en ce (1 9 9 7 );  Stevens 
(2 0 0 1 );  W incott (2 0 0 1 ).
15
E.g. A beles, B ellier and M cD onald (1 9 9 6 ); Cini (2 0 0 0  and 20 0 4 ); H o o g h e  (1 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 0  and
2 0 0 1 );  M cD onald  (2 0 0 0 );  Ross (1 9 9 5 ).
16
A  n um ber o f  studies have yielded  im portant results o n  how  business and  con su m er interests  
affect the behaviour o f  C om m ission actors (e.g . Cram 1997; E geberg 2 0 0 4  a and  b; From  2002; 
Hayward an d  M enon  2003; H o o g h e  2001; Mak 2000; M azey and R ichardson 1 9 9 7 , 2001; 
M iddlem as 1995; M orth 2000; Page and W outers 1994; Page 1997; P eterson  1995  an d  1999; 
Ross 1995; van S ch en d elen  and Pedler 1 9 94 ). T h e ro le p layed by national in terests co n tin u es to  
b e  a con ten tiou s issue, particularly as it con cern s th e European C om m ission ’s adm inistrative 
services (e.g . C hristiansen 1997; Egeberg 2 0 0 4  a and b; From  2002; H o o g h e  2001; M ichelm ann  
1978; M iddlem as 1995; Page and W outers 1994; Page 1997; P eterson  1999; Ross 1995; 
S pierenb urg  1 9 7 9 ).
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17design and the procedures according to which it operates. These studies have
mostly followed a new-institutionalist approach (March and Olsen 1989),
concentrating on the Commission’s fragmentation as conditioned by factors
such as its division into a political and an administrative realm, the prevalence
of functional specialisation of and a horizontal division of labour between
different Directorates General (DGs), the absence of a central authority, and
decision-making procedures that emphasise collegiality rather than hierarchy.
Variation in the outputs produced by the Commission has been attributed to
fragmentation and the associated complexity, instability, and fluidity of the
18European Commission that allow, for example, for a variety of policy styles. On 
a conceptual level, this approach has been greatly advanced by Peters (1991, 
1994 and 2001) who suggested that the European Commission’s agenda-setting 
activities should be viewed as a pluralist or ‘competitive process’ (Peters 2001, p. 
83) during which different actors (for example, Directorates General) 
interrelate as largely autonomous, but interdependent organisations. In this 
view, fragmentation affects the European Commission’s policy outputs, for 
example the form and content of legislation it proposes.
These insights have been taken up in a number of case studies relating the 
incidence of fragmentation to actual policy-making behaviour observed in the
19European Commission. While the results presented in these contributions are 
appealing, one may also say that some of them tend to risk over-simplification. A 
central observation emerging from my reading of these studies has been that, 
perhaps due to a pre-occupation with the complex and multiple causes of 
fragmentation as such, the effects of fragmentation on the organisational 
dimension have been subject to speculation rather than systematic investigation. 
For example, an assumption underlying many contributions is that the mere 
incidence of organisational divisions equates with ‘fragmented’ Commission
17
S ee, for exam p le, Christiansen (2001a); Cini (1 9 9 6 ); C oom b es (1 9 7 0 );  E geberg (2 0 0 2 );  
M ich elm an n  (1 9 7 8 ); Page (1 9 9 5  and 1997); Peters (1 9 9 4  and 2 0 0 1 ); P eterson  (1 9 9 9 );  S pence
(1 9 9 7 );  Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
18
E.g. Cram (1 9 9 4  and 1997); Laffan, O ’D on n ell and Sm ith (2 0 0 0 );  M orth (2 0 0 0 );  Page
(1 9 9 2 );  Rittberger and R ichardson (2 0 0 3 ).
19
S ee , for exam p le, Christiansen (2001a); Cini (1 9 9 6 ); Laffan (1 9 9 7 );  Peterson  (1 9 9 9 );  
Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
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behaviour, i.e. policy-making that is uncoordinated, incoherent, prone to
20internal blockage and resistant to change. Taking up the well-established 
general notion of fragmented institutional behaviour which implies that ‘the 
bureaucracy does not act as an integrated tool of the public instrument, but
rather as a set of subgovemments’ (Peters 1995, p. 185), several contributors
21have used fragmentation in a somewhat static way. Fragmentation appears to 
serve as a catch-all variable with little explanatory value because it tends to be 
confused with its actual effects. It has lacked a precise definition of what it 
actually is, how it manifests itself, and how it varies, for example across policy 
sectors, issues and over time.
Taking up the notion of organisational fragmentation, I argue that in order 
to advance our understanding of how the Commission operates we need to
further develop and to define the fragmentation of the Commission. What is
needed is a conceptualisation of how fragmentation manifests itself and how it 
varies, under what conditions is may persist or be overcome, and how it affects 
the policy outputs produced by the Commission. In order to develop a
framework for establishing causal links between the Commission’s
organisational fragmentation and its legislative outputs I conceptualise 
legislative policy-making in the European Commission as a process of policy 
coordination.
As observed  by H arcourt (1 9 9 8 , p. 3 7 1 ) , ‘con ven tional w isdom  argues that p o licy  issues are
badly co-ordinated  w ithin the C om m ission’. For exam p le, Peterson  (1 9 9 9 , p. 6 a ) n o tic ed  a
ten d en cy  o f  ‘im peratives - national, political and  sectoral -  ( . . . )  to divide th e C om m ission  and
m itigate against collective adm inistrative action ’, w hile Laffan (1 9 9 7 , p . 4 2 5 )  stated  that
‘estab lish in g a C om m ission  lin e, as op p osed  to the policy p referen ces o f  individual d irectorates,
is tortu ou s’.
21
In th e words o f  M arch (1 9 9 4 , p. 192-193), ‘rather than have decision  processes that p ro ceed  
from  con sistent in tention s, identities, and exp ectations to  coord inated  d ecision s an d  actions, 
organ izations exh ib it n um erous sym ptom s o f  in coh eren ce . D ecision s seem  u n c o n n ec te d  to  
action s, yesterday’s actions u n con n ected  to  today’s actions, justifications u n c o n n ec te d  to  
d ecision s. B eliefs are o ften  u n con n ected  to  ch oices, so lu tions u n co n n ec ted  to prob lem s, an d  
processes u n co n n ected  to  outcom es. O rganizations frequently  have am bigu ous p referen ces an d  
id en tities, am biguous exp erien ces and  history, am biguous tech n olog ies, an d  flu id  participation  
in  d ecision  m aking’. For accounts relating the in cid en ce o f  fragm entation  in  the C om m ission  to  
‘fragm en ted ’ behaviour see, for exam ple, C hristiansen (2 0 0 1 b ); Cini (2 0 0 1 );  C oom b es (1 9 7 0 );  
Laffan (1 9 9 7 ); M etcalfe (2 0 0 0 ); Peterson (1 9 9 9 ); Schm idt (1998a); Stevens an d  Stevens
(1 9 9 6 );  Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
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The concept of policy coordination
Policy coordination is one of the classic issues of the Public Administration
22literature. It occupies an important position in organisation theory and has 
been addressed in the context of public policy analysis and debates on ‘New
23Public Management*. Concepts of policy coordination have been used to 
analyse decision-making in complex or ‘fragmented’ institutional environments 
such as the White House, the French core executive and the German ministerial
24bureaucracy. Policy coordination has been understood as both a goal, i.e. ‘the 
bringing together of diverse elements into a harmonious relationship in support 
of common objectives’ (Seidman 1980, p. 145), and a process, i.e. the ‘act of 
coordinating’ (ibid.) that takes place in an arena of at least two organisations. 
As I am conducting an analysis of policy-making in the European Commission, I 
am primarily interested in concepts focusing on the process of coordination. The 
contributions that have inspired the research design of this study mostly 
originate from a bureaucratic politics perspective which analyses policy-making 
in institutions and bureaucracies by viewing their component parts as 
organisational actors with their own purposes and goals (Allison and Zelikow
1 9 9 9 )-
Coordination theorists perceive of fragmented institutional environments as 
being composed of a plurality of actors, for example government departments
25or ministries, that maintain different tasks, interests, goals and strategies. 
However, far from being autonomous these actors are interdependent, due to 
several reasons. Institutional decision-making rules require them to co-operate 
and collaborate. Other factors intensify interdependence, for example the cross-
22
E.g. A lexander (1 9 9 3 ); A llison (1 9 7 1 ); A llison and Zelikow (1 9 9 9 ); C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 );  Davis 
(1 9 9 5 );  G oetz (20 0 3 ); H a n f and Scharpf e t  al. (1 9 7 8 ); Hayward an d  W right (2 0 0 2 );  M etcalfe  
(1 9 9 4 );  Peters (1 9 9 8 ); R ogers and W hetten  (1 9 8 2 ); Scharpf (1 9 9 7 );  Seidm an (1 9 8 0 );  S im on
( 1 9 9 7 )-
23
E.g. M etcalfe (1 9 9 4 ); Peters (1 9 9 8 ); Rogers and W hetten  (1 9 8 2 ).
24
S ee, for exam ple, H an f and  Scharpf (1 9 7 8 ); Hayward and W right (2 0 0 2 );  Seidm an (1 9 8 0 ).  
B esides the executive levels o f  central governm ent, m ore local or  regional organ isations e.g . 
agen cies o f  public transit systems have also b een  stud ied  (e.g . C hisholm  1989; Pressm an and  
Wildavsky 1973).
25
C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 ); H an f and  Scharpf (1 9 7 8 ); Hayward and W right (2 0 0 2 ); L ind blom  (1 9 6 5 );  
M arch and O lsen  (19 7 6 ); Peters (1 9 9 8 ); Rogers and W hetten  (1 9 8 2 ).
25
cutting nature of policy issues and the far-reaching functional specialisation of
26organisational actors. Due to internationalisation, technological 
developments, and changing policy agendas incorporating new issues (such as 
environmental concerns or minorities’ rights), many policy issues have become 
more ‘cross-cutting’, i.e. they tend to cut across a greater number of issue 
dimensions (e.g. technological, public interest, economic) (e.g. Peters 1998). 
The far-reaching specialisation of organisational actors organised within an 
institution increases the tendency towards overlapping policy responsibilities. 
Together, these factors create a ‘multiorganizational setting* (Chisholm 1989, 
p. 5) in which organisational actors must seek to promote the development of 
consensus in order to be capable of action.
With its notions of plurality and interdependence, the coordination 
literature draws attention to the interactions of organisational actors, the unit of 
analysis being the set or fields of organisational actors organised within an
27institution, rather than a single policy actor. According to the literature, the 
fragmentation of an institutional environment inevitably leads to debate and 
conflict among these actors. In the words of Hanf and Scharpf (1978, p. 3), ‘a 
single consistent policy in a given functional area pursued by all political units is
one of the least probable outcomes of governmental processes involving multi-
•  28organisational systems’. In order to be able to realise their goals and to 
produce policy outputs, e.g. a legislative proposal, organisational actors engage 
in a process to accommodate their differences which can be described as joint 
decision-making and joint action (Rogers and Whetten 1982). Most commonly
26
For a  sum m ary o f  these factors see, for exam ple, C am pbell and  Peters (1 9 8 8 ); C hisholm  
(1 9 8 9 );  Davis (1 9 9 5 ); G oetz (2 0 0 3 ); Hayward and W right (2 0 0 2 ); Peters (1 9 9 8 );  R ogers and
W h etten  (1 9 8 2 );  Seidm an (1 9 8 0 ).
27
C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 );  Davis (19 9 5 ); H an f and  Scharpf (1 9 7 8 ); Hayward an d  W right (2 0 0 2 );  
Peters (1 9 9 8 );  R ogers and  W hetten  (1 9 8 2 ). T h e term  ‘in stitu tion’ is used  h ere to  refer to a  
‘govern m en t in stitu tion ’ (C am pbell and Peters 1988 , p. 19 ), its organisation  an d  structure, 
in c lu d in g  form al rules and standard operating practices. T his d efin ition  d oes n o t  im ply a  
rejection  o f  m ore ex ten d ed  n otion s o f  institutions such  as com prising ‘the w hole range o f  state 
an d  societal institutions that shape how  political actors d efin e their interests an d  that structure  
their  relations o f  powers to o th er groups’ (Steinm o, T h elen  and L ongstreth  1992 , p. 2 ) , but 
rather reflects th e lim ited  scope and purpose o f  this study. In ord er to clearly d isaggregate the  
E u rop ean  C om m ission  as an overall entity from  the d ifferen t e lem en ts (i.e . DGs e t  cetera) it is 
co m p o sed  of, DGs are term ed ‘organisations’ or  ‘organisational actors’ and the C om m ission  as
su ch  is referred to as an institution.
28
A lso se e  Hayward and  W right (2 0 0 2 ); Peters (1998a); R ogers and W h etten  (1 9 8 2 ).
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called ‘coordination’, this political process has been conceptualised as being 
‘undertaken by an organization or an interorganizational system to concert the 
decisions and actions of their subunits or constituent organizations* (Alexander 
1993» P- 33 0  and as seeking ‘to manage the conflicts that may be anticipated or 
do actually emerge in a context of interdependence between the policy actors’ 
(e.g. Hayward and Wright 2002, p. 20).
Coordination is aimed at preventing, avoiding and repressing conflict and
•  29promoting the development of consensus in an institution or organisation. In 
other words, coordination represents a response of organisational actors to the 
fragmentation of their institutional environment. The management of
30coordination varies, for example across policy sectors and countries. In this 
context, higher levels of fragmentation and conflict among organisational 
actors have been said to make coordination more difficult to cope with and 
therefore ‘fragmented’ institutional behaviour more likely. Coordination 
encompasses a variety of activities including procedures, rules, routines and 
standard operating practices. The literature draws a basic distinction between 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ ways or mechanisms of coordination. Formal 
coordination centres on obligatory procedures and the principle of hierarchy 
(i.e. coercion and imposition), whereas informal coordination implies various 
consensus-building activities that take place in less ‘formalised’ arenas, for
31example ad-hoc working groups and personal conversation among officials. In 
‘multi-organisational’ environments, most decisions are made on the basis of a 
mix of these different forms of coordination.
The concept of policy coordination can be applied to the European 
Commission and offers an excellent tool to conceptualise the processes that go 
on within. Apart from few exceptions (Metcalfe 1996 and 2000; Peters 2001), 
the concept has been ignored in the context of the European Commission thus 
far, even though the term ‘coordination’ has occasionally been used to
29
Hayward and  W right (2 0 0 2 ); M etcalfe (1 9 9 4 ); Scharpf (1 9 9 7 ).
30
E.g. C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 ); Davis (1 9 9 5 ); Hayward an d  W right (2 0 0 2 ); Kassim e t  al. (2 0 0 1 );  
Peters and W right (2 0 0 1 ); Peters, R hodes and W right (2 0 0 0 );  R ogers an d  W h etten  (1 9 8 2 ).
31
A lexan d er (1 9 9 3 ); C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 ); Davis (1 9 9 5 ); H a n f and Scharpf (1 9 7 8 );  Hayward and  
W right (2 0 0 2 ); L indblom  (1 9 6 5 ); Peters (1 9 9 8 ); Scharpf (1 9 9 7 ); Seidm an (1 9 8 0 );  S im on  
(1997>-
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•  32characterise Commission policy-making. A central assumption underlying my 
study is that the Commission is a fragmented institution, i.e. a ‘multi­
organisation’, composed of a plurality of actors that are interdependent and 
that engage in coordination. The Commission is divided into a political and an 
administrative realm and on its administrative level characterised by the 
compartmentalisation and functional specialisation of different Directorates 
General (DGs). The different DGs maintain distinct tasks and pursue their own 
policy agendas (see below). At the same time, they are interdependent because 
their responsibilities tend to overlap and procedures require them to mutually 
consult each other rather than solving conflict solely by means of hierarchy and 
coercion. The situation of plurality and interdependence leads to an 
environment of general uncertainty in which conflict and debate are likely to 
emerge and to which the DGs react by means of coordination activities. The 
higher the level of fragmentation and conflict, the less likely that conflict is 
overcome. The following section relates the general insights on fragmentation 
and coordination to the central questions posed in the thesis.
Research question and design
As previously stated, the phenomenon of fragmentation of the Commission 
encompasses several dimensions. In order to define fragmentation more clearly, 
to explain how it takes effect and to show how it varies I have chosen one aspect 
of fragmentation: its organisational dimension as it occurs on the administrative 
level of the Commission. The central research question addressed in the thesis 
is how this ‘administrative fragmentation’ affects the Commission’s legislative 
outputs, i.e. whether and how it prepares and proposes EU legislation. In the
32
S ee, for exam ple, C hristiansen (2001a); Cini (1 9 9 6 ); C oom bes (1 9 7 0 ); H arcourt (1 9 9 8 );  
Hayward and M enon  (2 0 0 3 ); M azey and R ichardson (1 9 9 7 ); S p en ce (1 9 9 7 );  Stevens (2 0 0 1 ) .  
W h ile som e work has b een  d o n e  on  form al coordination  procedures, such  as the coord inative  
fu n ction s o f  the Secretariat G eneral or the Legal Service less is know n ab out m ore in form al ways 
o f  coord ination , such  as bargaining (Christiansen 2001a; Cini 1996; C oom bes 1970; L udlow  
1991; N u gen t 2001; Stevens 2 0 0 1 ). A lthough  a n um ber o f  contributors have ack n ow led ged  that 
in form al consensus-build ing is o f  pivotal im portance in  the European C om m ission , th ere has 
b e e n  little em pirical work with the excep tion  o f  research in to  the inform al ch an n els  o f  
in flu en ce  used  by C om m ission President Jacques D elors d uring  th e 1980s (C ini 1996; Laffan  
1997; M etcalfe 1996; M iddlem as 1995; Peterson 1999; Ross 1995 ).
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following paragraphs, the explanatory and the dependent variable are narrowed 
down and defined.
The administrative fragmentation of the European Commission
In the literature, associations with the ‘fragmentation’ of institutions are often 
normative. In the words of Chisholm (1989, p. 13-14), the term implies 
‘breakage, disconnection, incompleteness, and disjointedness, terms that 
presuppose that an entity once whole has been broken up’ (also see Rogers and 
Whetten 1982). However in this thesis the term ‘fragmentation’ is used in a 
neutral way to describe the European Commission as being decomposable into 
different organisational actors, for example DGs and the cabinets. I concentrate 
on the fragmentation of the Commission as occurring on its administrative 
level. The European Commission holds an array of powers that include 
implementation responsibilities, the external representation of the European 
Union, and the legal guardianship of the Treaties. The preparation of 
legislation which is widely acknowledged to represent a cornerstone of the 
Commission’s activities and which is the focus of this study is falls within the 
responsibility of different Directorates General (DGs) all of which are organised
33on the administrative level.
The focus on fragmentation occurring on the administrative level of the 
European Commission does not reflect an ignorance of the enormous (and 
much better documented) significance of Commissioners and cabinets for the 
process of preparing and ultimately deciding on legislative proposals. The 
choice of the level of analysis has foremost been governed by my interest in 
administrative policy-making and by the fact that ‘few Commission initiatives are 
launched, few Commission proposals are made, and few Commission decisions 
are taken before they are extensively examined and, ultimately, approved by the 
services [i.e. the DGs]’ (Nugent 2002, p. 142). A majority of policy initiatives 
originate directly from DGs and even when they are launched on cabinet or
33
E.g. Christiansen (2001a); Cini (1 9 9 6 ); Edwards and S p en ce (1 9 9 7 ); N u g en t (2 0 0 1 );  Peters  
(1 9 9 4  and 2 0 0 1 ).
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54Commissioner level, the bulk of drafting work is undertaken in the DGs. 
Hence, any decision taken by cabinets and Commissioners depend on decisions 
previously taken on DG level. Nor does the focus on the Directorates General 
imply that the positions of and the influence taken by cabinets and 
Commissioners on the DGs must be ignored, but rather allows the analysis to 
take account of the fact that DGs act on the instructions of ‘their’ respective 
cabinets and/or Commissioners or, more indirectly, that they may act in 
anticipation of their preferences and positions. Also no claim is made to explain 
the evolution of EU legislation as such since the process of inter-institutional 
negotiations lies outside the scope of this study, taking place after the 
Commission has concluded its agenda-setting role and involving other EU 
institutions.
In terms of the organisational fragmentation occurring on the 
Commission’s administrative level, the most determining feature is the 
functional specialisation of the individual DGs. The European Commission is 
comprised of 24 different organisations or services that support the work of the 
so-called ‘political’ level of Commissioners and their cabinets. While a small 
number of services take on coordinative or horizontal functions, most services 
are so-called Directorates General (DGs) that maintain functional
35responsibilities for policy sectors or issues. This has led a number of authors to 
call DGs ‘quasi-ministries’, i.e. ‘the organisational equivalent of government
36ministries in domestic administrations’ (Hix 1999, p. 37). While not ignoring 
that each DG is sub-divided into various departments and units each of which 
may develop its own organisational identity, I focus on the DGs as organisational 
actors that take responsibility for distinct policy sectors and the legislative 
initiatives associated with these. In most cases, one DG takes lead responsibility 
for a legislative dossier and at least one other DG participates in the preparation 
process. DGs not only undertake different tasks, but also maintain different
34
E.g. C ini (1 9 9 6 ); N u gen t (2 0 0 2 ); Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
35 . . .  
For exam p le, DG Agriculture deals with agricultural policy, w hereas D G  C om p etition  is
responsib le for applying EU com p etition  law. For detail o n  the fun ction s o f  th e L egal Service
an d  the Secretariat G eneral see, for exam ple, C hristiansen (2001a); Cini (1 9 9 6 );  C oom b es
(1 9 7 0 );  Ludlow  (1 9 9 1 ); N u gen t (2 0 0 1 ); Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
36 A lso see  Christiansen (2001a); M ichelm ann (1 9 7 8 ); Page (1 9 9 5 ); S p en ce (1 9 9 7 ).
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missions and agendas. This is the result of many factors, the most important 
being institutional affiliation which is linked to the pre-defined functions and 
tasks (see below).
In spite of their different responsibilities and agendas DGs do not operate as 
autonomous entities, but depend on each other and are required to co-operate. 
There are various reasons for this, the most important being that internal 
decision-making rules require mutual consultation on legislative initiatives (see 
Chapter Two for detail). Furthermore, most (if not all) policy issues stretch 
beyond neatly defined sectoral boundaries (Peters 1998) and therefore usually 
prompt the participation of more than one DG. In the European Commission, 
the tendency towards interdependence is further intensified by the fact that 
DGs tend to be somewhat more specialised than national ministries and that the
37overlapping of policy responsibilities therefore occurs more frequently. The 
preparation of legislation can therefore be conceptualised as a process of co­
operation, collaboration, and coordination among different Directorates 
General through which they respond to a given situation of fragmentation.
While administrative fragmentation is a universal feature of legislative 
policy-making in the European Commission, its actual level varies with each case 
of legislative policy-making and so do its effects on legislative outputs. In order 
to assess the level of administrative fragmentation and to analyse its impact, I 
have chosen three indicators: the number of DGs that actively participate in the 
preparation of a legislative initiative (or ‘dossier’); the extent to which these 
DGs differ over the ‘paradigm’ of legislation; and the extent to which they
38compete for authority over the initiative. The choice of these indicators has 
been inspired by the literature on policy coordination which claims that 
coordination is more difficult to handle the greater the number of
Tw o obvious exam p les are telecom m u n ication s and en ergy  that, in  m any m em b er states, fall 
u n d er  the authority o f  the econ om ics ministry, whereas in  th e E uropean C om m ission, th ey  each  
have their ow n D irectorate G eneral. See E geberg (2 0 0 2 ); H ix  (1 9 9 9 ); Page (1 9 9 7 );  Peters  
(1 9 9 4  and 20 0 1 ); R ichardson (1 9 9 6 ).
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In reality, d ifferen ces o n  paradigm  an d  com p etition  for authority m ay overlap. For exam p le, 
w hat seem s like a d isagreem en t o n  the substance o f  a legislative initiative m ay in  fact re flec t an  
underlying struggle for authority. W hile o n e  m ight com b in e th e two indicators to  assess the  
overall ‘d istance’ b etw een  th e DGs I find  it m ore useful to  k eep  them  apart for  analytical 
purposes.
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organisational actors, the more they compete for power and influence, and the
• • 39more they disagree on the definition of policy problems and solutions. The 
indicators allow us to conceptualise administrative fragmentation as running 
along a continuum and varying across policy sectors. In reality, we can always 
expect some degree of fragmentation as in the European Commission, there are 
no single-actor constellations nor are actors’ goals and views completely 
congruent.
The thesis takes fragmentation as an explanatory variable to analyse how it 
affects the legislative outputs of the Commission. Hence, it does not seek to look 
at the underlying causes of fragmentation or to explain why it varies. Doing so 
would represent an entirely different study which would have to examine a 
multitude of possible causes of fragmentation, for example national interests, 
interest groups as well as technological and economic developments. These 
factors have been shown to influence policy-making in the Commission and to
40influence the motivations and interests pursued by individual DGs. One could 
also think about the nature of the issues that affect a given situation of 
fragmentation because issues are important in understanding how decisions are
• 41made in institutions and bureaucracies (e.g. Peters 1998). Rather than 
uncovering the various possible causes of fragmentation my aim is to show how a 
given situation of fragmentation impacts on the Commission’s behaviour in the 
legislative process. Insofar as other factors affect a given situation of 
fragmentation they can be expected to influence Commission behaviour and 
hence the overall EU policy process. Rather than stopping short at the notion
39
C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 ); H a n f and Scharpf (1 9 7 8 ); Hayward an d  W right (2 0 0 2 );  Peters (1 9 9 8 a );
Seid m an  (1 9 8 0 ).
40
S ee, for exam p le, Christiansen (1 9 9 7 ); Edwards and S p en ce (1 9 9 7 );  G reenw ood  (1 9 9 7 );  
M azey and  R ichardson (1994; Page (19 9 7 ); Peterson  and B om berg (1 9 9 9 ); R ichardson (1 9 9 6 );  
Ross (1 9 9 5 ); Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
41 For exam ple, som e policy issues cu t across a greater n u m b er o f  issue d im en sion s than  others  
an d  therefore provide for m ore scope for con flict and controversy than others. H ow ever, o n e  
m ust b e aware that the cross-cutting nature and, linked  to  it, the controversiality o f  issues are far 
from  b ein g  objective facts, b ut d ep en d  o n  the percep tions, interests, an d  m otives o f  the  
organisations and individuals that deal with them . As p o in ted  o u t by Peters (1 9 9 4 , p. 18), 
‘p olicy  issues d o  n o t d efin e them selves b u t rather are sh aped  through  co m p lex  soc ia l and  
political p rocesses’. A lso see Jachtenfuchs (1 9 9 6 ); K ingdon (1 9 8 4 ); Peters (1 9 9 8 ); S ch on  and  
R ein  (1 9 9 4 ).
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that such factors ‘matter’, the thesis allows for understanding the mechanisms 
whereby they influence the legislative process.
1) The number of DGs
The number of DGs that actively participate in the preparation of legislation is a 
crucial factor determining administrative fragmentation. According to the 
policy coordination literature, a greater number of organisational actors makes 
the reaching of agreement between them more difficult as more (and
42potentially more diverse) interests must be reconciled. While usually one DG 
takes formal responsibility for any legislative initiative, at least one other DG is
43associated. For most policy initiatives, a large number of DGs are formally 
associated, with more than twenty DGs not being uncommon. Significant 
variation occurs as regards the actual involvement of these DGs: usually, 
between one and four DGs submit detailed comments on draft documents and 
proposals to inter-service consultations and engage in a dialogue with the DG 
that keeps formal drafting responsibility, for example in inter-service 
committees or working groups. In accordance with formal procedures, the DG 
with drafting responsibility must consult with and try to obtain agreement from 
these other DGs before a legislative proposal can be passed on to formal 
decision-taking in the cabinets and the College of Commissioners (see Chapter 
Two for detail). The greater the number of DGs, the greater their plurality and 
interdependence.
2) Differences on the paradigm of legislation
The second indicator of administrative fragmentation is the extent to which the 
participating DGs consent or disagree on what I call the ‘paradigm’ of 
legislation. DGs may maintain different policy agendas and pursue different 
goals for each legislative initiative and, more generally, policy sector. A central
42
S ee C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 ); H an f and Scharpf (1 9 7 8 ); Hayward an d  W right (2 0 0 2 ); P eters (1 9 9 8 , 
p. 3 if .);  Seidm an (1 9 8 0 , p. i4 6 f .) .
43 T his is clearly in dicated  in  the official sources d ocu m en tin g  the C om m ission ’s legislative 
activities, for exam p le th e P relex Database w hich records the involvem ent o f  d ifferen t DGs back  
to the 1970s.
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claim found in the policy coordination literature is that greater differences 
among organisational actors make coordination more difficult to deal with 
because common ground and therefore the chances of reaching agreement are
44reduced. Based on the assumption that the views held in different DGs on 
policy problems and solutions are rarely completely congruent, I argue that 
conflict or debate over the details of legislative initiatives is a universal feature of 
Commission policy-making. Such debate may concern the scope of regulatory 
provisions, the setting of implementation periods, or the timing of publishing a 
legislative proposal. More fundamental variation occurs if there is dispute 
concerning the substance of and the need for EU legislation. First of all, DGs 
may differ over the primary objectives of legislation. For example, one DG may 
favour a detailed regulatory framework whereas another may speak in favour of 
proposing as little regulation as possible and instead relying on the self­
regulation of markets. Secondly, DGs may conflict on whether the Commission 
should propose legislation at all.
The positions of the DGs on these two aspects are the result of several 
factors, the most important one being institutional affiliation which is related to 
the pre-defined functions and tasks assigned to each DG (Allison and Zelikow
451999). As demonstrated in a number of case studies, such ‘soft ideology’ 
(Peters 1995, p. 179) underpins much of the daily work of DG officials, even at
46the lower levels of the hierarchy. To a lesser extent, the existence of 
‘departmental views’ (ibid.) may be conditioned by personalities, for example in 
the senior management of DGs, who maintain their own values and motives and 
‘different perspectives on appropriate policy responses’ (Page 1997, p. 135) or 
the views held by the Commissioner responsible. Furthermore, the views held in 
different DGs are significantly shaped and influenced by exogenous factors such 
as interest groups, expert committees, national representatives, as well as
44
H a n f and  Scharpf (1 9 7 8 );  Hayward and  W right (2 0 0 2 ); Peters (1 9 98a); Seidm an (1 9 8 0 ).
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For exam p le, th e E n vironm ent DG  is likely to have an o u d o o k  o n  en vironm en tal issues that is 
q uite d ifferen t from  that taken by DG  Industry, as the form er is tasked with p rom otin g  the  
p rotection  o f  the en v iron m en t w hereas the latter seeks to advance the com petitiveness o f  the
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For g o o d  case stud ies see, for exam ple, A rm strong and B ulm er (1 9 9 8 );  C ini (2 0 0 0 );  H o o g h e
(2 0 0 0 );  Ross (1 9 9 5 ).
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technological and economic developments. DGs may also vary in their positions 
and oudooks due to different ‘sub-cultures* resulting from the fact that officials
47are drawn from a variety of political and administrative cultures. However 
rather than analysing the underlying causes of the different positions and 
preferences that prevail in the DGs the primary aim is to uncover these 
positions and preferences and to analyse how they shape the process of policy 
coordination (see above).
3) The competition for authority
The third indicator concerns the extent to which the participating DGs compete 
for influence, control and competence over the legislative initiative, i.e. 
authority. According to coordination theories, greater competition for 
influence renders coordination more difficult to cope with since rivalry can be
48expected to dominate the search for consensus. The allocation of formal 
drafting responsibility to one DG does not rule out that other DGs dispute this
49authority and seek to increase their influence and power at its expense. Even if 
the allocation of the dossier is not disputed as such, the authority taken by a DG 
may be subject to conflict during the legislative process. Many legislative 
initiatives cover a whole range of regulatory issues or themes that are the 
responsibility or prompt the interest of several DGs. These DGs may conflict 
over which DG will lead the definition of the policy solution for the individual 
issues.
The legislative outputs produced by the European Commission
A key argument put forward in the thesis is that in order to understand how the 
European Commission operates, we need to dismiss the somewhat simplistic 
assumption that the Commission’s fragmentation automatically translates into
47
In this con text, the adm inistrative arm  o f  the European C om m ission  has o ften  b een  ca lled  a 
‘m ulticultural organ isation’, for exam p le d u e to its linguistic diversity. S ee C ini (2 0 0 0 );  
M cD onald  (2000); N u gen t (2 0 0 1 ); Page (1 9 9 7 ); Peters (2 0 0 1 ); S pence (1 9 9 7 ); R ichardson  
(1 9 8 2 ).
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‘fragmented’, i.e. slow and incoherent behaviour which is resistant to change 
(see above). In order to explain the variation in the Commission’s legislative 
policy-making I distinguish three categories of legislative outputs: the formal 
legislative proposals published by the Commission; the legal instruments it 
adopts; and the publication of consultative documents exploring the 
possibilities and options of EU-level legislation. As an initiator of EU legislation, 
the European Commission prepares and adopts formal draft legislation which 
takes the form of a draft directive or a proposal for some other kind of legal 
instrument (e.g. a regulation). Draft legislation is published and submitted to 
the EU institutions for hearings and voting. The European Commission may 
also adopt its own legal instruments, including Commission directives, decisions 
and regulations. These instruments are legally binding and do not require the 
approval of other EU institutions. In this context, the provisions of Article 86 
(ex-Article 90) of the Treaty empower the Commission to issue directives or 
decisions to Member State* in order to prevent them from introducing or 
maintaining measures contrary to the Treaty regarding public undertakings and 
enterprises being granted special and exclusive rights (see Chapter Two for 
detail).
In most cases, the drafting of legislation is preceded by a ‘preparatory stage’ 
during which the European Commission prepares and adopts documents of an 
explanatory or consultative nature, most commonly so-called ‘Green Papers’. 
These documents build an important part of the overall process of legislative 
policy-making because they indicate whether and for what reasons the 
Commission intends to propose legislation in a given policy domain. 
Furthermore, they set out the aims of future legislation and present timetables 
for drafting legislative initiatives. Being primarily addressed to interested 
outside parties that are invited to participate in a process of consultation and 
debate with the Commission, these consultative documents represent a routine 
way in which the European Commission ‘formalises’ (Cini 1996, p. 146) its 
agenda-setting function. Hence, I treat them as legislative outputs produced by 
the European Commission.
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In order to assess variation on legislative outputs, I have chosen three 
indicators of the European Commission’s legislative outputs: the duration of the 
process through which the Commission prepares and adopts a consultative 
document, a legislative proposal or legal instrument; the consistency of the 
propositions made from the initiation to the adoption of these documents; and 
the decision whether to propose legislation.
1) The duration of legislative policy-making
Empirical data reveal that the process which stretches from initiation to the final 
adoption (or abandonment) of a legislative initiative may take anything from a 
few months to several years. In my empirical analysis I show how high levels of 
administrative fragmentation are linked with slow legislative policy-making, 
whereas low levels can be associated with fast policy-making. The underlying 
explanation is that the more serious the conflict between the participating DGs, 
the more time they need to resolve it. While the end of the preparation process 
is rather easy to define by using the dates of formal adoption or abandonment 
of proposals and documents, one must be more careful about assessing the start 
of a legislative initiative. The European Commission may announce the taking 
of legislative action in a variety of ways, including announcements made by 
Commission officials in the press or in the Commission’s official 
documentation.50
2) The consistency of the Commission's legislative propositions
From initiation to the adoption of a legislative initiative, the provisions discussed 
in the European Commission may remain fairly stable or instead undergo a 
great deal of change. Sometimes the Commission adopts a legislative proposal 
which closely reflects the propositions made at policy initiation, usually by the 
DG holding formal drafting responsibility. Sometimes, the ‘official’ strategy 
pursued by the Commission may change several times. As will be shown, higher
50
Follow ing a  prelim inary data analysis, I ch ose to  use this kind o f  in form ation  rather than  
relying o n  speculation  and rum ours con ta ined  in  press reports or  the m em ory o f  interview ees. I 
ch o se  to use three d ifferen t categories o f  the duration: ‘sh ort’ (less than twelve m onths);  
‘m od era te’ (twelve to 24  m onths); and ‘lo n g ’ (m ore than 24  m on th s).
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levels of fragmentation provide a greater scope for incoherence than lower ones 
because more diverse possibilities are being discussed and a departure from 
initial propositions might be needed to win necessary approval among the 
Commission actors involved. In order to assess variation in the consistency of 
the Commission’s legislative propositions, I contrasted the propositions made
51for each legislative initiative at different stages of the preparation process.
3) The decision whether to propose legislation
The Commission usually concludes the initiation of legislation with adopting a 
legislative proposal or legal instrument, a decision which is often previously 
announced in a consultative document. Otherwise it would waste a considerable 
amount of scarce resources, notably staff, time and energy. The greater the 
difficulties to overcome a given situation of fragmentation and conflict, the 
more likely is that the decision whether to propose legislation is deferred or that 
the legislative initiative is abandoned altogether. The proposition of legislation 
is clearly marked by the publication of the relevant documents, whereas 
deferment and abandoning are either indicated in the Commission’s official 
documentation or by other kinds of information including, for example, press 
statements.
A qualitatively-oriented cross-sectoral study
In order to investigate and uncover the causal relationships between the 
variables under study, I conduct a qualitatively-oriented, in-depth comparison of 
the Commission’s legislative policy-making in two policy areas over a period of 
more than fifteen years. Existing attempts to explain decision-making in the
52European Commission have mostly been based on single case studies. While 
the cross-sectoral variation of the Commission’s policy-making has been widely 
acknowledged, less has been said about its underlying reasons and studies have
In  ord er to  d o  so, I analysed and  cross-checked several sources o f  evidence. D etail o n  the data  
I u sed  is provided  in  the A ppendix  o f  the thesis. F ollow ing a prelim inary data analysis, I use
three d ifferen t categories o f  the consistency: h igh , m oderate and low.
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largely avoided generalisations on how exactly the internal life of the
53Commission influences its policy outputs. An argument put forward here is 
that because different policy areas are characterised by distinct levels of 
administrative fragmentation they face different problems of policy 
coordination that lead to different legislative outputs. The two chosen policy 
domains are the telecommunications and the audiovisual sector. They have 
primarily been chosen with a view towards their variation in relation to the 
explanatory variable, i.e. administrative fragmentation, but also because a 
number of factors make them interesting subjects for a cross-sectoral study.
Both the telecommunications and the audiovisual sector are high-tech 
sectors with an enormous economic potential and on the national level, there 
have been far-reaching regulatory changes affecting them: during the 1980s, 
member states started to abolish state monopolies and systems of public service 
and replaced them with systems of regulated competition (for detail see 
Chapter Two). The European Commission started to prepare and propose 
legislation in the two sectors in the mid-1980s, basing most pieces of legislation 
on the reasoning and the legal foundations of the Single European Market 
(SEM) project. In both policy sectors, the regulatory issues addressed by the 
Commission cut across a number of issue dimensions and often were politically 
sensitive ones that attracted controversy across the entire spectrum of sectoral
54interests, including member states (see Chapter Two). This led the European 
Commission to address similar themes of legislation, for example market 
opening and liberalisation, a harmonisation of market conditions and 
facilitation of cross-border investment and trade, as well as regulation designed 
to safeguard the so-called ‘public interest’ (e.g. user rights).
In this context, it needs to be stated that the thesis does not attempt to 
explain the evolution of EU telecommunications and audiovisual policies as 
such. The development of these policies has been characterised by a multitude 
of factors, such as Treaty provisions and the case law of the European Court of
53
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Justice, negotiations in the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and 
other EU institutions, business and user lobbying, technological developments, 
and external events. The scope of the analysis is limited to tracing how the 
Commission’s legislative proposals evolved for the two policy areas and how the 
outcomes of this process can be explained by variation in administrative 
fragmentation.
Against the background of far-reaching changes taking effect on the 
national, international and EU levels, the chosen policy sectors reveal 
considerable variation on the indicators of my chosen independent variable, i.e. 
administrative fragmentation. The overall picture is one of a high level of 
administrative fragmentation in the audiovisual field and a considerably lower 
level in the telecommunications sector. Distinct arrays of DGs took over 
responsibility for the preparation of legislation in the two fields -  these differed 
not only in terms of the numbers of DGs, but also in the extent to which there 
existed differences on the paradigm of legislation and competition for 
authority. In telecommunications, two DGs (DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms) determined the preparation of legislation for the entire period 
under study with other DGs being either not interested or limiting their actions 
to a minimum. In contrast to this stable pattern, the audiovisual domain was 
characterised by increasing numbers of DGs. While during the 1980s, their 
number was also limited to two (DG Culture and DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs), it doubled to four in the early 1990s to include DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms, and further increased to five in the late 1990s 
to involve DG Industry.
While in both policy domains, a debate occurred among the DGs 
concerning the details of legislative provisions, considerable variation can be 
observed in terms of the differences on the paradigm of legislation and the 
competition for authority. In telecommunications, DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms agreed on the need for and the primary objectives of legislation and 
they were in basic consent to share authority for telecommunications issues. DG 
Competition took responsibility for liberalisation and market opening, whereas 
DG Telecoms concentrated on issues of re-regulation. Both DGs accepted that 
EU legislation would be based on a combination of market opening with re-
4 0
regulatory harmonisation that would guarantee fair market conditions and user 
rights. In the audiovisual field, a similar level of agreement prevailed at first. 
During the 1980s, DG Culture and DG Internal Market were in accordance to 
share authority for audiovisual legislation by allocating liberalisation and market 
opening to DG Internal Market and by assigning re-regulation to DG Culture. 
They also agreed on the primary objectives of legislation, consisting of a mix of 
liberalisation and re-regulation. The situation radically altered when in the early 
1990s DG Competition and DG Telecoms joined the policy arena to express 
entirely different positions on the need for and the objectives of legislation and 
to challenge the established allocation of authority.
The empirical analysis reveals how the different configurations of 
administrative fragmentation relate to different legislative outputs produced by 
the Commission. While in the telecommunications sector, the DGs were able to 
overcome debate on the details of legislation, they were much less able to do so 
in the audiovisual domain where conflict persisted or intensified. In the 
telecommunications sector, the participating DGs acted rapidly and coherendy 
during the entire period under study and were able to produce a large number 
of consultative documents, legislative proposals and legal instruments. In the 
audiovisual field, the DGs involved needed more time to develop legislation, the 
Commission changed propositions more frequently and proposed fewer pieces 
of legislation. Moreover, at several occasions the Commission deferred decision- 
taking or abandoned legislative initiatives altogether.
The methodological approach is qualitative and uses process-tracing of the 
major legislative initiatives taken by the European Commission in the 
telecommunications and the audiovisual sectors from the early 1980s to the
55year 2000. The empirical analysis is divided into three periods that roughly 
coincide with major phases of legislative policy-making underway in the 
Commission. The first phase reaches from the early 1980s when legislation was
55
Given the scop e o f  this thesis, financial support initiatives, R&D program m es an d  ‘soft law’ 
(i.e . n on-b in d ing  instrum ents) are exc lu d ed  from  the analysis as are regulatory initiatives w hich  
are con sid ered  o f  m inor im portance (such as num berin g  an d  ad dressing in  
te lecom m u n ication s). For a defin ition  o f  telecom m u n ication s and  audiovisual policy  
respectively see  C hapter Two. S ince the year 2 000 , th e E uropean C om m ission  has en tered  
an oth er p hase o f  policy-m aking w hich is still in  progress in  b oth  sectors an d  th erefore ou tside  
th e scop e o f  this study.
4 1
first initiated to 1989 when the Commission concluded the preparation of 
legislative proposals aimed at introducing limited liberalisation and regulatory 
harmonisation. The second stage begun in 1990 when the Directorates General 
set out to develop further the Commission’s policy strategy and to expand 
legislation by drafting major policy initiatives. During this period which lasted 
until 1996, the Commission prepared several pieces of legislation aimed at 
further opening telecommunications and audiovisual markets and establishing 
minimum rules to ensure fair market conditions and to safeguard the interests 
of users. In 1997, the European Commission entered another phase of 
legislative policy-making. In the context of converging media, 
telecommunications and computer technologies Commission DGs started to 
develop regulatory approaches to deal with these changes in both policy areas. 
This phase ended around 2000 with the adoption of legislative proposals aimed 
at consolidating and simplifying the existing legislative frameworks.
The evidence presented in the empirical analysis is based on several sources 
of primary material: official documentary sources published by the European 
Commission, press reports, interviews, and unpublished documentary sources 
produced by the Commission DGs. The starting point for gathering empirical 
evidence was a close examination of published official sources, followed by an 
analysis of press cuttings. In order to collect missing information and to cross­
check evidence in-depth interviews and, where needed, reference to 
unpublished Commission documents were used. Detail on the sources and 
samples of evidence is provided in the Appendix of the thesis.
Conclusion
Taking as a departure point to look into the ‘black box’ of the European 
Commission, the main question addressed in my thesis is how the internal 
divisions that characterise the Commission affect its policy-making behaviour. 
More specifically I ask how the organisational fragmentation on its 
administrative level, triggered by the functional specialisation of different 
Directorates General and the absence of a pre-defined course of policy-making, 
affects the ways in which its prepares and proposes legislation. From existing
42
contributions I take up the idea that in order to understand how the European 
Commission operates, how its sets policy agendas and takes decisions we must 
dismiss the popular image of the Commission being a single-minded actor and 
instead conceptualise the Commission as an arena which is composed of 
different actors that engage in a ‘pluralist process’ (Peters 2001) to coordinate 
their actions. I argue that the fragmentation of the Commission has lacked a 
precise definition thus far and that there has been little account taken of the 
ways in which it actually manifests itself and how it varies across policy areas and 
over time. Hence, the central aim pursued in this study is to select a single, but 
crucial aspect of fragmentation and to analyse how it takes effect and how it 
varies.
Using insights from the concepts of policy coordination that are derived 
from the Public Administration literature I conceptualise legislative policy­
making in the European Commission as a process of coordination among 
different organisational actors (i.e. Directorates General) that maintain distinct 
tasks and interests and therefore inevitably engage in conflict and debate. These 
actors find themselves not only in a situation of plurality, but also one of 
interdependence because decision-making rules require them to collaborate 
and to consult each other. In order to accommodate their differences they 
engage in a process of coordination which is characterised by different activities 
designed to accommodate, repress and resolve conflict.
Selecting as the explanatory variable the fragmentation which occurs on the 
administrative level of the European Commission, I use three different 
indicators to assess what I call ‘administrative fragmentation’: the number of 
DGs that actively engage in legislative policy-making; the differences that exist 
between them as regards the primary objectives and the actual need for 
preparing Community legislation; and their competition for authority over 
identifying policy problems and solutions. The legislative outputs produced by 
the European Commission are operationalised using three indicators: the 
duration of legislative policy-making; the consistency of the Commission’s 
legislative propositions; and whether the Commission actually proposes 
legislation, defers or abandons doing so.
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I analyse the impact of administrative fragmentation in a qualitatively- 
oriented in-depth comparison of the Commission’s legislative activities in two 
policy areas over a period of more than fifteen years. The two domains are the 
audiovisual and the telecommunications sector and were both subject to 
extensive legislative efforts undertaken by the European Commission that 
combined liberalisation with re-regulation. While several background 
conditions make the two sectors interesting subjects for a cross-sectoral 
comparison they are characterised by significant variation in the explanatory 
variable under study, i.e. administrative fragmentation. While the 
telecommunications sector was characterised by low levels of fragmentation over 
a long period of time, the audiovisual field saw a significant increase of 
fragmentation over the years. The empirical analysis will show how in both 
sectors the different levels of administrative fragmentation translated into 
distinct scenarios of coordination and correlated with legislative outputs.
Conceptualising the European Commission as a fragmented policy-making 
institution whose constituent parts are in conflict but try to collaborate and 
coordinate challenges existing views of role of the Commission, including that 
of a ‘supranationalist’ and unified ‘competence maximizer’ as well as that of a 
blocked and inefficient policy-maker. While conflict and fragmentation are 
universal features of the Commission’s policy-making, variation concerns 
whether and how they are overcome. Showing how administrative 
fragmentation affects the Commission’s legislative outputs, the analysis uncovers 
the different roles the Commission is capable of playing under different 
circumstances. Hereby the thesis challenges existing views not only of the 
Commission, but also of how the overall EU policy process operates.
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Chapter Two: The Context o f 
Organisational Decision-Making 
in the European Commission
Introduction
The present chapter has got two purposes. First, it sets out the institutional and 
procedural framework underpinning the preparation of legislation in the 
European Commission. The aim is to show that in the course of legislative 
policy-making the Commission DGs find themselves in a situation in which they 
are required to balance their individual organisational interests with the 
requirements posed by formal procedures and commonly used ‘rules of the 
game’. The chapter provides detail on the functional specialisation of and the 
internal structure of the Commission Directorates General (DGs) as well as on 
the procedures that shape legislative policy-making in the European 
Commission. It is argued that the processes that drive the preparation of 
legislation on the Commission’s administrative level are less fixed and rule- 
bound than the hierarchical structure of the Commission may suggest. 
Although preparing legislation usually follows established ‘codes of practice’, 
routines and ‘rules of the game’ the course of legislative policy-making is not 
entirely predictable, but depends on the behaviour of different DGs and their 
use of these different rules and routines. The DGs maintain a significant scope 
of flexibility and discretion they may use to actively shape the course of policy 
coordination.
The second theme of the chapter is to establish the context in which the 
European Commission placed its audiovisual and telecommunications policies. 
In order to avoid presenting an over-whelming amount of detail in the
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empirical chapters I sketch out central developments in the two policy areas that 
shaped the Commission’s legislative policy-making. Besides a definition of the 
boundaries of the two policy domains I provide an account of the background 
against which the Commission placed its legislative activities, including the 
traditional models of national regulation and the developments that posed 
challenges to them, the legal foundations of Community legislation and its
56major themes. In order to indicate the variation which can be observed on the 
central explanatory variable, i.e. administrative fragmentation, the chapter 
provides an overview of the Directorates General that engaged in preparing 
legislation in the two sectors under study. This includes a summary of their 
functions, tasks and general missions as well as their respective policy agendas 
for the telecommunications and audiovisual area. I show that while initially 
similar levels of administrative fragmentation prevailed in the two sectors, the 
situation fundamentally changed in the early 1990s due to a significant increase 
of fragmentation in the audiovisual field. A brief section at the end of the 
chapter provides some concluding remarks, pointing to the general and sector- 
specific conditions that underpin the Commission’s legislative policy-making in 
the two policy domains under study.
The organisation and procedures o f the European Commission 
The institutional setting
A central assumption put forward in this study is that the European Commission 
is a complex institution which is divided or fragmented across several 
dimensions (see Chapter One). On its organisational dimension, the most 
obvious sub-division is that into an administrative and a political arm. The so- 
called political level comprises the Commissioners and their support staff, the 
cabinets. Commissioners ultimately adopt all major initiatives and decisions the 
Commission takes, usually based on preparatory work undertaken in the
Sticking to com m on  practice, the term s ‘EC’ and .C om m unity’ are u sed  w hen  referring to the  
p eriod  prior to th e 1992 Treaty o n  the E uropean U n io n  an d  ‘E U ’ for  th e p eriod  since.
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57administrative services. The cabinets assist their respective Commissioners and
58usually consist of six or seven staff. The second arm of the European 
Commission is composed of the administrative sendees, the focus of my study. In 
several respects, this realm of the European Commission resembles a classic
59Weberian bureaucracy as many of its organisational principles are hierarchical. 
The European Commission’s administrative services are organised into 
departments, similarly to national civil service being organised into ministries 
(e.g. Spence 1997). Most services are Directorates General (DGs) with sectoral 
policy responsibilities (e.g. for agriculture, environment, and competition
00
policy) and operating according to the principle of functional specialisation.
Other services exert functions of a more horizontal or ‘coordinative’ nature, the
01
most important ones being the Secretariat General and the Legal Service.
The internal structure of all these services resembles a classical hierarchy
02
(see Figure 1). Each DG is headed by Director General whose primary task is
C om m issioners are ap p oin ted  for five-year term s in  a com p licated  p roced u re involving the  
E uropean Parliam ent and the m em ber states. C om m issioners h o ld  p olicy  portfo lios sim ilar (but 
necessarily con gru en t) to the DGs. T h e so-called C ollege o f  C om m issioners is ch aired  by the  
C om m ission  President as a primus inter pares. T h e  m ost im portant p rin cip le associated  with the  
C ollege is the princip le o f  collegiality, im plying that the C om m issioners take collective  
responsibility and that individual C om m issioners m ust form ally act in  the n am e o f  the European  
C om m ission  rather than in  their individual capacity. See, for exam p le, N u g en t (2 0 0 1 )  for  
detail.
58
W ork in the cabinets is usually organised accord ing to an  internal division o f  labour, w ith each  
m em ber assum ing responsibility for particular aspects o f  their respective C om m issioner’s work. 
Cabinet m em bers also provide an im portant link betw een  C om m issioners an d  their DGs. For 
detail see, for exam p le, Cini (1 9 9 6 ); Edwards and S pence (1 9 9 7 ); N u g en t (2 0 0 1 );  Stevens
(2 0 0 1 ).
59
E.g. Page (1997); Peters (1995); Spence (1997).
60
E.g. M etcalfe (1 9 9 4 ); N u gen t (2 0 0 1 ); Peters (2 0 0 1 ).
61
T h e Secretariat G eneral is tasked to ensure that the C om m ission is w orking effectively and  
that its com p osite  units coord inate their activities, for exam p le by con ven in g  form al inter-service 
m eetin gs. T h e Legal Service k eeps responsibility for en su rin g  that th e proposals drafted  and  
action  undertaken  by the C om m ission are legally correct an d  represents th e E uropean  
C om m ission  in  legal action  at th e European C ourt o f  Justice. For detail o n  th e L egal Service and
th e Secretariat G eneral see, for exam p le, Edwards an d  S pence (1997); N u g en t (2 0 0 1 ) .
62
For several decades, the DGs used  to b e know n and called  by b oth  their n um bers an d  titles. 
For exam p le, the DG  for C om petition  u sed  to b e known as ‘D G  C om p etition ’ o r  ‘D G  IV’. 
T h rou gh ou t the past twenty years, the titles o f  som e DGs w ere ch an ged , m ostly b ecau se their  
p olicy  responsibilities w ere reduced , en larged  or m odified . For m any years, DG s w ere therefore  
m ost com m only  referred to in term s o f  their num bers (N u gen t 2 0 0 1 ) . S ince the inauguration  
o f  the Prodi C om m ission  in  S eptem ber 1999  and  the en su in g  attem pts to  ach ieve greater 
transparency and  public accessibility o f  the E uropean C om m ission, this practice has ch an ged . 
DGs are n ow  know n by their titles or abbreviations thereof. T h rou gh ou t the em pirical chapters,
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to manage his or her DG and to represent it both inside and outside the 
European Commission. All Directors General have senior staff to assist them, 
including deputies, senior assistants and advisors. Each DG is divided into three 
to six Directorates each of which is headed by a director. The Directorates take 
different responsibilities within those assigned to the DG and are divided into 
specialised divisions or units, usually between three and six in number. Units 
and divisions are headed by so-called Heads of Unit or Heads of Division. Each 
unit is staffed by approximately three to four staff.
Deputy Director 
GeneralAdvisor
Directorate B Directorate CDirectorate A Directorate ...
Unit 1 Unit 2 UnitUnit 1 Unit 2 U nit...Unit 1 Unit 2 U nit...
Director General
Figure 1 The Organisational Structure of a Directorate General 
Rules, procedures and routines
Among its many other functions which include implementation responsibilities 
and the external representation of the European Union, the preparation of 
legislation represents a cornerstone of the Commission’s activities. The 
European Commission keeps the sole right of formal initiative for most areas of 
legislation under the first pillar of the EU (except for few exceptions in justice
63and home affairs). The European Commission may propose three main forms
the DGs are referred to by the tides they had at the time, including indication of their numbers
in brackets or footnotes to avoid confusion. For the period after 19 9 9 , only the tides are used.
63
E.g. Christiansen (2 0 0 1 a); Cini ( 1 9 9 6 ); Edwards and Spence ( 1 9 9 7 ); Nugent (2 0 0 1 ); Peters 
( 1 9 9 4  and 2 0 0 1 ). The focus is on the ways in which the European Commission exerts its formal 
right of initiative does not reflect an ignorance of the fact that there are various origins of EU 
legislation. The Commission does not operate in a vacuum, but often takes up ideas and 
problems put forward by other EU actors and institutions. Peterson and Bomberg ( 1 9 9 9 , p. 3 8 )
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of legislation for adoption by the Council in co-operation with the European 
Parliament: Directives, Regulations and Decisions.64 Under special
circumstances, the Commission may also adopt its own Directives or Decisions 
following the procedures of Treaty Article 86(3) (ex-Article 90(3)) that provide 
an overlap between the Commission’s executive and legislative functions (see 
section two) .65
The process during which the European Commission’s administrative 
services develop and propose legislation is commonly called ‘agenda-setting’ 
(Peters 2001, p. 78-79) since it provides the basis for legislative decisions taken 
by other EU institutions. From a perspective focusing on the European 
Commission this process is itself ‘an incremental process* (ibid.) that comprises 
various stages, including agenda-setting and issue-definition, policy formulation, 
and decision-taking, and that takes shape at various levels (see Figure 2). Even 
though formal decision-taking is confined to the College of Commissioners, one 
must acknowledge that important decisions are made in the Commission well 
before. Commissioners and cabinets heavily rely on and usually decide on the 
basis of the preparatory work undertaken by the DGs to provide information 
and expert advice and to prepare legislative proposals and other relevant texts 
(Nugent 2002; Spence 1997). In this context, choices made by and within DGs 
structure all subsequent choices - even if the DGs simply anticipate the goals and 
preferences of their cabinets and Commissioners, for example when deciding 
whether to consider a policy issue or not. Since these choices shape the entire 
course of the legislative process it is vital to understand how they emerge.
provide a useful overview o f  the origins o f  C om m ission  proposals. N evertheless it is c lear that 
th e ‘op portu nities for the Com m ission to establish th e param eters w ithin  w hich  future  
discussion  takes p lace, and thus to in flu en ce final ou tcom es, are substantial’ (C ini 1996 , p.
. » » .
D ecision s are also b in d in g  in their entirety, but applicable on ly  to th ose m em b er states, 
corporate actors or  individuals they are addressed to. D irectives, th e m ost co m m o n  form  o f  
legislation  th e E uropean C om m ission p rop osed  in  the two sectors u n d er study, are ad dressed  to  
all m em ber states an d  b ind in g  in  the result to b e achieved , leaving it to  each  m em b er state to  
d ec id e  over the m ost appropriate form  and m eth od  o f  im p lem en tin g  its provisions in to  national 
law. For detail o n  the d ifferent legislative procedures see , for exam p le, H ix  (1 9 9 9 );  N u g en t  
(1 9 9 5 ; 2 001 , p. 2 6 5 ).
65
For a discussion see, for exam ple, Cini and  M cGowan (1 9 9 8 , p. i6 4 f .) ;  N u g en t (2 0 0 1 , p. 
2 6 5 ).
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Figure 2 Central Levels and Stages of Legislative Policy-Making in the European Commission
The actual drafting of proposals for directives or other legal instruments is 
usually preceded by a ‘preparatory stage’ during which the European 
Commission prepares documents of a consultative or explanatory nature, most 
commonly so-called ‘Green Papers’ or other Commission Communications. 
These consultative documents constitute an important part of the overall 
process of preparing legislation because they set out a number of possible policy 
options the European Commission might take (e.g. sector-specific regulation 
versus non-binding measures). Often they express clear Commission 
preference for one of these options and indicate policy guidelines and 
timetables for future action. These documents represent one way in which the 
European Commission ‘formalises’ (Cini 1 9 9 6 , p. 1 4 6 ) its agenda-setting 
function. Within the Commission, such documents are also of considerable 
importance. Because their provisions result from the consultations among the 
participating Commission DGs they reflect the preliminary results of policy 
coordination. For example by announcing the proposition of legislation and
indicating its central provisions they direct the future course of legislative policy-
. . 66
In this context it is important to note that it would be generally difficult for the Commission 
to justify a substantial change of its chosen course of action previously announced in a 
consultative document because the common norm among Commission officials is to avoid
50
The preparatory stage is followed by the drafting of legislative proposals and 
legal instruments. Following consultations with outside actors, Commission DGs 
engage in further defining and spelling out the Commission’s chosen course of 
action. Under the leadership of one, sometimes two DGs they prepare draft 
legislation which is intended for adoption by the College of Commissioners as 
either official draft legislation to be submitted to the EU institutions or a 
Commission instrument, for example a directive or a recommendation. The 
publication of draft legislation is often accompanied by another consultative 
document or explanatory memorandum that identifies the reasons for the 
Commission’s legislative strategy.
In order to analyse the preparation of legislation taking place on the 
administrative level of the European Commission, it is essential to understand 
the rules and procedures that govern this process. Whereas the composition 
and duties of the European Commission are set out in the Treaties, the ways in 
which the Commission must proceed in preparing and adopting draft legal 
instruments are prescribed by its internal rules of procedure (e.g. European
67Commission 2000) and related documents. These rules that have been 
amended several times over the past decades establish the rules of the game 
according to which Commissioners, cabinets and Directorates General are 
assigned their tasks and functions and the procedures they are asked to follow. 
While they make rather specific provisions for decision-taking in the College of 
Commissioners, they leave much more room for interpretation and discretion 
on the level of DGs. They simply ask the DGs that engage in the preparation of a 
legislative initiative to cooperate and to consult each other. Hence, for the DGs,
the formal rules only set framework conditions or ‘rules of the game’ (Hooghe
682000, p. 101) rather than a clear-cut procedure. Hence the progress of each 
dossier is unique and not predictable. The fact that there are only few 
enforceable procedures implies that codes, routines or rules may be adapted,
in con sisten cy  and  to d efen d  an official C om m ission policy collectively vis-a-vis o th er  EU
institutions and the public (e.g . Christiansen 2 0 0 1 ).
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For an  overview o f  these d ocu m ents see
h ttp ://w w w .e u r o p a .eu .in t/co m m /re fo r m /in d ex  e n .h tm .
68
As p o in ted  ou t by H o o g h e  (2 0 0 0 , p. 107 ), ‘C om m ission  officials are less ru le-bound  than is 
often  assum ed’.
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changed, circumvented or broken. At the same time, one needs to be aware that 
in most cases DGs and their sub-divisions stick to established rules and that the 
preparatory processes taking place on the administrative level broadly follow the 
same lines (Nugent 2001; Spence 1997). For example, early policy drafts are 
usually drawn up on lower levels of the hierarchy and then put forward to more 
senior policy-makers who are entitled to overrule previous decisions. The 
procedures provide for several, partly overlapping phases of policy formulation: 
the initiation and early drafting phase, the drafting phase, inter-service 
consultations, and decision-taking in the political arena of cabinets and
• • 69_Commissioners (see Figure 2). The following paragraphs provide an overview 
of these phases, including an indication of how much scope they offer for 
discretion and flexibility.
Initiation and early drafting phase
For any legislative initiative, no matter whether it takes the shape of a 
consultative paper, a formal policy proposal or a Commission instrument, 
responsibility is taken over by one, sometimes two DGs for what is commonly 
called a ‘file’ or ‘dossier’. No matter whether the initiative prompts a call made 
by the European Parliament or the Council or whether it originates from within 
the European Commission, the initial question to be solved is which DG is going 
to take responsibility for the file. In most cases, the decision on which DG takes 
possession of the dossier is a straightforward one, following directly from its 
general policy responsibilities and/or from its authority over previous dossiers
70(Cini 1996; Nugent 2001). Following the allocation of the dossier, the unit in 
the DG with drafting responsibility engages in the early drafting work of a 
consultative document and/or a legislative proposal. This is usually undertaken 
by a handful of staff, led by a Rapporteur in the unit responsible. Rapporteurs 
keep the director of their directorate informed about the progress of the dossier
69
A lthou gh  this final stage is n o t focus o f  the p resent study, the applicable procedures are 
briefly sum m arised h ere, m ainly for the reason  o f  com p rehensiveness, b u t also  b ecause the
d ifferen t stages are closely linked  and often  ten d  to overlap.
70
I f  the allocation  o f  dossiers to  a particular DG  is d ispu ted  by o n e  or m ore D G s the d ecision  o f  
w hich  organisation gets h o ld  o f  the file  is resolved through  the C om m ission  hierarchy, first on  
th e m ore sen ior DG level, and if  necessary, by the cabinets or  C om m issioners.
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and incorporate changes the latter may raise during the drafting process. The 
unit usually starts consulting with actors inside and outside the Commission, 
including national experts, lobbying groups, and independent consultants,
71both informally and in more formalised committees. When policy drafts reach 
a more advanced stage, they travel up the hierarchy of the DG up until they 
reach the Director General and his or her advisers who may make 
recommendations or raise objections. The draft travels up and down within the 
DG hierarchy with re-drafting usually taking place in the unit under the 
responsibility of the Rapporteur.
As there is no straightforward procedure prescribing the course of action for 
this first stage the DG with formal drafting responsibility has considerable 
discretion as regards how to proceed. For example, in order to weigh different 
options of action against each other and to explore the legal basis of a legislative 
proposal, the DG may commission a legal analysis or a study to outside experts 
or consultants. This may be followed by consultations with outside actors. 
Within the Commission, the DG may seek to coordinate its efforts with other 
DGs, for example by conducting preliminary consultations in ad-hoc or issue- 
related working groups or through personal contacts (e.g. electronic mail, 
telephone calls, face-to-face). The unit may also completely refrain from 
engaging in such consultations and proceed alone until it submits a more 
advanced draft text to formal inter-service consultations.
Inter-service consultations
The European Commission’s Rules of Procedure formally require the DG with 
drafting responsibility to coordinate its drafting efforts with other DGs. In 
practice, each DG that expresses an interest in the dossier may participate in the 
so-called inter-service consultations. The responsible DG usually circulates an 
advanced draft text to these DGs and the Legal Service, the latter being tasked 
to ensure that the dossier reaches all relevant DGs and that rules and timetables 
are complied with. The file usually includes a note stating that if no objections
71
For an overview see, for exam p le, Cini (1996); M azey an d  R ichardson (1997); S pence  
( 1 9 9 7 )-
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are raised within a specified number of days, it is assumed that there are no 
fundamental problems identified with the dossier and that it can be put forward 
for formal discussion among cabinets in its present form. If other DGs raise 
objections, they send their comments to the DG with drafting responsibility as 
well as to the cabinets involved. The unit responsible is not obliged to amend its 
proposals if other DGs object, but if it does not take up their recommendations 
it must attach a note to the file stating the objections raised by other DGs before 
it can be passed on to discussion and decision-taking in the cabinets and the 
College of Commissioners (see below).
Apart from this formalised written procedure, the DGs concerned with the 
dossier usually engage in inter-service groups, permanent working parties and 
other formal coordination meetings that are organised and supervised by the 
Secretariat General. At the same time, they often continue to coordinate in 
more informal ways similar to the early drafting phase (see above). It is at all 
these occasions that disputed provisions may be discussed and amendments 
suggested. Officials often choose to seek clearance from other DGs in informal 
arenas before draft texts enter more formal arenas. The main intention behind 
this is to avoid conflict and ‘politicization’ because it is commonly expected by 
Commission officials that an early involvement of the senior management of the 
DGs and the cabinets makes this stage more time-consuming and controversial 
(Nugent 2002; Spence 1997).
Formal decision-taking
After formal inter-service consultations have concluded, the DG with drafting 
responsibility prepares a draft text for submission to the Commissioner cabinets. 
Often this is not the first time that cabinets get involved as they often bring in 
their views before, particularly if DGs have difficulties to agree on a common 
policy strategy (see above). The draft text is then discussed by the cabinets, first 
in the special cabinets meetings which represent one member of each 
participating cabinet, then by the chefs de cabinets. Before the draft text reaches 
the College of Commissioners for decision, it may be sent back and forth 
between cabinets and the DG with drafting responsibility for modification and re­
54
drafting. The College votes by simple majority following predefined procedures, 
with votes being confidential and not made public. When it comes to voting, the 
College has several choices: it can accept the draft proposal, reject it, refer it 
back to the DG responsible for amendments, or defer taking a decision at all 
(Cini 1996; Nugent 2001).
The context o f the European Commission’s telecommunications and  
audiovisual policies
The empirical analysis examines the major legislative initiatives undertaken by 
the European Commission in the telecommunications and the audiovisual 
sector from the early 1980s to the year 2000. It would neither be reasonable nor 
feasible to include all pieces of EU legislation adopted by the Community in the 
two domains during this period because doing so would present us with an 
overwhelming amount of empirical detail and therefore make comparative 
assessments and arriving at generalisations rather difficult Instead I concentrate 
on the dominant themes of legislation addressed by the European Commission 
in the two policy areas under study. Because these themes were rather similar 
across the two sectors, they provide a useful framework for directing the 
empirical analysis.
From the start of legislative initiatives, the Commission DGs that engaged in 
preparing legislation for telecommunications and the audiovisual field primarily 
aimed at combining market opening and liberalisation with re-regulatory 
measures (see Table 1). Foremost this implied to expose restricted areas and 
services to competition, for example by opening telecommunications services to 
competition and by relaxing the prohibition of television advertising. Initially 
these efforts were limited to telecommunications and audiovisual equipment 
and services and later extended to cover the provision and operation of
72networks carrying these services. The second cornerstone of the Commission’s
72
E q uipm en t refers to  b oth  the network (lin es and sw itches) and the term inal eq u ip m en t  
(con su m er devices) co n n ected  to these networks (e.g . te lep h on es, m odem s, television  se ts). In 
each  sector, a variety o f  services are offered, such  as vo ice teleph ony, data com m un ication s, 
traditional television broadcasting, voice m ail, te lesh op p in g  an d  so  on . Infrastructure refers to  
the netw ork that carries these services, in clu d ing  cop p er wires, terrestrial transm ission o f  
broadcasting, satellites, broadband and cable television networks e t  cetera.
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legislative activities concerned the harmonisation of regulation. First, this was 
aimed at harmonising market conditions to facilitate cross-border investment 
and trade, to prevent the abuse of dominant positions and to promote the 
application of new technologies. For example, the Commission proposed 
similar conditions for service providers and operators concerning the access to 
networks, market entry, licensing, technical standards, criteria of ownership and 
market power. Secondly, re-regulation concerned the guaranteeing of user 
rights, for example universal service and the protection of audiences from 
harmful content - mostly in the name of the so-called ‘public interest’ and as a 
response of the two sectors’ significance for society.
Table 1 Examples o f the themes o f legislation addressed by the European Commission in the 
telecommunications and the audiovisual sector
them e telecom m unications sector audiovisual sector
market opening 
and liberalisation
■ liberalisation of terminal
equipment
■ liberalisation of
telecommunications services
■ liberalisation of
telecommunications
networks
■ liberalisation of advertising
■ liberalisation of television
networks
regulation of
market
conditions
■ access to network infrastructure 
■licensing conditions
■ interconnection and
interoperability
■ regulation of advertising
■ quotas for the broadcast of
television programmes of 
European and 
‘independent’ origin
■ rules limiting media
ownership
■ technical standards for the
transmission and reception 
of television broadcasts
regulation in the 
name of the 
public interest
■ universal service
■ affordability
■ number portability
■ protection of viewers from
harmful content (e.g. 
pornography and violence)
■ prohibition of certain types of
advertising
The focus on the dominant themes of legislation prepared for by the 
Commission implies that the analysis does not cover all issues emerging in the 
two sectors under study. Since the Commission has mostly defined audiovisual 
legislation in the context of regulating television, other audiovisual activities, for 
example radio broadcasting and cinema, are excluded from the scope of
56
73study. While other European Union institutions, notably the European 
Parliament, have often debated audiovisual policy with a view towards its 
cultural dimension, for example its significance for democracy, the freedom of 
opinion and pluralism, the European Commission has mostly treated
• 74audiovisual legislation from an economic perspective. It has concentrated on 
the significance of television for investment and trade and its role in achieving 
the SEM (Single European Market). The purely ‘cultural’ dimension of EU 
audiovisual policy is therefore excluded from the scope of the study. As regards 
the telecommunications sector, I exclude the regulation of issues I consider of 
minor importance, for example numbering, addressing and technical standards. 
As this study concentrates on the major pieces of binding legislation prepared 
by the European Commission, it excludes from its scope financial support 
programmes, R&D initiatives, and non-binding policy instruments (e.g. 
Resolutions and Recommendations). Nor are the Commission’s executive 
powers to rule on state aid, anti-competitive behaviour and the abuse of 
dominant positions under competition general law analysed.
The national traditions of television broadcasting and telecommunications
In most European countries, traditional monopolies dominated the audiovisual
75and the telecommunications sector until the late 1980s. In 
telecommunications, so-called PTOs (Public Telecommunications Operators) 
owned the network infrastructure, supplied terminal equipment and provided
As stated by th e European C om m ission, ‘television is our prim ary source o f  in form ation  and  
en ter ta in m en t W e each  sp en d , o n  average, up  to  three hours a day w atching news, sports, film s 
an d  o th er  program m es. T h e audiovisual sector provides o n e  m illion  E U  job s. It involves b ig  
com m ercia l interests and issues o f  cultural diversity, public service an d  social responsibility. 
Each national governm ent runs its own audiovisual policy, w hile the U n io n  sets ru les and  
gu id e lin es w here com m on  interests, like o p en  EU borders an d  fair co m p ed d o n , are co n ce rn ed ’ 
(h ttp ://w w w .e u r o p a .eu .in t/p o l/a v /o v e rv ie w  en .h tm ). In  th e literature, sim ilar claim s have 
b een  m ade, such  as that ‘the audio-visual sector in  the EC will usually refer to  TV an d  film
activities.’ (H itch en s 1999 , q u oted  in  G oldberg e t  al. 1998 , p. 5 ) . A lso see  C ollins (1 9 9 4 ).
74
For overviews see, for exam ple, C ollins (1 9 9 4 ); H offm ann-R iem  (1 9 9 6 );  H um phreys (1 9 9 6 );
W ard (2 0 0 2 ).
75
Britain was a n otab le excep tion  w here telecom m u n ication s started to  b e  liberalised  in  1981. 
For g o o d  overviews see  G rande (1 9 9 4 ); T hatcher (1 9 9 9 ).
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76all telecommunications services. Mainly because building and maintaining 
telecommunications networks required massive financial investment, 
telecommunications was considered a natural monopoly. PTOs were usually 
housed within national ministries for posts and telecommunications, their 
employees having civil servant status. They combined the functions of regulators 
and suppliers of networks and services. The audiovisual field was organised in a 
fashion similar to telecommunications. The transmission and provision of 
broadcasting was based on a public service broadcasting (PSB) system that 
operated as a quasi-monopoly, tasked to inform, educate and entertain the
77viewers. The most common means to finance these public service broadcasters 
was the license fee paid by the viewers. Using advertising as a means to finance 
broadcasting was either prohibited or strictly limited and the small number of 
available television channels and broadcasting services were based on the 
scarcity of frequencies.
In the late 1970s, both the audiovisual and the telecommunications sector 
started to undergo fundamental technological change. In telecommunications, 
the ‘microelectronic revolution’ (Grande 1994) and the emergence of new 
transmission modes (satellites, optic-fibre cables, broadband) entailed a greater 
capacity of telephone networks and led to the emergence of new 
communications services, for example high-speed facsimile, electronic mail,
78telex, and mobile telephony. The far-reaching technological changes created 
new market demands, prompting the entry of actors from the computer and 
data-processing sector and pressure exerted by companies wanting to use the 
new services and to develop their corporate networks. Profound technological 
changes also revolutionised the audiovisual sector. New technologies (satellite, 
cable) reduced the existing scarcity of frequencies and therefore increased the
79possibility to distribute new programmes and audiovisual services. New services
76
E.g. Eliassen and Sjovaag (1 9 9 9 ); N oam  (1 9 9 2 ); Sauter (1 9 9 7 ); S ch neider (2 0 0 1 );  S teinfield
e ta l .  (1 9 9 4 ).
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E.g. B arendt (1 9 9 3 ); Dyson e t  al. (1 9 8 8 ), H um phreys (1 9 9 6 ), Levy (1 9 9 9 ), N oam  (1 9 9 1 ) . A  
n otab le excep tion  was the U nited  K ingdom  w here com m ercial television  was in trod u ced  in
1954 . See, for exam p le, Crisell (1 9 9 7 ); H offm an-R iem  (1 9 9 6 ).
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E.g. Bauer e t  al. (1 9 9 4 ); Dyson and H um phreys (19 9 0 ); H um phreys an d  S im pson  (1 9 9 6 ).
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emerged, including interactive telematic services (e.g. tele-banking, tele­
shopping), video recording and digital television. This led private companies 
(e.g. publishers, the advertising and the film industry) to argue in favour of 
relaxing the so-far strict regulation of audiovisual broadcasting and to allow for 
more advertising on television programmes.
Together, the technological and economic pressures led many national 
experts and policy-makers to argue that greater competition was needed in the 
two sectors. Calls were made for greater competition, efficiency, and consumer 
choice and for making European telecommunications and television markets 
more competitive vis-a-vis US and Japanese firms. The technological and 
economic changes co-incided with a changing political climate that prevailed in 
many West European countries since the late 1970s, most prominently in
Thatcherite Britain, and the regulatory reforms that were associated with it to
80‘roll back the state*. From the early 1980s, national governments introduced
regulatory changes that were intended to open up the existing monopolies and
81to introduce liberalisation and more competition.
The emerging EC dimension
Up until the early 1980s, virtually no EC legislation existed in the
82telecommunications and the audiovisual sectors. Community-wide 
harmonisation was limited to issues such as mutual recognition of technical
80
E.g. Dyson e t  al. (1 9 8 8 ), Dyson and H um phreys (1 9 9 0 ), G rande (1 9 9 4 ), H um phreys and
Sim p son  (1 9 9 6 ).
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In  th e U n ited  K ingdom , the T hatcher governm ent started to liberalise the  
telecom m u n ication s sector in  1981 w hen  the T elecom m u nications A ct provided  for sp litting  
th e provision  o f  telecom m u n ication s from  that o f  postal services, created  the m on op olist, British 
T eleco m , as a separate governm ent-ow ned corporation  an d  in trodu ced  full com p etition  to the  
term inal eq u ip m en t m arket. Further legislative acts com p leted  the process o f  liberalisation  
(T h atcher 1 9 99 ). O ther W est European countries follow ed  in  the course o f  the 1980s, notably  
G erm any, France and  Italy that all in trodu ced  lim ited  steps to  liberalise their  
telecom m u n ication s sectors (N oam  1992).
Sim ilar developm en ts took  p lace in  the audiovisual field . Italy started to authorise com m ercial
television  broadcasting during the secon d  h a lf o f  the 1970s (Dyson e t  al. 1 9 8 8 ). O th er countries
so o n  follow ed, authorising private satellite and cable ch an nels an d  in trodu cing  advertising as a
means for private broadcasters to finance themselves (e.g. Fraser 1997; Harcourt 2002;
H um phreys 1996; N oam  1 9 91). So-called ‘d ual’ system s represen tin g  a co -ex isten ce o f
com m ercia l and p ublic service broadcasters em erged .
82
E.g. G oldberg e t  al. (1 9 9 8 ), H um phreys (1 9 9 6 ), Sandholtz (1 9 9 8 ), T h atch er (2 0 0 1 ).
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standards and mosdy took place in alternative (and mosdy intergovernmental)
83fora. No binding legislation was adopted. In the late 1970s, the European 
Commission started to develop several R&D programmes designed to promote 
new communications technologies and services, notably ESPRIT and RACE for 
the telecommunications sector, and the MEDIA Programme for the audiovisual 
field.84
The EEC Treaty made no mention of telecommunications. PTOs were 
generally thought to be protected by Article 86(2) (ex-Article 90(2)) which
85exempted the provision of public services from competition. Nor did the 
Treaty make any explicit provisions for the audiovisual field.86 Hence, the efforts 
undertaken by the European Commission during the 1980s to establish 
legislation in the two areas were based on a growing body of case law of the 
European Court of Justice which established the applicability of the Treaty of 
Rome to each policy area. In a number of decisions, the European Court of 
Justice ruled that telecommunications and audiovisual broadcasting represented 
economic activities carried out for remuneration and that they therefore fell
87under the Treaty of Rome.
In  th e telecom m u n ication s sector, im portant b od ies w ere the CEPT and  the IT U  (see  
S ch n eid er and W erle 1 9 9 0 ), w hereas for the audiovisual field , there w ere associations such  as 
the EBU (see G oldberg et al. 1998).
For g o o d  overviews see G oldberg e t  al. (1 9 9 8 ), P eterson  an d  Sharp (1 9 9 8 ), Sandholtz  
(1 9 9 2 ) , U n gerer an d  C ostello  (1 9 8 8 ).
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E.g. Sauter (1 9 9 7 ); S ch neider and W erle (1 9 9 0 ). It was n o t  b efore the entry in to  force o f  the  
Treaty o n  the E uropean U n io n  in  1993 that telecom m u n ication s was first explicitly  m en tio n ed  
in  T id e XII EC o n  Trans-European Networks (T E N ), providing specific objectives for  
telecom m u n ication s legislation , such as in tercon n ection , interoperability and access to
networks. For an overview see Sauter (1997, p. 18if.).
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T h ere has b een  a revision o f  the Treaty o f  R om e and  the estab lishm ent o f  a  ‘C ulture A rticle’
(Article 128) in the Maastricht Treaty which entered into force in 1993. The article established
a lim ited  com p eten ce  o f  the C om m unity in  cultural m atters by p rom otin g  a com m on  culture.
C oun cil d ecisions in  cultural m atters are to b e  taken unanim ously  rather than by qualified
majority voting. The ‘Culture’ Article has been of limited significance for Community regulation
o f  television  broadcasting as legislation  has b een  based on  eco n o m ic  aspects (e .g . G old b erg  et
al. 1 9 9 8 ). Finally, th e Treaty o f  Am sterdam  am en d in g  the Treaty o n  the E uropean  U n io n
in clu d ed  a P rotocol o n  th e System o f  Public Broadcasting in  the M em ber States, p rovid ing that
the Treaty provisions shall b e  w ithout prejudice to the com p eten ce  o f  M em ber States to  provide
for th e fu n d in g  o f  Public Service Broadcasting for the fu lfilm ent o f  the p ub lic service r e m it
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For the audiovisual sector, the m ost im portant ru ling was the so-called  ‘Saatchi’ case in  1974. 
T h e d ecision  over the d ispute that h in g ed  u p on  w hether broadcasting d id  fall u n d er th e  Treaty 
o f  R om e established that th e harm onisation  o f  legislation  fell u n d er the p roced u re o f  the  
approxim ation  o f  laws in  the con tex t o f  the com m on  m a rk et E.g. C ollins (1 9 9 4 );  G old b erg  et
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Following from case law several Treaty provisions have proven relevant to
the two sectors: Articles 23-31 (ex-Articles 30 -  37) on the free movement of
goods; Articles 43-55 (ex-Articles 52 -  66) on the freedom to provide services
and freedom of establishment; the competition law provisions of Article 81 (ex-
Article 85) on anti-competitive agreements, Article 82 (ex-Article 86) on the
abuse of monopoly positions and, of particular importance for the
telecommunications sector, Article 86 (ex-Article 90) which establishes the
88applicability of Treaty provisions to the public sector (see below). Prior to the 
entering into force of the SEA in 1986, no significant legislative measures were 
adopted by the Community. Under the SEA, regulatory harmonisation was 
based on Article 95 (ex-Article 100a) on the approximation of laws under 
qualified majority voting in the Council in co-operation with the European 
Parliament, whereas pure liberalisation measures rested on Article 86 (ex- 
Article 90) forbidding member states from introducing or maintaining 
measures contrary to the Treaty regarding public undertakings and enterprises
89granted special and exclusive rights.
The first attempts made by the European Commission to initiate legislation 
in the two policy areas did not originate directly from the Commission, but 
represented a response to the calls made by other Community institutions. In 
the late 1970s, the Council invited the Commission to draft policy guidelines for
al. (1 9 9 8 ); H um phreys (1 9 9 6 ). For the telecom m u n ication s sector, the so-called  ‘British
T e le co m ’ case established  the application  o f  EC com p etition  rules to th e p ub lic sector,
in clu d in g  telecom m unications. E.g. Sandholtz (1 9 9 8 ); Sauter (1 9 9 7 ); S chm idt (1 9 9 8 a ).
88
W h en  the Treaty o f  Am sterdam  en tered  in to  force o n  1 May 1999  togeth er  with a
con solidation  o f  the Treaty establishing the E uropean C om m unity an d  the Treaty o n  the
E uropean U n ion , all existing Treaty Articles w ere renum bered. In this chapter b oth  o ld  and
n ew  num bers are provided. In the em pirical chapters all Treaty A rticles are referred  to  by the
n u m b erin g  system that was used  at the tim e. Chapters T h ree to Five use the o ld  n um bers, and
C hapters Six and Seven the new  num bers.
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Article 8 6 (1 )  (ex-Article 9 0 (1 ))  o f  th e TEU states that con cern in g  public undertakings or  
undertakings granted  special or exclusive rights, m em ber states are n o t a llow ed to en act or  
m aintain  in  force acts contrary to the Treaty rules, in  particular com p etition  rules. A rticle 8 6 (2 )  
grants lim ited  d erogation s from  the application  o f  the Treaty to services o f  a  gen eral eco n o m ic  
in terest to the ex ten t that such rules w ould  n o t  b e contrary to  the C om m unity in te r e st  Article 
8 6 (3 )  (ex-Article 9 0 (3 ))  tasks the European C om m ission  with observing the application  o f  
A rticle 86 , i f  necessary by m eans o f  en actin g  its own directives or  d ecision s addressed  to the  
m em b er States. S ince the 1970s, the E uropean C om m ission  had sou gh t ways to  issue ex-ante 
regulation  by m eans o f  fo llow ing the so-called ‘Article 9 0  p roced u re’ (now  A rticle 8 6 ) . In  
particular, see  the C om m ission  Directive 8 0 /7 2 3 /E E C  o f  2 5 .0 6 .1 9 8 0  o n  financial transparency. 
O fficial Journal L / 1 9 5 /3 5  ° f  2 9 .0 7 .1 9 8 0 . For useful in trodu ction s to  the use m ade by the  
E uropean  C om m ission o f  A rticle 9 0  see Schm idt (1998a , pp. 74-83); Sauter (1 9 9 7 ).
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the telecommunications sector (Schneider and Werle 1990, p. 91). The 
European Parliament passed a Resolution in May 1981, calling on the European 
Commission to draft Council directives in order to harmonise standards and to 
prevent any further fragmentation of the European telecommunications 
market. Similarly, in the audiovisual field, the European Parliament called on 
the Commission to take steps towards a Community policy on television 
broadcasting. The Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, the Media and 
Sport drafted a number of reports and resolutions requesting a Community 
media policy that would remove the legal and technical barriers to a common
90broadcasting market and promote European audiovisual products.
Before the mid-1980s, the European Commission limited its activities to 
draft a number of consultative papers and recommendations and did not 
prepare legislation. However, even during these years the dominant themes of 
future legislation emerged. The European Commission placed both its 
telecommunications and audiovisual policies in the context of achieving the 
common market (European Commission 1984a and 1987). This largely 
represented a response to the case law established by the European Court of 
Justice according to which legislation in the two fields was to be based on the 
common market provisions. It implied that the Commission treated the 
telecommunications and the audiovisual sector from an economic point of view. 
Following from the overarching logic of the common market, the dominant 
policy issue addressed by the European Commission was to open up what had 
been markets largely national in nature thus far, both by means of liberalisation
91and (re-) regulation. The main objectives behind this were to increase 
investment, consumer choice and the quality of services, and to achieve 
common standards, universal service and affordability of services (see above).
90
T h e European Parliam ent first ad opted  the Schall R eport in  January 1981 (O fficial Journal 
C 28, 9 .2 .1 9 8 1 , p . 7 4 ) , fo llow ed  by the legendary H ah n  R eport an d  R esolution  (E uropean  
Parliam ent 1982 a an d  b ). T h ese landm ark d ocu m ents w ere fo llow ed  by further calls for a 
C om m unity audiovisual policy. For an overview see European Parliam ent 1987; also se e  C ollins 
(1 9 9 4 , p. 31 f.); M achet (1 9 9 9 , p. 5fi).
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‘L iberalisation’, ‘d eregu lation ’ and ‘re-regulation’ proved to  b e d om in an t term s u sed  by the  
E uropean  C om m ission  and o th er sectoral actors (e.g. Eliassen and Sjovaag 1999; M ajone 1 9 90). 
Liberalisation is n o t to b e  con fused  with ‘d eregu lation ’, as fair an d  effective com p etition  may 
require regulation  to  prevent d om in an t players from  abusing their p osition  (e.g . Graham  and  
Prosser 1987; M ajone 1996 ).
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On Community level, powerful national and transnational interests lobbied 
for the introduction of EU-level legislation, for example equipment 
manufacturers and business users in telecommunications and the advertising
• 92industry and the commercial broadcasters in the audiovisual field. At the same 
time, the interests affected in the two fields tended to be diverse and clear-cut 
coalitions for or against EU-level initiatives were rare. Likewise, member states 
were not always in favour of Community legislation and frequently changed
• 93their positions, depending on the issue under consideration.
Administrative fragmentation in the audiovisual and the telecommunications sectors
In each policy area under study, distinct settings of DGs shaped the course of 
legislative policy-making. A central claim made in Chapter One is that these 
different configurations resulted in different levels of administrative 
fragmentation, defined by the number of DGs, their differences on the 
paradigm of legislation and their competition for authority. The empirical 
analysis will show how variation in administrative fragmentation created 
different scenarios of coordination and led to distinct legislative outputs 
produced by the European Commission. During the 1980s, rather similar levels 
of administrative fragmentation prevailed across the two policy domains. In 
each sector, two DGs actively engaged in the preparation of legislation. These 
DGs agreed not only on the need for Community-wide legislation, but also on a 
set of policy objectives, most importantly a combination of market opening and 
liberalisation with re-regulation, based on a harmonisation of minimum rules. 
They also accepted to share the authority for the different aspects of legislation. 
In the early 1990s, substantial variation emerged between the two domains. 
While the level of administrative fragmentation remained stable in the 
telecommunications sector, the situation fundamentally altered in the 
audiovisual field, due to a significant increase of administrative fragmentation.
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E.g. C ollins (1 9 9 4 ); Fraser (1 9 9 7 ); H um phreys (1 9 9 6 ); Sandholtz (1 9 9 8 );  S ch m id t (1 9 9 7  
an d  1 9 9 8 ).
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For detail o n  m em ber states’ p osidon s in  telecom m u n ication s see , for exam p le Cram (1 9 9 7 );  
S andholtz (1 9 9 8 ), Schm idt (1 9 9 8 a ), T hatcher (2 0 0 1 ). M em ber states’ interests as regards to  
audiovisual issues have b een  d ocu m en ted  by C ollins (1 9 9 4 ); Fraser (1 9 9 7 ); H arcourt (1 9 9 8 );  
H um phreys (1 9 9 6 ).
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The number of DGs doubled from two to four. Furthermore, differences among 
the participating DGs on the paradigm of legislation increased as did the 
competition for authority for audiovisual issues.
In the telecommunications sector, the preparation of telecommunications 
legislation was mostly dealt with by two Directorates General for more than 
fifteen years, the DGs for Competition and Telecommunications. While DG 
Competition has had a long-standing history in the Commission due to its 
powers to implement general competition law, DG Telecoms is a relatively new 
organisation as it was only created in 1986. Besides there was either very little or
94no input made by other Commission DGs. During the 1980s, the DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs expressed an interest in telecommunications 
legislation, notably in the context of its efforts to achieve the SEM by means of 
the free movement o goods and the freedom to provide services. However, its 
interest in actively contributing to the preparing telecommunications legislation 
soon reduced when it turned to concentrate on other issues, for example public 
procurement (see Chapter Three). Moreover, as it broadly endorsed the policy 
priorities expressed by DG Competition and DG Telecoms it saw little reason to 
interfere. In the 1990s, other DGs began to take an increasing interest in 
telecommunications and wanted to be consulted on legislative provisions, for 
example the DG Consumer Protection, DG External Relations, and DG Science, 
Research and Technology (e.g. Fuchs 1994; Schmidt 1998a). However, these 
DGs usually limited their activities to submit comments on those legislative 
provisions that directly affected their responsibilities, mostly during formal 
inter-service consultations, concentrating on technical details and specifications 
rather than the substance of the Commission’s policy strategy (see Chapter 
Four). Between DG Competition and DG Telecoms there was a high level of 
agreement concerning both the general paradigm of legislation and the 
allocation of authority for telecommunications issues. In spite of their different 
tasks, functions and outlooks on telecommunications issues (see below) the two 
DGs managed to pursue a common line of action and to coordinate each 
others’ activities over a period of more than fifteen years.
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T his has b een  d ocu m en ted  by D ang-N guyen (1 9 9 3 , p . 16); Fuchs (1 9 9 4 ); Schm idt (1 9 9 8 a , p. 
53)-
In contrast to this stable pattern, the audiovisual field was characterised by 
changing levels of administrative fragmentation. During the 1980s, 
fragmentation was low, similarly to the telecommunications sector. Two DGs, 
DG Culture and DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, engaged in the 
preparation of audiovisual legislation, with other DGs taking no significant 
interest in their activities. The two DGs maintained different tasks and missions 
and had different policy priorities for the audiovisual field but agreed on the 
paradigm of audiovisual legislation and accepted each others’ authority for 
audiovisual issues. The situation changed in the early 1990s when two other 
DGs joined the policy arena: DG Competition and DG Telecoms. The number 
of DGs doubled and there was a significant increase of differences on the 
paradigm of legislation and the division of authority. Administrative 
fragmentation increased even further when DG Industry joined the policy arena 
in the late 1990s. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the DGs that 
engaged in the preparation of legislation in each sector, indicating their general 
tasks and functions as well as their outlooks on sectoral issues.
The setting in the telecommunications sector
Before the late 1970s, no organisation existed in the European Commission 
that held specific responsibilities for telecommunications. Telecommunications 
issues were perceived to be part of the EC’s technology and industrial policy and 
therefore fell under the responsibility of the industrial branch of DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs. In the European Commission, an EC dimension 
to telecommunications policy was first discussed upon the initiative of Etienne 
Davignon, then Commissioner for Industry, whose interest was to promote
95communications and information technologies on a European level. In 1979, 
he set up an Information Technology Task Force (ITTF) in the Commission. Its 
officials were mostly recruited from DG Internal Market and Industry 
(Sandholtz 1992, 1998). The main reason for the establishment of the ITTF was 
to create an organisation within the Commission to deal with overseeing the 
implementation of the RACE and ESPRIT programmes. In 1986, the Task
95
E.g. Eliassen and Sjovaag (1 9 9 9 ); Sandholtz (1 9 9 2 ); T hatcher (2 0 0 1 ).
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Force acquired the status of a Directorate General, called DG for 
Telecommunications, Information and Innovation Industry (DG XIII, hereafter 
‘DG Telecoms’). A division was founded in the new DG, called 
‘Telecommunications Policy’. Its main task was to look at possible regulatory 
changes on Community level that would build on existing lines of action taken 
on the international level, for example the efforts undertaken to harmonise the 
markets for terminal equipment.
While during the 1980s, most divisions in DG Telecoms dealt with R&D 
issues, the division ‘Telecommunications Policy’ developed an interest in 
exploring possibilities for Community-wide liberalisation and regulatory 
harmonisation of telecommunications services and networks. The main concern 
of the officials was to promote the application of new communications 
technologies and services, such as facsimile, data communications, and
96modems. In this context, they laid emphasis on opening up national markets 
that were restricted due to public monopolies and little technological
• 97innovation (see Chapter Three). They were also interested in establishing 
minimum rules that would guarantee access to networks and interoperability, as 
well as user rights such as affordable tariffs. It was not before the early 1990s 
that DG Telecoms pursued a more ambitious strategy (see Chapter Four). In 
the context of the impact of new technologies and services, such as mobile 
telephony and the internet, it began to argue in favour of complete 
liberalisation, including public voice telephony and infrastructure. In the view 
of DG Telecoms liberalisation would have to be balanced with ongoing 
regulatory harmonisation, guaranteeing, for example, interconnection and 
universal service.
The main task of DG Competition has been to implement EU competition 
law, which includes vetting on mergers, joint ventures and acquisitions as well as
96
In this con text, DG  T elecom s has often  b een  portrayed as b e in g  c lose ‘to  th e ‘classic’ 
con cep tion s o f  industrial policy: it sees its task as b oth  stim ulating and stren gth en in g  the  
d ifferen t players w hile taking care n o t to u nd erm in e the European ‘ch am p ion s” (Fuchs 1994,
p. 183; also see  Ross 1 9 9 5 ). A lso see  E uropean C om m ission  (1 9 8 7 ).
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• • 98ruling on state aid and the abuse of dominant positions. DG Competition has 
sought to open up markets and to lower market entry barriers for competitors 
in several policy sectors, including posts, telecommunications, and electricity. 
The use of its executive powers has centred on the implementation of Article 81 
(ex-Article 85) on anti-competitive agreements and Article 82 (ex-Article 86) on 
the abuse of monopoly positions as well as state aid control. Article 86 (ex- 
Article 90) grants the European Commission the right to rule on public 
undertakings by means of enacting directives or decisions without the approval
99of the European Parliament and the Council.
Given its mission to promote competition and to open up restricted 
markets, DG Competition has showed a natural interest in fostering an opening 
of telecoms markets since the early days of a European-wide 
telecommunications policy. During the 1980s, the units responsible in its 
Directorate for ‘Restrictive Practices, Abuse of Dominant Positions and Other 
Distortions of Competition I* joined DG Telecoms in its efforts to liberalise the 
telecommunications sector and took leadership over the preparation of 
liberalisation directives based on Article 86 (ex-Article 90) (see Chapter Three). 
During the 1990s, DG Competition greatly contributed to the expansion of 
liberalisation which ultimately resulted in full competition for 
telecommunications services and networks by 1 January 1998. As regards 
regulatory harmonisation, DG Competition argued in favour of a minimum of 
rules balancing the application of general competition law with ex-ante 
regulation and avoiding an overload of disputes to be solved by means of
98
For g o o d  overviews o f  D G  C om p etition ’s tasks and fun ction s see  Cini an d  M cGowan (1 9 9 8 );  
M cGowan and Wilks (1 9 9 5  and 1 997 ). T h e E uropean C om m ission’s and, m ore specifically, DG  
C om p etition ’s powers to im p lem en t gen eral com p etition  law w ere altered  m ore recently  d u e to  
am en d m en ts m ade to the M erger R egulation and antitrust rules. T h e C ouncil ad op ted  a N ew  
M erger R egulation in  January 2 0 0 4  and  a R egulation  con ta in in g  n ew  rules o n  antitrust 
en fo rcem en t that en tered  in to  force in  May 2004 . U n d er  the new  rules, th e m echanism s  
w hereby the C om m ission  can refer cases to  national jurisd ictions is sim plified  an d  NGAs 
(N ational C om petition  A uthorities) are em pow ered  to apply fully the provisions o f  the Treaty to  
en su re that com p etition  is n o t d istorted or restricted. S ee N ew  M erger R egu lation, C ouncil 
R egulation  N o  1 3 9 /2 0 0 4  o f  20  January 2 0 0 4  on  th e control o f  con centration s b etw een  
undertakings (T h e EC M erger R egulation). O fficial Journal L 24, 2 9 .1 .2 0 0 4 , pp. 1-22. C ouncil 
R egulation  N o  1 /2 0 0 3  o f  16 D ecem b er 2002  o n  the im plem en tation  o f  the rules o n  
com p etition  laid down in  Articles 81 and 82 o f  the Treaty. O fficial Journal L i 4 .1 .2 0 0 3 , pp. 1- 
25. C ouncil R egulation  N o  1 /2 0 0 3  was co m p lem en ted  by a C om m ission  Im p lem en tin g
R egulation  and six C om m ission N otices. For an  overview see  E uropean C om m ission  (2 0 0 4 ) .
99
For an overview see  M ichelm ann (1 9 7 8 , p. 78 ); Schm idt (1998a , p. 6 7 ) .
applying general competition law on a case-by-case basis (e.g. Schmidt 1998a). 
Although DG Competition did not take formal drafting responsibility for 
harmonisation directives, it actively participated in their preparation for more 
than a decade (see Chapters Three, Four and Seven).
The setting in the audiovisual sector
Within the European Commission, responsibility for media and audiovisual
issues has traditionally been held by DG ‘Information, Communication and
Culture’, commonly known as DG X or ‘DG Culture’. Before the mid-1980s, its
main task was to inform the public about the Commission’s activities (Collins
1994). After that, its activities centred on implementing the MEDIA
Programme, a financial support system for media production, distribution, and
training (see Goldberg et al. 1998 for detail). As has been widely acknowledged
in the literature, the main concern prevailing in DG Culture as regards
audiovisual policy has been pluralism and the diversity of television programmes
100(see Chapters Three and Five). As regards audiovisual legislation, DG Culture 
has expressed a special interest in detailed regulation, concerning for example 
the protection of children and minorities from harmful programmes, rules that 
would limit media concentration, and provisions that would promote European 
public service broadcasters rather than commercial operators. The views 
prevailing in DG Culture have commonly been associated with French cultural 
policy (Collins 1994; Levy 1999). As regards audiovisual legislation, the main 
responsibilities of DG Culture have centred on the broadcasting directive 
‘Television without Frontiers’. In 1993, DG Culture, more specifically its unit 
‘Audiovisual Policy’, took over formal responsibility from DG Internal Market to 
oversee the implementation of the directive and to prepare possible 
amendments (see Chapter Five). Towards the late 1990s, its role in preparing 
audiovisual legislation in the Commission somewhat reduced, mainly due to the 
conflicts and delays surrounding the revision of the existing ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ directive (see Chapter Six).
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Another key actor since the early days of the Commission’s audiovisual 
policy has been DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs.101 The DG has 
developed its interest in Community broadcasting regulation due to the links to 
the internal market for which it keeps established responsibility. The 
overarching concern in DG Internal Market was to achieve a common
broadcasting market by means of a mixture of liberalisation and regulatory
102harmonisation. Being concerned with the fragmented nature of the European 
television industry due to different regulatory systems in member states and the 
restrictions placed on cross-frontier television broadcasting, DG Internal Market 
called for harmonising member states’ rules since the early 1980s (see Chapter 
Three). In this context, it focused on facilitating the provision of cross-frontier 
television by means of relaxing rules on television advertising and harmonising 
a minimum of rules as this would stimulate the audiovisual industry and 
encourage investment.
The responsibility of DG Internal Market for the audiovisual domain 
centred on issues related to the realisation of the internal market. During the 
1980s, it initiated and kept responsibility for the broadcasting directive 
‘Television without Frontiers’ whose provisions were based on the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services (see Chapter Three). 
Responsibility was taken by a division called ‘Media and Data Protection’ within 
Directorate F (‘Approximation of Law, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom 
to Provide Services; the Professions’). During the 1990s, DG Internal Market 
gave the dossier to DG Culture and turned towards other legislative initiatives 
including legislation on media ownership and concentration (see Chapter Five). 
Towards the late 1990s, DG Internal Market increasingly dealt with media- 
related issues such as data protection, transparency, and electronic commerce 
(see Chapter Six).103
In 1993 , DG  Internal M arket and Industrial Affairs was split in to  two separate services, the  
D G  Internal M arket an d  Financial Services (or DG  XV) and the D G  Industry (D G  III).
R esponsibility for audiovisual issues was taken over by the newly-organised D G  Internal M arket
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In the early 1990s, the policy arena on the administrative level of the 
European Commission enlarged to include other DGs, most importantly DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms. As previously stated, the main task of DG 
Competition is to implement EU general competition law. In the audiovisual 
sector, DG Competition has concentrated on ruling on joint ventures and 
mergers by applying general competition law and the Merger Regulation (see 
Chapter Five). Another important activity has concerned ruling on abuses by 
public service broadcasters of their ‘dominant market position’ (Humphreys 
1996,p. 284). DG Competition also expressed an increasing interest in shaping 
the content of audiovisual legislation, due to its concern that regulatory 
provisions would counteract its interpretation of general competition law or
104establish new market barriers. In this context, DG Competition mostly argued 
in favour of keeping regulatory intervention at a minimum level.105 It actively 
participated in the preparation of the major pieces of audiovisual legislation, 
notably the directive on media ownership and the ‘Television without Frontiers’ 
directive (see Chapter Five). It also sought to influence the ‘Convergence’ 
debate underway in the Commission in the late 1990s which centred on the 
question whether the Commission should propose a new model of regulation 
combining legislation on telecommunications and audiovisual issues (see 
Chapter Six).
The involvement of DG Telecoms in audiovisual legislation mostly emerged 
due to the linkages existing between the audiovisual field and the 
telecommunications sector, for example in the context of mutual recognition, 
transmission standards and satellite equipment. However, up until the early 
1990s the interest of DG Telecoms remained limited to the regulation of 
television standards for which it prepared legislation (see Chapter Five). The 
main concern prevailing in DG Telecoms was to promote new technologies and
services, for example the transmission of programmes by satellite and new
106consumer equipment such as wide-screen television sets. The situation 
changed in the early 1990s when DG Telecoms started to take a much greater
104
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interest in shaping audiovisual legislation. Given its responsibility for the 
telecommunications domain and the success of its legislative initiatives in this 
sector, it started to develop an initiative for the so-called ‘Information Society’ 
(see Chapter Five). According to DG Telecoms, the increasing convergence 
between the communications, broadcasting, and information technology sectors 
questioned the traditional distinctions between telecommunications and media 
services. In the view of DG Telecoms, the necessary response would be to adapt 
audiovisual legislation to the regulatory model established for the 
telecommunications sector, i.e. to achieve a combination of far-reaching 
liberalisation with a minimum of rules that would facilitate technical innovation, 
investment and commercialisation. Aims like pluralism and consumer choice 
were not to be achieved by regulation, but would eventually be self-fulfilling due
107to greater choice and the self-regulatory forces of the market.
Following from its interest in shaping the evolution of audiovisual legislation 
and realising its vision of a ‘convergent’ regulatory regime, DG Telecoms sought 
to actively participate in all major legislative initiatives pursued by the 
Commission in the audiovisual field during the 1990s. Apart from its efforts to 
further develop legislation on television standards and conditional access 
systems, DG Telecoms brought itself into the preparation of the directives on 
media ownership and the revision of the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive 
(see Chapter Five). Furthermore, in the late 1990s, it undertook efforts to adapt 
the regulatory model for the audiovisual sector to that of telecommunications, 
notably in the context of its ‘Convergence’ initiative (see Chapter Six).
Conclusion
The chapter has provided detail on the organisational and procedural context 
underpinning legislative policy-making in the European Commission. As has 
been shown, while the Directorates General of the European Commission are 
organised according to the principle of hierarchy, the procedures that drive 
their collaboration and co-operation are less fixed and rule-bound than one 
might expect. Common ‘codes of practice’ and routines exist and determine
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much of the process of drafting legislation. Although the course of legislative 
policy-making usually follows these established routines, Commission DGs (and 
within them the different units and divisions) maintain considerable flexibility 
and discretion as regards whether and how to make use of them, for example 
when to consult other Commission DGs and how much to listen to their 
concerns. Hence, the course of legislative policy-making substantially depends 
on the behaviour of the participating DGs and their use of rules, routines and 
procedures during the act of coordinating.
As has been shown the two policy areas under study are characterised by 
several background conditions that make them interesting subjects of a cross- 
sectoral comparison. The European Commission addressed similar themes of 
legislation, centring on a combination of market opening and liberalisation with 
re-regulation which would establish market conditions and safeguard the so- 
called ‘public interest*. The context in which the Commission placed its 
legislative efforts was characterised by strictly regulated public monopolies (or 
quasi-monopolies) on the national level and the attempts made in some 
member states to introduce more competition. Following the case law of the 
European Court of Justice, the European Commission initiated and proposed 
legislation on the basis of achieving the SEM. It started acting in the mid-1980s, 
largely in a response to requests made by other Community institutions, for 
example the European Parliament.
The chapter indicated the levels of administrative fragmentation that 
emerged in the two policy sectors at different times. Initially low levels of 
fragmentation prevailed in both fields, due to a small number of DGs and the 
fact that they agreed on the need for and the substance of Community 
legislation and consented to share authority for defining policy solutions. A 
central momentum of variation emerged in the early 1990s when the number 
of participating DGs doubled from two to four in the audiovisual field, whereas 
it remained unchanged in telecommunications. While in telecommunications, 
the two participating DGs continued to accept the paradigm of legislation and a 
sharing of authority, more fundamental conflict emerged between the four DGs 
in the audiovisual sector that concerned the paradigm of legislation as well as 
the division of influence and control. In spite of their different missions and
72
functions, DG Competition and DG Telecoms established a set of shared policy 
priorities in telecommunications. It was based on a combination of liberalisation 
with regulatory harmonisation and the underlying perception that an open 
market would be needed to facilitate trade and investment, to promote new 
technologies and to increase consumer choice. The co-existence of 
liberalisation and re-regulation was linked to a consent on the authority of DG 
Competition for the former and of DG Telecoms for the latter.
In contrast to the shared paradigm of legislation and authority in 
telecommunications, there was much less common ground between the DGs 
involved in the audiovisual sector. While DG Culture and DG Internal Market 
that took primary (and, during the 1980s, exclusive) responsibility for 
audiovisual matters based their collaboration on an agreement on policy 
objectives and a division of authority, a substantial increase in administrative 
fragmentation occurred in the early 1990s, prompted by the entry of DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms into the policy arena. Not only was there a 
greater number of DGs actively participating in the making of legislation, but 
also greater conflict between them concerning the paradigm of legislation and 
authority. DG Internal Market argued in favour of market opening and 
liberalisation combined with a minimum harmonisation of rules. DG Culture 
tended towards speaking for more and more detailed regulation than envisaged 
by DG Internal Market, whereas DG Competition and DG Telecoms preferred 
little or no regulation and relying instead on the application of general 
competition law or market forces. As will be demonstrated in the empirical 
chapters these significant differences resulted in contrasting positions on the 
primary objectives of audiovisual legislation as well as the actual need for it (see 
Chapters Five and Six). Linked to their different policy agendas for the 
audiovisual sector, the four DGs also tended to compete for power and 
influence. DG Culture and DG Internal Market wanted to maintain their 
respective responsibilities for legislative policy-making, whereas DG 
Competition was primarily concerned about not giving away its powers to apply 
general competition law. DG Telecoms sought to expand its authority for 
communications- and media-related issues, including the Commission’s 
legislative activities in the audiovisual sector.
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The following chapters analyse how the different levels of administrative 
fragmentation discerned in the two policy domains influenced the process of 
policy coordination and affected the legislative outputs produced by the 
European Commission.
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Introduction
The present chapter analyses the efforts undertaken by the Directorates General 
of the European Commission to first initiate legislation in the audiovisual and 
the telecommunications sectors. In the early 1980s, there was virtually no 
Community legislation in the two fields and public monopolies dominated in 
most member states. By the end of the decade, the situation had changed 
fundamentally: first steps had been undertaken to open the restricted markets 
to competition and to introduce a harmonisation of rules by means of 
Community legislation prepared for by the European Commission. The chapter 
analyses these steps and is organised into two broad parts. The first part 
examines the Commission’s legislative policy-making in the audiovisual field, 
and the second part analyses its preparation of legislation in 
telecommunications. In both policy areas, the Commission DGs prepared 
limited measures to open up markets to competition by means of liberalisation 
and to provide for a minimum of regulatory harmonisation. In the audiovisual 
field, the Commission proposed a directive in 1986 called ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ which combined elements of liberalisation and re-regulation on 
several policy issues, most importantly television advertising. In the 
telecommunications sector, it drafted two Commission directives in 1987 and 
1988 that were designed to liberalise terminal equipment and the provision of 
value-added telecommunications services. These measures were complemented
by a re-regulatory proposal on ONP (Open Network Provision) in 1989 which 
established the principles of access to and use of public telecommunications 
networks by means of technical interfaces, tariff principles and usage 
conditions.
The chapter examines the evolution of these mayor legislative initiatives. 
The findings suggests that there were similar levels of administrative 
fragmentation in each sector that correlated with high legislative outputs 
produced by the European Commission. Only two DGs actively engaged in the 
preparation of legislative proposals: DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
and DG Culture in the audiovisual field, and DG Telecoms and DG 
Competition in telecommunications. There was either very little or no input 
made by other Directorates General. For the audiovisual field, DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs advocated legislation based on the economic 
dimension of television broadcasting, whereas DG Culture concentrated on 
cultural and social aims associated with the public interest. In 
telecommunications, DG Telecoms engaged in promoting new technologies 
and services and in increasing investment, while DG Competition had an 
interest in advancing the opening up of telecommunications markets to 
competition by means of liberalisation. The evidence shows that in spite of their 
different agendas, few differences existed between the participating DGs in 
terms of the paradigm of legislation and they consented to a division of 
influence and control. In both sectors, the DGs were in accordance on 
combining liberalisation with re-regulation and they were willing to share 
authority for preparing legislation.
The low level of administrative fragmentation which existed in both policy 
domains does not suggest that there were no conflicts or debates between the 
DGs involved. Dispute and controversy did occur, but they were limited to the 
details of legislation rather than its substance. This greatly facilitated 
coordination among the participating DGs. Their collaboration mostly relied on 
a division of work arranged between them. In telecommunications, DG 
Competition took responsibility for liberalisation, whereas DG Telecoms 
concentrated on re-regulation. In the audiovisual field, DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs centred its efforts on liberalisation and re-regulation designed
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to achieve the common market, whereas DG Culture focused on regulation in 
the name of the public interest. Another important mechanism of coordination 
were the preliminary consultations that took place between the DGs, usually on 
the lower levels of their hierarchies, for example in issue-related working groups 
or through personal contacts among officials. During these consultations, the 
DGs were usually able to solve contentious issues. The analysis shows how in 
both policy domains the participating DGs were able to produce detailed drafts 
of legislation on which there was a high level of agreement and that caused little 
discussion when they made their way through the formal decision-making 
procedures of the Commission. Legislative policy-making was rapid and 
consistent and resulted in several decisions to propose Community legislation.
The main argument which emerges from the chapter is that if there is a 
high level of unity among the Commission DGs they have little difficulties to 
coordinate their actions. Conflict and debate are almost ever-present features of 
coordination since the DGs rarely completely agree on the details of legislation. 
However, conflicts may be overcome if there are few differences on the 
paradigm of legislation and if competition for policy authority remains low. 
Making effective use of different coordination mechanisms, Commission actors 
are able to act rapidly and consistently.
The first half of the chapter examines the preparation of Community 
legislation in the audiovisual domain and is divided into two broad parts. The 
first section analyses the agenda-setting process through which DG Culture and 
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs decided that the Commission would 
propose legislation and developed major policy aims and legislative provisions. 
The result of this process was the Green Paper on ‘Television without Frontiers’ 
(European Commission 1984a), an important consultative document which 
explored the possibilities of Community legislation on several issues. The 
second section examines the process through which the Commission DGs 
engaged in drafting a proposal for a directive on ‘Television without Frontiers’ 
(European Commission 1986). It shows how they further refined the 
Commission’s approach to audiovisual legislation and translated it into a 
legislative proposal by means of effective policy coordination. The second half 
of the chapter focuses on the Commission’s legislative policy-making in the
7 8
telecommunications sector. In a first section I show how DG Competition and 
DG Telecoms set a policy agenda which committed the Commission to propose 
legislation based on a combination of liberalisation with re-regulation 
announced in the 1987 Green Paper on Telecommunications (European 
Commission 1987) The second section analyses the preparation of legislation 
liberalising terminal equipment and services as well as regulating for ONP and 
shows how intense coordination between DG Telecoms and DG Competition 
enabled the Commission to produce high legislative outputs. At the end of the 
chapter a concluding section summarises the configurations of administrative 
fragmentation and legislative outputs that emerged during the first major phase 
of Commission policy-making and relates them to the emergence of distinct 
patterns of policy coordination.
Policy coordination in the audiovisual area 
Setting the policy agenda
Growing awareness in the European Commission
Before 1980, no audiovisual legislation existed in the European Community. In 
the European Commission, there was little interest in preparing legislative 
proposals for the audiovisual field, as policy priorities were elsewhere, centring
for example on regional development, reforming CAP (Common Agricultural
108Policy) and advancing the EMS (European Monetary System). The DG for 
Information, Communication and Culture, commonly known as ‘DG X’ or ‘DG 
Culture’, kept responsibility for issues associated with the media and audiovisual 
sector. However, since its main task at the time was to inform the public about 
the policy initiatives undertaken by the European Commission it did not 
undertake efforts to prepare legislation in the audiovisual area.
Interview N um ber 4 , Interview N um ber 8. For detail on  the E uropean  C om m ission ’s policy  
priorities b efore 1980  see, for exam p le, N u g en t (2 0 0 1 ). For detail o n  the activities o f  the  
E uropean  C om m unity in  the audiovisual fie ld  before 1980 , see C ollins (1 9 9 4 );  H um phreys  
(1 9 9 6 , p. 260); W agner (1 9 9 4 , p. 9 6  f.).
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The situation began to change in the early 1980s when satellite and cable 
technologies challenged the established traditions of television that prevailed in 
most European member states, based on Public Service Broadcasting systems 
and a limited number of available television channels. Satellite television made 
transffontier television a reality and provided the scope for a circumvention of 
national broadcasting regulation. For example, a commercial channel 
forbidden to increase the share of advertising on its programme beyond a 
certain limit in its country of operation could now simply establish itself in a 
member state with less rigid advertising restrictions and transmit its programme 
to the other country it was originally intended for. Situations such as these soon 
raised concerns among policy-makers that national regulation would be less and 
less able to control trends towards commercialisation and
109internationalisation. The Community institutions slowly started to develop an 
interest in advancing a Community audiovisual policy. The first institution that 
recognised a need to develop Community audiovisual legislation was the 
European Parliament which called for removing the legal and technical barriers 
to a single broadcasting market and for promoting European audiovisual 
services (see Chapter Two). In this context, the European Parliament urged the 
European Commission to report on the media sector by mid-1983 and to 
explore the political and legal means required for the realisation of a European 
television channel.110
In the Commission, the issue was taken up by DG Culture. Its responsibility 
for responding to the Parliament’s requests was generally accepted by other 
Commission actors as a logical consequence of the DG’s general authority over 
cultural and audiovisual matters.111 At the time, it was common norm in the 
Commission to treat broadcasting from a cultural policy perspective which 
centred on concerns such as the expression of cultural matters in the media and
109
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the position of the European film and television programme industry vis-a-vis
112the powerful US producers. This cultural policy framework was the 
undisputed domain of DG Culture. In late 1982, DG Culture began 
undertaking efforts to prepare a consultative document on a Community 
audiovisual policy. It drafted a so-called Interim Report entitled ‘Realities and 
Tendencies in European Television: Perspectives and Options’ (European 
Commission 1983a). The Report concentrated on the creation of a pan- 
European television programme, an issue on which other DGs made little or no 
input as it did not attract wide-spread interest in the Commission and was not
113considered a contentious issue. Nevertheless consultations between DGs 
influenced the overall content of the Interim Report, mainly because the DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs considered the dossier a window of 
opportunity to initiate Community audiovisual legislation.
The DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, also called ‘DG III’, 
traditionally kept responsibility for realising the common market for goods and 
services and for promoting a Community industrial policy, including the 
preparation of legislative proposals. As regards the common market a 
cornerstone of its activities was to ensure the freedom of establishment and the
114freedom to provide services established in the Treaty. In the early 1980s, DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs gradually increased its interest in the 
audiovisual sector as part of its efforts to achieve the common market that, 
according to DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, included audiovisual
115products and services. Linked with its institutional mission, DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs viewed the audiovisual sector from a perspective 
oriented towards industrial and economic policy rather than the cultural policy 
framework pursued by DG Culture. Following the case law of the European
112
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Court of Justice ruling that the freedom of establishment and the freedom to
provide services applied to the audiovisual sector, officials in DG Internal
Market and Industrial Affairs came to view the provision of television
116broadcasting as part of the single market. The dominant attitude in DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs was that the legal barriers to cross-frontier 
broadcasting needed to be removed by a harmonisation of rules that would 
remove impediments to the unrestricted flow of television, for example as 
regards advertising.117
In DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, the issue of a common
broadcasting market was dealt with by a division organised within the
Directorate for the ‘Approximation of Laws, Freedom of Establishment,
Freedom to Provide Services’, called ‘Intellectual Property and Unfair
Competition’. The main issue discussed in the division was how to realise the
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services in the audiovisual
area. The officials responsible considered Europe to be seriously disadvantaged
by the fragmented character of its audiovisual markets, particularly in
118comparison to the huge and much more homogenous US market. The arrival 
of cross-frontier broadcasting by means of satellite technology seemed a 
welcome boost towards increases in European productions and intra-European 
exchanges of audiovisual services. DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
considered a harmonisation of advertising rules a central step on the way to 
creating a common broadcasting market. In this context, a further stimulus 
towards promoting a harmonisation of rules was the request posed to the 
Commission by the European Parliament to propose a directive that would
119 p-Nharmonise national rules of advertising. The Parliament noted that the 
information and communication industries had an important economic
116
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dimension and that in view of the cross-frontier character of television, national 
regulation would gradually lose its effectiveness.
The drafting of the Interim Report ’
While the drafting of the ‘Interim Report’ was underway in DG Culture, the DG 
began to coordinate its actions with DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
in order to set the agenda for Community audiovisual legislation. The two DGs 
consulted each other, usually in the context of inter-service working groups that 
brought together officials of the relevant units as well as through more personal 
contacts between individual officials. DG Culture concentrated on the creation 
of a pan-European television programme but since the Report would present 
the Commission’s first official response to the technological and economic 
challenges in the audiovisual area, it was also generally expected to discuss 
implications for the future regulatory framework at Community level. Among 
DG Culture and DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs it was broadly
accepted that this task was not falling into the domain of the former, but under
120the authority of the latter. This was mostly due to the widely-held view that a 
Community audiovisual policy would primarily address the economic side of 
television (see below).
Although DG Culture and DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
maintained different outlooks on audiovisual policy, concentrating on its
cultural and economic dimension respectively, they both consented on the need
121to explore further whether to establish Community regulation in the area. In 
the context of their consultations they arranged to make the issue of 
Community-wide regulation the subject of a separate consultative document, a 
so-called Green Paper which would reflect ‘on the progressive establishment of 
a common market for television, especially considering the freedom to provide 
television services within the Community and to receive television programmes 
transmitted from one Member State to the other’ (European Commission 1983,
Interview N um ber 2, Interview N um ber 4 , Interview N um ber 8.
121
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p. 8). It was also agreed between the two DGs that the document would be 
prepared under the leadership of DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, in
collaboration with DG Culture, as the document would concentrate on the
•  122 economic aspects of television broadcasting.
The final version of the Interim Report (European Commission 1983a) 
published by the Commission in May 1983 was not subject to any serious debate 
and adopted after a speedy drafting process. The document reflected closely the
• 123ideas of the DGs for Culture and Internal Market and Industrial Affairs. As 
regards pan-European television, it gave consideration to the practical 
possibilities of establishing a European television programme, envisaging the 
Commission’s support for measures taken by European organisations (such as 
the European Broadcasting Union). The Report stated that satellite, cable and 
video technologies would internationalise European television by the end of the 
1980s. As regards audiovisual regulation, it stated that
‘on the institutional front, they [the European Community and its 
Member States] will have to devise and put in place a general 
framework for the ‘European system’ which will be constituted by 
the satellite, cable and traditional network, and to examine the 
economic financial aspects of the new situation, including the 
question of advertising’ (European Commission 1983a, p. 5).
The preparation of the Green Paper ‘Television without Frontiers*
Much of the drafting of the Green Paper which came to be commonly called 
‘Television without Frontiers’, was based on work previously undertaken in the 
unit ‘Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition’ organised within the 
Directorate for the approximation of laws of DG Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs. As early as in 1981, its officials who were mostly German legal experts 
under Director Ivo Schwartz launched a legal analysis intended to identify legal 
obstacles to the free circulation of radio and television broadcasts. Its main 
result was that existing national rules presented legal obstacles to the free 
circulation of television and radio programmes in the Community as they
122
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124produced restricted and fragmented national markets. Most importantly, 
these obstacles were the rules on advertising, but also on copyright, youth 
protection and the right-of-reply. To the officials in DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs the case for audiovisual regulation on Community level was 
clear. In accordance with the senior management of the DG, they envisaged a 
harmonisation of rules intended to liberalise and to open up markets and to 
establish minimum rules necessary to ensure the free circulation of broadcasts. 
The Commissioner for the Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, Karl-Heinz 
Naijes, supported the idea.125
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs consulted on the contents of 
Community audiovisual legislation both within and outside the Commission. As
regards outside actors, it mostly engaged in talks with the broadcasting and the
126advertising industry. The companies confirmed the view taken in DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs that existing national rules on advertising 
presented legal obstacles to the free circulation of television programmes and 
that they hampered investment and consumer choice. In the Commission, the 
interest of other Commission DGs in participating in the drafting of the Green 
Paper ‘Television without Frontiers* was rather low, with the exception of DG 
Culture. Audiovisual policy was not yet considered a high-profile policy area and
127therefore did not attract a great number of Directorates General. As a 
consequence, the drafting of the Green Paper took place in a relatively closed 
circle, dominated by DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs officials who 
engaged in consultations with DG Culture, mostly in their established working 
groups.
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and DG Culture continued to 
have different outlooks on the broadcasting sector, i.e. an internal market 
viewpoint in DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and a perspective 
oriented towards cultural policy and the public interest in DG Culture that was
124
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in favour of protecting and supporting the European media industry.
Nevertheless the two DGs had a fundamental objective in common, namely the
creation of what they called a common broadcasting landscape by means of 
• • 128legislation. Even though DG Culture did not share the policy priorities of DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs that centred on liberalisation through 
minimum rules, it agreed with DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs in so 
far that it hoped that efforts to realise a common broadcasting market would 
benefit its interest to foster cultural unity and programme diversity.
A factor which further eased the relationship of the two DGs was that they 
considered each others’ support useful to strengthen their own arguments and
• 129were therefore willing to take up each others’ recommendations. DG Culture 
was aware that any regulatory harmonisation based on cultural policy would run 
into difficulties due to a lack of Treaty provisions. As was convincingly argued by 
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, broadcasting had to be treated as a 
tradable service falling within the Treaty’s provisions for the common market 
because the Community lacked legislative competence in purely cultural
130matters. Because justifying a Community initiative on cultural grounds was no 
serious option, officials in DG Culture were willing to accept the efforts taken in 
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, hoping that its legal expertise would 
benefit their interest in fostering cultural unity in the Community and
131strengthening the European programming and production industry. Officials 
in DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, in turn, believed that listening to 
DG Culture and incorporating some of its concerns would make their own 
policy strategy more comprehensive and help gathering support from outside 
interests holding views similar to those of DG Culture (e.g. the European 
Parliament and the European television producers).
Based on a consent on the need for legislation as well as its primary 
objectives, the coordination among the two DGs on the contents of the Green
128
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Paper ‘Television without Frontiers’ was rather easy. Consultations between DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and DG Culture continued to be of an 
informal nature: the two DGs engaged in preliminary talks that centred on 
informal draft texts of the Green Paper before formally consulting with other
132Commission services. These talks were mostly organised in inter-service 
working groups and also took place through personal conversation among 
officials. In the course of these consultations, the two DGs came to agree that 
the purpose of the Green Paper ‘Television without Frontiers’ would be 
threefold (European Commission 1984a): first, reflecting the views in DG 
Culture, it would demonstrate the importance of radio and television 
broadcasting for European integration; second, it would illustrate the 
competence of the Community provided for by the applicability of the Treaty of 
Rome; and third, the document would set out ideas on the approximation of 
member states’ broadcasting regulation, the priority of DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs.
According to the ideas of DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, 
Community regulation was to focus on advertising, copyright, youth protection 
and the right-of-reply. In this context, DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
advocated the idea of ‘liberalisation through harmonisation’ (European 
Commission 1984a, p. 260). This implied to harmonise only a minimum of 
rules necessary to ensure the free circulation of television programmes so that 
markets would be opened and attract more investment. In order to keep the 
debate with outside actors open, the officials responsible intended to set out the 
aspects of possible Community regulation, but to leave open the scope and level 
of harmonisation (e.g. the type of the legal instrument) in the Green Paper. 
During consultations with DG Culture, DG Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs agreed to address aspects of culture and the public good emerging in the 
context of audiovisual policy, for example by referring to the right of 
Community citizens to benefit from a range of information, ideas and opinion 
offered in television programmes. As it was built on a solid consensus among 
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and DG Culture, the draft Green
Interview Number 4, Interview Number 8.
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Paper did not attract serious debate during the formal decision-making 
procedures that followed. Other Commission actors, for example the Legal 
Service and the Commissioner cabinets, approved of the draft document which 
passed the stages of decision-taking with no delays or major changes. A few 
months later, in June 1984 the Commission officially adopted its Green Paper 
‘Television without Frontiers’.
The Green Paper television without Frontiers*
Being a document of more than 300 pages length, the 1984 Green Paper on 
‘Television without Frontiers’ clearly argued in favour of a harmonisation of 
broadcasting rules. It stated that the primary objectives of Community 
legislation would be the ‘opening up of intra-Community frontiers for national 
television programmes* (European Commission 1984a, p. 4) and the creation 
of a single European broadcasting market by proposing minimum rules. All 
broadcasting in the Community would have to comply with such rules. Member 
states would be able to lay down stricter and more detailed rules on those 
broadcasters established within their jurisdiction, but not be empowered to 
prevent cross-border transmission of broadcasts. The Commission justified the 
Community’s right to legislate by referring to the rulings of the European Court 
of Justice, noting that the Treaty did not exclude any sphere of economic 
activity.
While the document left open whether Community legislation was to be 
achieved by a single instrument (a ‘catch-all’ directive) which would combine 
elements of market opening with harmonisation or by means of several 
directives, it made detailed provisions for the different aspects of regulatory 
harmonisation. These provisions were consultative and the Commission invited 
comments of interested parties before proceeding to draft formal proposals. 
The central issue of harmonisation was going to be advertising as the 
Commission found that the main barrier to a common broadcasting market was 
caused by the application of different advertising rules in member states that 
included the broadcast of programmes received from and produced in other 
member states. The Green Paper envisaged the general authorisation of
8 8
advertising in all member states, to be made subject to certain minimum 
standards. These rules concerned, for example, restrictions on advertising time 
(suggesting an upper limit of 20 per cent of total broadcasting of a channel), 
the prohibition of advertising on Sundays and public holidays, the separation of 
advertising from other programme material and sponsoring, as well as 
restrictions or prohibition of advertising of tobacco and alcohol (European 
Commission 1984a, p. 263^). Other issues covered by the Green Paper were 
right-of-reply, copyright and the protection of children from violence and 
pornography, issues for which the European Commission considered legislative 
initiatives necessary to harmonise national broadcasting markets (European 
Commission 1984a, p. 286f.). The Commission envisaged minimum rules in 
these areas, leaving it up to member states to enact more detailed or stricter
133regulation.
The preparation of legislation
On the basis of the Green Paper, DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
engaged in consultations with interest groups and member states. Outside 
actors broadly welcomed Community regulation in the field, particularly the 
advertising industry and the new commercial broadcasters that sought to
134advance liberalisation and market opening. The Green Paper also provoked 
more hostile reactions, notably from the established broadcaster interests, for 
example the public broadcasters (represented by the European Broadcasting 
Union), broadcasters’ professionals associations and trade unions that all feared 
for the negative effects of liberalisation, such as increasing media concentration. 
Member states were divided, with some governments welcoming the Green
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Paper, whereas others opposed Community regulation, particularly 
liberalisation.135
The plans of DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs received a stimulus 
when a new Commission was appointed in early 1985. Commissioner Narjes for 
Industrial Affairs and the Internal Market was succeeded by Lord Cockfield, a 
senior UK Commissioner who was to become the ‘architect’ of the Single
136Market programme. The Commission’s widely-cited White Paper on the 
Internal Market (European Commission 1985b, section 115 to 117), drafted by 
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, called the creation of a common 
broadcasting market an important and urgent task. The preparation of 
audiovisual legislation was also supported by the new Commission President 
Jacques Delors who made a personal commitment to realise not only the single
137market agenda, but also a common audiovisual landscape. ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ became one of the big issues in the Commission, ranking high on the 
overall policy agenda (Bulletin of the European Communities 1986). In this 
context, a broad majority of organisations and actors showed themselves
138supportive of the plans of DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs.
In March 1985, DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs started drafting a 
proposal for a directive ‘Television without Frontiers’. The positions expressed 
during public consultations had made DG Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs rethink some of the provisions of the Green Paper. For example, the 
officials responsible decided to exclude the right-of-reply from Community 
legislation, to exempt radio broadcasting from future proposals and to limit the 
general authorisation of advertising to cross-frontier rather than all advertising. 
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs had come to favour a ‘catch-all’
Interview N um ber 2, Interview N um ber 4 . M em ber states’ positions have b een  d ocu m en ted  
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instrument rather than a set of separate directives. A single directive would 
cover all aspects of regulation raised in the Green Paper (i.e. advertising, 
copyright, youth protection) and combine elements of liberalisation and re­
regulation. The main intention standing behind this decision was to design a 
regulatory framework which would be as comprehensive as possible and have a 
sound legal basis, tailored to the realisation of the SEM (Single European 
Market).139
Preparing the legislative dossier which was commonly referred to as 
‘Television without Frontiers’ was characterised by intense consultations 
between DG Internal Market and DG Culture. Other Commission DGs made 
little or no input as the dossier was considered the unquestionable domain of 
DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and, to a more limited extent, DG
140Culture. DG Culture continued to agree with DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs on the need to propose a directive based on the common 
market principles and to combine elements of liberalisation and re-regulation. 
Debate between the two DGs emerged over the details of legislation. In DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, the main objective continued to be that 
television broadcasts were received and retransmitted freely in all member
141states. Its approach centred on a framework containing as little regulation as 
possible and leaving sufficient space to market forces. DG Culture, in contrast, 
was committed to address cultural and social aims (such as the achievement of 
an ever closer union by means of enabling Community citizens to receive 
broadcasts from member states other than their own). This included making 
the Commission adopt stricter provisions than those envisaged by DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs. For example, DG Culture called for measures
142which would protect the European film industry. The idea was to place quotas 
on broadcasters to transmit a minimum of productions of European and 
‘independent’ origin. Initially this idea met with scepticism in DG Internal
Interview N um ber 4 , Interview N um ber 8, Interview N um ber 9.
140
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Market and Industrial Affairs whose main interest was to encourage investment 
and the realisation of the common market rather than creating new layers of 
regulation.
In order to resolve their disputes on the details of the ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ directive, DG Culture and DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
engaged in consultations that took place in the context of their working groups 
as well as through personal contacts. In spite of the leading position implied by 
its formal responsibility for the dossier, DG Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs considered it unwise to simply dismiss the ideas advocated by DG Culture 
- even though they implied more regulation than DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs wanted. DG Internal Market took the view that granting the 
control over the definition of cultural and social aims to DG Culture would
143reduce conflict and facilitate the building of consensus. In autumn 1985 it 
was announced that DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs would accept 
measures to promote the production of European programmes and that it 
would include a quota of 50 per cent for works of European origin to the draft 
directive. Another issue which caused debate between DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs and DG Culture was the regulation of advertising. DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs aimed at allowing advertising up to 15 per cent of 
daily programme time, applicable to cross-frontier broadcasting only. Member
144states would be free to impose stricter rules on national broadcasting. Initially 
DG Culture considered the threshold of 15 per cent too high and opted for 
stricter rules but later agreed to fix an advertising limit of 15 per cent of daily 
programming time of any television programme.
The draft directive ‘Television without Frontiers*
When after a few months DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and DG 
Culture had resolved their debate on the quotas and the advertising rules, the
143
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‘Television without Frontiers’ dossier passed the Commission’s formal decision- 
taking procedures without causing great controversies. In April 1986, less than 
one year after drafting had started, the Commission officially adopted the 
proposal for a directive on ‘Television without Frontiers’ (European
145Commission 1986). The finalised version of the proposal was largely in line 
with earlier drafts prepared on DG level, its provisions grounded on television 
and radio broadcasting as economic activities and combining liberalisation with 
regulatory harmonisation. Responding to the requests made by DG Culture, DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs had attached to the draft directive a 
memorandum that listed cultural and social aims as a priority of Community 
legislation, followed by economic aims such as the freedom to provide
146broadcasting services and the free circulation of broadcasts.
As regards liberalisation, the draft directive centred on advertising, the 
cornerstone of the proposal. It contained a provision that authorised advertising 
for the cross-frontier transmission of television programmes - limited to 15 per 
cent of advertising of the total daily air time (European Commission 1986). 
Member states were free to authorise, ban or limit the air time of radio and 
television advertising transmitted and received only on their territory. As 
regards regulatory requirements provisions included advertising, copyright, the 
protection of young people from harmful programmes, and quotas for 
European and ‘independent’ productions. For example, the proposal provided 
for a complete ban of advertising of tobacco and several restrictions on 
advertising of alcohol. Member states were left the option to lay down stricter 
and more detailed rules. The quota provisions obliged all television 
broadcasters to broadcast 30 per cent of programmes of Community origin and 
5 per cent of programmes produced independently (European Commission
1986). Rules were also proposed for copyright, applying to cross-frontier 
programme transmission by cable, and the protection of young people by 
means of requiring member states to prohibit harmful programmes while 
leaving them free to enact stricter or more detailed rules.
145
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The draft directive was debated under the co-operation procedure in the 
European Parliament and the Internal Market Council. In the Council of 
Ministers, the directive almost failed, due to a potential blocking minority under 
qualified majority voting. The European Commission revised its proposal on 
‘Television without Frontiers’ twice, mainly to make the quota provisions for
147television productions less binding. The copyright provisions were dropped, 
whereas an Article was added to the directive regulating for the right-of-reply 
granted to any natural or legal person. The directive was adopted in October 
1989 and entered into force in October 1991.148
Policy coordination in the telecommunications sector
Setting the policy agenda
Growing awareness in the European Commission
Until the 1980s, no Community policy on telecommunications existed as such. 
In the mid-1970s, the telecommunications sector had started to undergo 
fundamental transformation, triggered by its convergence with information 
technology. New communications services and applications emerged, such as 
facsimile, videotext and data transmission. Within the European Commission, 
there was no Directorate General with specific responsibility for the 
telecommunications sector. It was widely acknowledged that 
telecommunications issues fell into the domain of the DG for Internal Market
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149and Industrial Affairs and its industrial policy branch. The interest taken by 
the DG in the rapidly changing telecommunications sector was part of its 
concern for a competitive industry and the opening of European markets by 
means of liberalisation and ‘deregulation’ measures. The early stages of the 
Commission’s telecommunications policy were therefore based on an industrial 
policy framework.
On the initiative of DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, the 
Commission published two documents on the telecommunications in the late 
1970s: a Communication on ‘New Information Technologies’ (European 
Commission 1979) and ‘Recommendations on Telecommunications’ 
(European Commission 1980). In these documents, DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs drew attention to ‘the vital importance of an efficient 
telecommunications infrastructure’ (European Commission 1980, p. 2). Stating 
that ‘neither Community-wide services, nor a Community-wide market for 
terminals or other telecommunications equipment exist’ (European 
Commission 1980, p. 3), the Commission claimed that an efficient low-cost 
communication infrastructure would be essential to support the vast range of 
new sand increasingly transnational services. DG Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs saw a need for minimum regulatory harmonisation at Community level 
concerning, for example, mutual recognition. The four Recommendations were 
submitted for adoption by the Council and envisaged the creation and opening 
up of a Community-wide telecommunications market, suggesting, for example, 
that member states consult each other on technological standards and type 
approval and undertake limited steps to open up markets (e.g. by seeking
150competitive proposals for the procurement of equipment). In the meantime, 
the European Parliament intensified its calls for the creation of a Community 
market for telecommunications terminal equipment and the development of 
advanced telecommunications services and networks. In a number of
Interview  N um ber 9 , Interview N um ber 16. Similar observations have b een  m ade by Dang-
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resolutions and reports it requested the European Commission to explore
151opportunities to realise such a market.
The creation ofDG Telecoms
In 1983, on the initiative of Industry Commissioner Etienne Davignon who took 
a great interest in communications and information technologies, a Task Force 
was set up from an industrial policy division in DG Internal Market and
152 ______Industrial Affairs. The so-called Information Technology Task Force (ITTF) 
was primarily created to deal with overseeing the implementation of the RACE 
and ESPRIT programmes (see Chapter Two). Its mission was to promote the 
effectiveness and competitiveness of European telecommunications markets in
153the face of technological change and internationalisation. In this context, 
some officials, most of which were recruited from DG Internal Market and 
Industry, engaged in exploring the consequences of far-reaching technological 
and economic changes that affected the telecommunications sector and their 
impact on established national regulatory systems.
Between 1983 and 1985, the Task Force prepared several consultative 
documents that were later officially adopted by the Commission and that 
examined the changing telecommunications sector (European Commission 
1983 b, 1983c, 1984b, 1985a). The Task Force had consulted with DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs and, to a lesser extent, DG XII for Science and 
Research on these documents. As there was a high level of agreement between 
the Directorates General regarding the content of the consultative documents 
and as the authority of the Task Force to prepare them was generally accepted, 
the preparation of the documents was characterised by unity rather than
For an overview o f  action  taken E uropean Parliam ent see E uropean C om m ission  (1 9 8 7 , p.
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154conflict. Hence, they were rapidly adopted and the finalised versions were 
closely in line with previous drafts.
Acknowledging the economic importance of the telecommunications sector, 
the documents identified the weaknesses of the European telecommunications 
market, notably its fragmentation into national markets and the slow 
exploitation of new technologies due to low investment. According to the Task 
Force, this weakness endangered Europe’s competitiveness vis-a-vis the United 
States and Japan (e.g. European Commission 1983b, p. 12; 1984b, p. 8f.). As 
the main objectives of Community action the Task Force identified the 
promotion of new services and markets (e.g. telematics) and the full use of new 
technologies to advance the communications infrastructures in the Community. 
It also recommended Community legislation, proposing regulation which would 
create and stimulate a Community-wide market for telecommunications services 
and terminals. For example, the documents suggested a harmonisation of 
standards and approval procedures for terminal equipment (European 
Commission 1984b, p. i3f.). As regards the scope and level of Community 
harmonisation, the Task Force emphasised that the Commission’s approach
155would be mostly ‘deregulatory’ in nature. Because agenda-setting was still at 
an early stage, the documents were mostly exploratory in nature and refrained 
from making any more detailed policy recommendations. Nevertheless, they 
proved significant as that they marked the rising of awareness in the 
Commission that the telecommunications sector represented a policy area for 
regulatory harmonisation and liberalisation.
The preparation of the 1987 *Green Paper ’ on Telecommunications
In 1986, the European Commission began to take more concrete steps towards 
a Community telecommunications policy. The Task Force acquired the formal
154
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status of a Directorate General, called DG ‘Telecommunications, Information 
and Innovation Industry’ (commonly known as DG XIII or ‘DG Telecoms’). In 
the same year, a division within the newly-founded DG, called 
‘Telecommunications Policy’, came up with the idea to look into regulatory 
changes at Community level. The authority of DG Telecoms to explore a 
Community dimension of legislation on telecommunications was broadly 
accepted among other Commission DGs as it fell within its institutional mission 
to deal with the telecommunications sector.156
Given the success of the Green Paper on ‘Television without Frontiers’ (see 
previous sections), the idea emerging in DG Telecoms was to draft a ‘Green 
Paper’, a consultative document which would set out the Commission’s policy 
priorities for the telecommunications sector and build the basis for public
157consultations. The drafting of the Green Paper was the work of a small unit 
directed by Herbert Ungerer. The unit planned to provide a detailed analysis of 
the policy sector and to propose limited liberalisation and regulation at 
Community level. In the view of DG Telecoms, the traditional organisation of 
the telecommunications sector prevented the full development of new services 
and the realisation of an open and dynamic market. The officials identified a 
fourfold impetus for Community action: technological developments (notably 
the emerging new value-added services); the economic situation (i.e. the 
potential for more growth and investment in the sector); the trends towards 
liberalisation in some member states and the fact that different re-regulatory 
systems implied potential barriers to intra-Community trade; and the aim of 
realising the Single European Market (see European Commission 1987).
The drafting of the Green Paper began during the second half of 1986. DG 
Telecoms consulted on its provisions with two other DGs, the DGs for the 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and the DG for Competition. For DG 
Telecoms, coordination with these two DGs was important for two main reasons: 
first, in order to strengthen its position as a newly-founded DG and to give its 
voice more weight in the Commission, it sought to gather broad internal
156
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support for its policy strategy; secondly, it considered the legal expertise of 
officials in DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and in DG Competition 
useful to develop legislation on a sound legal basis.158
As most officials in DG Telecoms had formerly worked in DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs, the links between the two Commission DGs were
159strong. DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs shared the interest of DG
Telecoms to introduce Community legislation as this was in line with its efforts
to promote the creation of the SEM and to achieve the full implementation of
the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services. DG Internal
Market also supported the promotion of the telecommunications industry and
the application of new technologies and services. In 1985, DG Internal Market
and Industrial Affairs had drafted the White Paper on ‘Completing the Internal
Market’ which emphasised the importance of the telecoms network
infrastructure and services as the backbone of the prospering of intra-
Community trade and services (European Commission 1985b). Consultations
between the two DGs mostly took place in informal working groups and there
was little or no conflict concerning the provisions of the Green Paper on
160Telecommunications. DG Telecoms took up the input from DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs, for example by linking its policy programme to 
the single market framework.161
A greater and more significant input to the preparation of the Green Paper 
originated from DG Competition (DG IV). Officials in DG Competition agreed 
with DG Telecoms over basic policy aims, assigning primary importance to a 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector. Given its mission to promote 
competition in the Community’s markets, DG Competition had an interest in
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fostering an opening of telecoms markets in the Community.162 Since 1985, DG 
Competition had decided a number of cases of close relevance to the 
telecommunications sector which confirmed that telecommunications
163administrations were fully subject to the Treaty rules. DG Competition had 
also sought ways to issue ex-ante regulation by means of following the so-called 
Article 90 procedure empowering the European Commission to issue its own
164directives (see Chapter Two). It considered the telecommunications sector as 
a policy domain to which the Article 90 procedure might be applied. Due to its 
interest in advancing competition in the common market and in consolidating 
its powers to use the Article 90 procedure, DG Competition showed itself 
supportive of the attempts made by DG Telecoms to introduce Community 
legislation to the telecommunications sector.165 Officials in DG Telecoms, in 
turn, welcomed the opportunity to advance a Community policy for the
telecommunications sector based on accordance with the traditionally powerful
166DG Competition. Officials in both DGs therefore regarded a close 
collaboration as a welcome window of opportunity to advance their own 
interests.
The two DGs shared an interest not only in establishing Community 
competence, but also agreed on the substance of the policy approach to be
167taken by the European Commission. It was undisputed that the emphasis was 
going to be on the opening of the markets for terminal equipment and 
telecommunications services other than voice telephony, for example facsimile 
and data communications. DG Telecoms and DG Competition also intended to 
propose a separation of regulatory and operational functions of
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telecommunications administrations, and to combine liberalisation with 
measures to harmonise telecommunications standards and user conditions (e.g. 
interoperability). In 1986 and early 1987, they engaged in consultations on the 
Green Paper on telecommunications. These consultations mostly took place in 
inter-service working groups or through personal contacts. They largely 
excluded other Commission DGs that were either not interested or simply 
endorsed the strategy chosen by DG Competition and DG Telecoms. Apart from
making its input on the common market framework, DG Internal Market and
168Industrial Affairs largely kept out of the preparation process. The preparation 
of the Green Paper therefore took place in a rather small circle of people.
During their talks the two DGs agreed that the Commission would issue a 
directive under Article 90 introducing limited liberalisation for terminal
169equipment and advanced telecommunications services. They both considered 
a Commission directive a more efficient instrument than a directive which 
would need the approval of the Council and the European Parliament and be 
subject to a much more complicated decision-taking process. The two DGs 
decided that in the Green Paper on Telecommunications they would abstain 
from explicitly announcing the application of the Article 90 procedure, but
170instead refer to a possible use. Following a speedy preparation process led by 
DG Telecoms which collaborated closely with DG Competition, the finalised 
version of the ‘Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunications Services and Equipment’ was sent to the cabinets and 
Commissioners. There it caused little debate. The Commissioners responsible, 
Karl-Heinz Naijes for Telecommunications and Industry, Peter Sutherland for
168
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Competition, and Lord Cockfield for the Internal Market, were reported to be 
largely in agreement as they shared the concern for an open
• * 171telecommunications market and European competitiveness. In June 1987, 
less than one year after its initiation, the Commission adopted the Green Paper 
on the ‘Development of a Common Market for Telecommunications Services 
and Equipment’ (European Commission 1987), hereafter the ‘1987 Green 
Paper’.
The 1987 ‘Green Paper* on Telecommunications
The central statement of the ‘1987 Green Paper’ was that there had to be 
substantial changes to national regulatory systems by means of Community 
regulation. The establishment of Community regulation was set in the context 
of the completion of the Single European Market and the establishment of a 
Community-wide information market. Liberalisation was to be combined with 
measures to harmonise national standards and user conditions. As regards 
liberalisation, the Green Paper proposed a phased complete opening of the 
terminal equipment market to competition and the free and unrestricted 
provision of all services other than public voice telephony (European 
Commission 1987, p. 6 if.). The European Commission accepted the continued 
exclusive provision or granting of special rights regarding the provision and 
operation of network infrastructure. The continued exclusive provision or 
special rights regarding the provision of a limited number of 
telecommunications services (voice telephony being the only obvious 
candidate) was confirmed on the basis of making it subject to review at given 
intervals. The Commission also called for a clear separation of regulatory and 
operational functions of telecoms administrations and the partial opening of 
the market for satellite ground stations to competition (European Commission 
1987, p. 73f.).
As regards regulatory harmonisation, the ‘1987 Green Paper* proposed the 
establishment of the Open Network Provision, called ‘ONP’. ONP would govern 
the access to the telecommunications infrastructure, for example by establishing
171
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conditions for interoperability and interconnection and including the 
requirement for telecommunications tariffs to follow cost trends. DG Telecoms 
and DG Competition emphasised that the Commission did not intend to 
propose legislation which would cover more than a minimum needed to achieve 
the objective of an integrated, competitive European telecommunications 
market. For example, the Commission made explicit that it did not intend to 
propose legislation covering the status or the ownership of network operators 
and telecommunications administrations (i.e. PTOs), the policy regarding 
leased lines and the resale of line capacity (European Commission 1987, p. 13, 
15, 184).
The preparation of legislation
With the publication of its ‘1987 Green Paper’, the European Commission 
launched consultations with telecommunications organisations and companies. 
The consultations were led by DG Telecoms which aimed at identifying 
common positions on the future legislative framework and persuading a
172majority of outside actors to support its ideas. The consultations revealed a 
broad consensus on the aims of liberalisation and harmonisation, whereas in 
terms of the details, different positions prevailed, for example as regards to 
liberalisation and re-regulation of satellite communications or the creation
173common tariff principles. In February 1988, on the initiative of DG Telecoms, 
the Commission published a Communication (European Commission 1988a) 
which summarised the results of the consultations. The Communication was 
essentially the work of DG Telecoms, but also included contributions made by 
DG Competition. It was intended to present details on the Commission’s policy 
strategy. Officials in DG Competition and DG Telecoms decided to continue
Interview  N um ber 9 , Interview N um ber 13.
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174their double strategy of liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation. As the 
two DGs had previously agreed on the substance and most of the details of 
legislation and other Commission DGs continued to be either supportive or not 
interested, the preparation and adoption of the Communication had caused
175little debate and taken less than three months.
The Communication (European Commission 1988a) identified areas for 
which the Commission considered concrete policy actions necessary. Most 
importantly, these included the full opening of the terminal equipment market 
and the progressive opening of the services market. The Communication 
announced that the Commission would adopt two directives following the 
Article 90 procedure (European Commission 1988a, p. 22f.). As regards re­
regulation, the Commission announced the submission of a proposal for a 
directive on Open Network Provision (ONP) establishing conditions for 
interoperability and interconnection.
The directive on liberalising terminal equipment
During the following months, DG Competition and DG Telecoms intensified 
their collaboration. A major step on the way to implement the Green Paper was 
the initiative on liberalising terminal equipment. No later than three months 
after its notification, the directive would oblige member states to withdraw any 
special or exclusive rights granted to undertakings bringing into service or 
providing the maintenance of terminal equipment (such as modems or fax 
machines). The application and enforcement of Article 90 fell within the 
domain of DG Competition. Hence, the preparation of a Commission directive 
on terminal equipment was essentially the responsibility of DG Competition. 
This was broadly accepted by a majority of Commission DGs, including DG 
Telecoms.176
174
S ee contributions m ade by C om m ission m em bers C arpentier (1 9 9 1 ); N aijes (1 9 8 8 );
U ngerer and  C ostello (1 9 8 8 ).
175
Interview N um ber 9, Interview N um ber 11, Interview N um ber 13.
176 Interview Number 9, Interview Number 11, Interview Number 13.
104
DG Telecoms officials had a great interest in shaping the draft directive. 
Given that its unit for ‘Telecommunications Policy’ was resourced with more 
staff than the unit responsible in DG Competition, DG Competition welcomed
177its input. Under the leadership of DG Competition, the two DGs collaborated 
-  mostly in their semi-permanent working groups. In the course of 
coordination, dispute among the two DGs concerned the details of legislation. 
In order to facilitate coordination, the units responsible in DG Competition and 
DG Telecoms allocated the responsibility for the Open Network Provision 
(ONP) exclusively to DG Telecoms and decided to run the drafting of a 
proposal for a directive on ONP, the centrepiece of re-regulation,
• 178simultaneously with the drafting of liberalisation directives. By assigning 
liberalisation to DG Competition and re-regulation to DG Telecoms resulted in 
an efficient division of labour. Each DG concentrated on its respective task and 
continued to consult the other DG. During the months and years to follow, this 
would significantly strengthen the relationship between the DG Competition 
and DG Telecoms (see Chapter Four).
As a result of the preliminary consultations and their quasi-institutionalised 
division of work, DG Competition and DG Telecoms finalised what they called a 
‘final draft’ of a directive liberalising terminal equipment in April 1988, only a 
few months after public consultations on the ‘1987 Green Paper’ had 
concluded. The draft directive introduced a liberalisation schedule in the area 
of terminal equipment, asking member states to abolish ‘special or exclusive 
rights’ granted to PTOs concerning telephone sets, modems, telex terminals 
and other terminal equipment. In addition, member states were obliged to 
regularly communicate to the Commission a list of technical specifications and
179 __
type-approval procedures for terminal equipment. The College of 
Commissioners did not adopt the directive straightaway, but presented the draft 
text at an informal meeting of member states* telecommunications ministers.
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Some member states heavily criticised the use of Article 90(3), preferring a 
proposal for a directive to be adopted under the Article 100a procedure on the 
approximation of laws that would involve the European Parliament and the 
Council. During negotiations with member states, the Commission made few
concessions to national delegates, mainly concerning implementation
180timetables and technical specifications. In May 1988, less than four months 
after publishing its Communication on the results of the public consultations on 
the 1987 Green Paper (European Commission 1988a) and in line with the 
timetable set out herein, the College of Commissioners adopted the ‘Directive 
on Competition in the Markets in Telecommunications Terminal 
Equipment’.181
The directive on liberalising services
As foreseen in the ‘1987 Green Paper’ (European Commission 1987), the 
next step towards market opening and liberalisation was to open value-added 
services (VANs), i.e. telecommunications services other than public voice 
telephony, to competition. DG Competition and DG Telecoms continued their 
productive collaboration by consulting each other and exchanging their views 
on a second Commission directive, called the ‘Services Directive’. The
preparation process started even before the directive on terminal equipment
182was finalised. During the consultations which were mostly led in their inter­
service groups, DG Competition and DG Telecoms worked out a consensus on 
the details of the ‘Services directive’. Member states would be obliged to 
withdraw all special or exclusive rights for the supply of telecommunications
180
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services other than voice telephony and to separate the regulatory powers of 
PTOs from their commercial activities from January 1991.
Other Commission DGs did not interfere significantly with the preparation 
of the directive liberalising services. The strategy pursued by DG Competition 
and DG Telecoms was generally accepted. For example, the DG for the Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs had just started to undertake efforts to open 
public procurement, including telecommunications (European Commission 
1988c and d). This contributed to increase the momentum of the liberalisation
183strategy pursued by DG Competition and DG Telecoms. In late 1988, DG 
Competition, in collaboration with DG Telecoms, was about to finalise a 
directive which liberalised the provision of value-added services. Policy 
formulation had proceeded rapidly and the final draft closely reflected earlier
184propositions. The directive was planned to be implemented progressively,
183exempting voice telephony and telex from competition. In addition to the 
abolition of exclusive rights granted to PTOs for the provision of VANs, the 
directive asked for the separation of regulatory powers maintained by PTOs 
from their commercial activities. Other provisions included that PTOs had to 
enable their customers to terminate long-term contracts.
Commissioners were expected to discuss and adopt the directive before the 
end of the year, after presenting an informal draft to the Internal Market 
Council.186 In December 1988, following opposition from member states against 
the draft text submitted by the Commission, the Commission re-scheduled the 
final adoption of the directive for March 1989. This was mainly intended to 
allow for more time for negotiations between the Commission and member
187 •states. This decision was taken only shortly before a new Commission was 
introduced in early 1989. For competition, Commissioner Peter Sutherland was
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succeeded by Sir Leon Brittan. For telecommunications and industry, 
Commissioner Karl-Heinz Naijes was succeeded by Filippo Maria Pandolfi. The 
two new Commissioners were less in agreement on the Commission’s plans to 
liberalise telecommunications services by means of an Article 90 directive than
their predecessors. Brittan supported the adoption of a Commission directive,
188 __whereas Pandolfi opposed it. The dissent between Brittan and Pandolfi 
concentrated on how the Commission should proceed to liberalise 
telecommunications services. Eventually, Commissioners decided to stick to a 
Commission directive, but to modify some of its provisions, such as whether to 
liberalise basic data communications services and the date of entry into force -
• • 189and to postpone its adoption by a few months. The fact that the directive was 
adopted later than foreseen and that it differed from its earlier version in some 
respects was therefore not due to conflicts divisions occurring on the 
administrative level of the Commission, but primarily a consequence of the fact 
that its adoption co-incided with the re-organisation of the political level of the
190Commission.
The Commissioner cabinets decided that the directive would restrict the 
liberalisation of data communications and grant derogations and special
191transitional arrangements to some member states. DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms modified the draft directive accordingly. The College of
192Commissioner adopted the ‘Services Directive’ in June 1989. The directive 
prescribed a gradual opening up of the telecommunications market until 31 
December 1992. Member states were bound to withdraw exclusive rights for the 
provision of telecommunications services other than voice telephony. The 
directive did not apply to telex, mobile radio telephony, paging and satellite 
communications services. Data transmission was liberalised, but liberalisation 
was made subject to permission from member states authorities. Member states
188
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making the provision of services subject to a licensing procedure were bound to 
ensure objective, non-discriminatory and transparent conditions for granting 
such licenses. The maintenance of special or exclusive rights for the provision 
or operation of telecommunications networks was bound to the establishment 
of objective and non-discriminatory conditions governing access to the 
networks. From July 1991, PTOs had to separate their regulatory from their 
commercial functions.
Re-regulation: The Open Network Provision
In an attempt to reduce conflict and to facilitate coordination, DG Competition 
and DG Telecoms had previously arranged that the latter would be granted the 
sole authority to prepare re-regulatory proposals for implementing the ONP 
(see above). After the publication on the follow-up Communication on the 
‘1987 Green Paper’ (European Commission 1988b) DG Telecoms started 
drafting a proposal for a directive for adoption by the European Parliament and 
the Council under the co-operation procedure. The ‘Telecommunications 
Policy’ unit in DG Telecoms aimed at a Community-wide harmonisation of 
principles governing the access to telecommunications networks (European 
Commission 1987, p. 69). ONP was to consist of three parts: technical 
conditions that would enable networks to connect with each other; service 
conditions supplying users with certain minimum standards; and tariff
193principles that would enable users to compare prices.
DG Competition accepted the provisions made by DG Telecoms as it 
considered a legislative solution useful to avoid lengthy legal conflicts with 
telecommunications administrations over the provision of network
194infrastructure to users and competitors. At the same time, it had an interest in 
avoiding contradictions with the definitions and concepts set out in the 
liberalisation directives and in keeping what it considered the right balance 
between market opening and re-regulation. DG Telecoms consulted extensively 
with DG Competition, mostly in their working groups that preceded formalised
193
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inter-service consultations and therefore excluded other Commissioner services. 
During the preparation process, DG Telecoms continued to rely on the legal 
expertise of DG Competition officials, particularly in the context of balancing
195liberalisation and regulatory measures. Because the two DGs agreed on the 
substance of the ONP proposal, discussion centred on the details, concerning, 
for example, definitions and technical specifications. DG Telecoms and DG 
Competition decided that rather than first publishing a consultative document 
on ONP, the Commission would adopt an informal legislative proposal to be 
made available to the public. Building consultations with outside actors on an 
existing detailed draft rather than an exploratory document, the officials 
involved aimed at speeding up the legislation process.196
Following a preparation process which lasted only a few months, DG 
Telecoms and DG Competition made the draft publicly available together with 
the informal draft of the ‘Services Directive’ in December 1988 (see above). 
The fact that the two DGs managed to make the legislative proposals on 
liberalisation and re-regulation available at the same time indicates the high
197level of agreement between them. The draft directive on ONP was largely in 
line with previous versions: it provided for the harmonisation of conditions for 
open and efficient access to and use of the public telecommunications network 
and already liberalised telecommunications services, allowing for the inclusion 
of technical interfaces, usage conditions and tariff principles to these 
conditions.
The official ONP proposal (European Commission 1988b) adopted by the 
European Commission in January 1989 represented a largely unchanged 
version of the draft proposal agreed on by DG Competition and DG Telecoms. 
Member states showed themselves divided as regards to their position on
198ONP. The amendments made by the Commission to the ONP proposal were
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mostly aimed at strengthening the links between ONP and the Sendees
199Directive. During the final Council Meetings in December 1989, the 
Commission offered the ONP and the Services Directive as a ‘package deal’. It
made the ONP criteria voluntary rather than compulsory, but granted the
200Commission reserve powers to enforce the ONP conditions. The day the
Council adopted the ONP directive, the Commission formally notified the
201Services Directive to become operational.
Conclusion
In the early 1980s, the audiovisual and the telecommunications sectors were 
basically untouched by Community legislation, their regulation being subject to 
national systems of public monopolies and public service traditions. Within less 
than a decade, the situation changed significantly. Under the leadership of the 
European Commission, Community legislation was established to introduce 
limited liberalisation and re-regulation to the two policy domains. The 
Directorates General of the European Commission prepared several important 
consultative documents and comprehensive legislative packages consisting of 
liberalisation and re-regulation measures. The analysis of the first stage of the 
Commission’s legislative policy-making in the audiovisual and the 
telecommunications sector revealed a striking similarity in terms of the central 
variables under study: low levels of administrative fragmentation correlated with 
high legislative outputs.
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In each policy area, the settings of DGs that actively participated in the 
preparation of consultative documents and legislation were limited to two DGs: 
DG Culture and DG Internal Market in the audiovisual sector, and DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms in telecommunications. In the 
telecommunications sector, the setting also included DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs at first. This was largely due to the strong links between DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and DG Telecoms that resulted from the 
fact that many officials of the former had formerly worked in the latter. DG 
Internal Market then gradually withdrew its input, mostly because it accepted 
the policy strategy pursued by DG Telecoms and because it turned to other 
policy priorities, for example public procurement. The initial coordination 
scenario of three DGs shifted towards bilateral collaboration of DG Telecoms 
and DG Competition. In both policy sectors, other DGs took little or no interest 
in the activities of the participating DGs.
In spite of their different missions and outlooks, there was a high level of 
consensus between the DGs involved that related to both the paradigm of 
legislation and the allocation of authority. In the audiovisual field, DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs agreed with DG Culture not only on the need for 
proposing Community legislation, but also on its basic objectives (see Table 2). 
In both DGs it was broadly accepted that the Commission would concentrate on 
liberalisation and market opening and complement such measures with re­
regulation of market conditions and user rights. The logic underlying this 
approach and agreed on by the two DGs was the realisation of the SEM. The fact 
that leadership for ‘Television without Frontiers’ was allocated to DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs was due to the fact that the DG was generally 
accepted to have the greater legal expertise to prepare legislation based on the 
common market. A similar level of agreement could be observed for the 
telecommunications domain in which DG Telecoms and DG Competition were 
united on the need for Community legislation as well as its major objectives -  
achieving a common market by means of combining limited liberalisation with a 
minimum of re-regulation (see Table 3). The two DGs accepted each others’ 
responsibility -  that of DG Competition for liberalisation and that of DG 
Telecoms for re-regulating the telecommunications sector.
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Table 2 Indicators of administrative fragmentation in the audiovisual sector during the 1980s
G reen Paper ‘Television  
without Frontiers’ and  
Interim Report
proposal for a directive 
‘T elevision  without 
Frontiers’
number of DGs two two
differences on paradigm low low
competition for authority low low
overall level of adm. 
fragmentation
low low
Table 3 Indicators of administrative fragmentation in the telecommunications sector during the 
1 9 8 0 s
1087 ‘Green  
Paper’
liberalisation  
o f  terminal 
equipm ent
liberalisation  
o f  services
O pen  Network  
Provision
number of DGs three —► two two two two
differences on 
paradigm
low low low low
competition for 
authority
low low low low
overall level of 
adm.
fragmentation
low low low low
Due to the low levels of administrative fragmentation that prevailed in the two 
policy domains, coordination among the Commission DGs did not meet with 
serious difficulties. Since the different DGs maintained distinct policy agendas 
conflict was inevitable, but limited to the details of legislation and therefore 
rather easy to resolve. Coordination mostly took place in the issue-related 
working groups that were established between the participating DGs and was 
further intensified through the personal contacts between individual officials. 
Coordination was also greatly facilitated by the fact that the participating DGs 
established a division of work which was closely oriented towards their functions 
and interests. In telecommunications, DG Competition concentrated on 
liberalisation measures, while DG Telecoms took responsibility for ONP, the 
centrepiece of re-regulation. In the audiovisual field, DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs maintained control over liberalisation and the regulation of 
market conditions, but was willing to accept the influence taken by DG Culture 
on issues that touched the cultural and social dimension of television 
broadcasting and referred to the public interest.
In both policy domains the collaboration between the participating DGs 
preceded the more formal consultations including other Commission actors, for
X13
example the Legal Service and the cabinets. Following their intense and efficient 
coordination the DGs presented these other actors with detailed policy drafts on 
which there was a high level of agreement. This usually limited the scope of 
debate and reduced conflict, speeding up the overall process of policy 
formulation and decision-taking and making it subject to fewer changes. The 
legislative activities of the participating DGs led the Commission to propose 
several pieces of legislation to which it had previously committed itself in 
consultative documents: two Commission directives introducing limited 
liberalisation and a re-regulatory proposal in the telecommunications sector, 
and a comprehensive legislative package combining elements of liberalisation 
with re-regulation in the audiovisual field (see Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6).
Table 4 Legislative outputs produced by the European Commission in the audiovisual sector 
during the 1 9 8 0 s
Green Paper ‘Television  
without Frontiers’ and 
Interim Report
proposal for a directive 
‘T elevision  without 
Frontiers’
duradon less than twelve months less than twelve months
consistency high high
decision to propose 
legislation
■ proposition of legislation y y
■deferment _ _
■ abandonment — —
overall legislative outputs high ‘" g 1' .. . .
Table 5 Legislative outputs produced by the European Commission in the telecommunications 
sector during the 19 8 0 s
1987 ‘Green  
Paper’
liberalisation  
o f  terminal 
equipm ent
liberalisation  
o f  services
O pen  Network  
Provision
duration less than 
twelve months
less than 
twelve months
less than 
twelve months
less than 
twelve months
consistency h i g h high high
decision to propose 
legislation
■ proposition of y y
legislation
■ deferment — — — —
■ abandonment — — — —
overall legislative high high high high
outputs
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Table 6 Central consultative and legislative documents adopted by the European Commission in
the audiovisual and the telecommunications sectors during the 1980s
year sector type o f  docum ent tide o f  docum ent
19^3 telecoms consultative
document
Commission Communication on  
T elecommunications 
(European Commission 1983b) 
Commission Communication on 
Telecommunications -  Lines o f Action 
(European Commission 1983c)
audiovisual consultative
document
Interim Report on Realities and 
Tendencies in European Television 
(European Commission 1983a)
1984 telecoms consultative
document
Communication on Telecommunications 
(European Commission 1984b)
audiovisual consultative
document
Green Paper on ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ (European Commission 1984a)
1986 audiovisual consultative
document
Proposal for a directive ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ (European Commission 1986)
1987 telecoms consultative
document
1987 ‘Green Paper’ on 
T elecommunications 
(European Commission 1987)
1988 telecoms consultative
document
Follow-up to ‘Green Paper’ on  
T elecommunications 
(European Commission 1988a.)
telecoms legal instrument Commission directive on competition in 
markets for terminal equipment 
(Directive 8 8 /3 0 1 /EC )
^ 8 9 telecoms legislative proposal Proposal for a Council Directive on 
implementing ONP 
(European Commission 1988b)
1990 telecoms legal instrument Commission directive on competition in 
markets for telecommunications services 
(Directive 9 0 /3 3 8 /E C )
The following two chapters analyse the second major phase of legislative policy­
making that was undertaken by the European Commission in the two sectors. As 
will be shown, the similar configurations of administrative fragmentation and 
legislative outputs that were observed for the first stage of policy-making gave 
way to significant variation between the two policy domains from the early to the 
mid-1 9 9 0 s. Chapter Four examines the preparation of legislation in the 
telecommunications sector and shows how low levels of administrative 
fragmentation enabled the European Commission to produce high legislative 
outputs. Chapter Five analyses the Commission’s legislative activities in the 
audiovisual field and demonstrates how a significant increase in administrative 
fragmentation intensified conflict and made the proposition of legislation more 
difficult.
n 5
Part Two:
The
Refinement
and
Expansion o f 
the European 
Commission’s
Legislative
Activities,
199°  “  * 996
Chapter Four: From 
Collaboration to Partnership -  
Coordination in the 
Telecommunications Sector
Introduction
This chapter examines the second major phase of legislative policy-making 
undertaken by the European Commission in the telecommunications sector. 
The 1990s mark a decade which fundamentally transformed the 
telecommunications landscape in the European Union from a situation in 
which national state monopolies dominated into a liberalised European market
for networks and a wide variety of different communications services. Much of
202 . .this development was shaped by Community legislation. The present chapter 
analyses the efforts undertaken by the Directorates General of the European 
Commission to prepare this legislation. Having established a 
telecommunications policy in the late 1980s by means of consultative 
documents and proposals for several directives that introduced limited 
liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation in the late 1980s (see Chapter 
Three), the two participating Commission DGs, DG Telecoms and DG 
Competition, now sought to refine and expand Community authority.
The chapter shows how within five years, DG Telecoms and DG Competition 
prepared six important consultative documents setting out the Commission’s 
future course of action and drafted proposals for ten different directives aimed 
at liberalisation and the extension of ONP (Open Network Provision) 
respectively. The efforts jointly undertaken by DG Competition and DG
202
E.g. Eliassen and Sjovaag (1 9 9 9 ); Schm idt (1998a); T hatcher (2 0 0 1 ).
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Telecoms led to legislation designed to liberalise satellite communications, 
mobile telephony, cable infrastructure and, finally, voice telephony. On the 
initiative of DG Competition and DG Telecoms, the Commission also prepared 
several re-regulatory proposals harmonising member states’ provisions on a wide 
range of issues, for example interconnection, universal service, and licensing. 
The period under study ends concludes with 1996, the year in which the 
European Commission adopted its directive introducing full competition to 
voice telephony by 1 January 1998.
Since the relatively low level of administrative fragmentation observed for 
the 1980s persisted, DG Telecoms and DG Competition were able to continue 
and intensify their relationship. In spite of their different missions that made 
DG Competition focus on competition and DG Telecoms concentrate on the 
promotion of new telecommunications services, alternative networks, and more 
consumer choice, the two DGs managed to consent on the basic objectives of 
legislation and on sharing authority for the telecommunications sector. They 
both envisaged an open and competitive market, the promotion of new services, 
standardisation and minimum rules regulating issues such as the access to 
networks and user conditions. It remained undisputed among the two DGs that 
DG Competition would be responsible for liberalisation and DG Telecoms for 
re-regulation. Other Commission DGs did not significantly affect policy-making 
as they were either not interested or simply endorsed the policy strategy 
pursued by DG Competition and DG Telecoms. Controversy between the two 
DGs did occur but was limited to the details of legislative initiatives, such as how 
provisions would balance general competition law and sector-specific 
regulation.
As in the 1980s, coordination between DG Telecoms and DG Competition 
was intense and mostly managed by means of informal consultations, a division 
of policy responsibilities and an exchange of staff. DG Telecoms and DG 
Competition managed to resolve contentious issues and to supply other 
Commission actors with detailed legislative drafts. The result was high legislative 
outputs produced by the European Commission: fast and coherent policy­
making that culminated in a large number of decisions to propose Community 
legislation. The argument emerging from the analysis is that the Directorates
1 1 8
General of the Commission are able to overcome conflict provided that it does 
not relate to the paradigm of legislation or the division of authority. Low levels 
of fragmentation enable the DGs to make use of several coordinating activities 
that help accommodating conflict and therefore make higher legislative outputs 
more likely.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. A first section analyses the 
attempts undertaken by DG Competition and DG Telecoms to consolidate 
existing lines of action established during the 1980s. It is shown how the two 
DGs used the provisions made in the 1987 ‘Green Paper’ on 
Telecommunications (European Commission 1987; see Chapter Three) to 
prepare further legislative proposals. The second section examines the setting 
of a new policy agenda by means of preparing the 1992 ‘Review on 
Telecommunications’ (European Commission 1992b) and the drafting of 
several other consultative documents that prepared the ground for the full 
liberalisation of telecommunications. Coordination between the two DGs was 
most intense and effective during this period. The third section analyses the 
preparation of legislation. It shows that the drafting of these proposals mostly 
was a process of implementing the compromises achieved during agenda-setting 
and therefore caused little conflict. A final section will present conclusions on 
the management of conflict and the course of policy coordination in the 
European Commission and summarise the dominant configurations of 
administrative fragmentation and legislative outputs that emerged during the 
period under study.
The consolidation of existing legislation
The implementation of the 1987 *Green Paper* on Telecommunications
The 1987 ‘Green Paper’ on Telecommunications (European Commission
1987) had set out a long-term approach of combining liberalisation with 
regulatory harmonisation -  a strategy which had come to be accepted by a large
203majority of Commission actors (see Chapter Three). Besides the issues of 
liberalising terminal equipment and advanced telecommunications services, for 
example facsimile and data communications, and regulating for ONP, the 
Green Paper referred to other areas of liberalisation and re-regulation. For 
example, it envisaged the opening of satellite communications and the 
extension of ONP conditions to leased lines and voice telephony. In the early 
1990s, the Directorates General of the Commission engaged in preparing 
legislation to implement these ideas.
The liberalisation of satellite communications
As indicated in the 1987 ‘Green Paper’ on Telecommunications (European 
Commission 1987, p. 14), an important issue coming up in the context of 
liberalising the telecommunications sector was satellite communications. The 
term ‘satellite communications’ referred both to the network infrastructure and 
the provision of satellite-based telecommunications or broadcasting services. As 
regards its network dimension, the ‘1987 Green Paper* (European Commission 
1987, p. 14) proposed a partial opening of the market in satellite ground 
stations to competition, particularly for receive-only earth stations. Officials in 
DG Competition envisaged even more far-reaching liberalisation: by means of 
legislation private operators ought to be allowed to offer satellite-based 
telecommunications services in competition with national operators in all 
member states.204 This view was shared by DG Telecoms that considered the 
liberalisation of satellite communications an important step on the path to an 
integrated and efficient telecommunications market. In 1990, the two 
Commission DGs prepared a Green Paper on satellite communications, a 
consultative document exploring a liberalisation of the satellite market, with the 
principal drafting responsibility to be taken by DG Telecoms.
As there was no dissent between DG Competition and DG Telecoms on 
whether to liberalise satellite communications, the preparation of the Green 
Paper proceeded in a straightforward manner. Based on a period of pre­
203
Interview N um ber 9 , Interview N um ber 16.
204 Interview Number 9, Interview Number 13.
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consultations with outside actors and on close co-ordination between the two 
DGs in their inter-service working groups, DG Telecoms drafted a document 
text which suggested extending the principles of liberalisation and 
harmonisation to the satellite market. The document recommended two major 
changes: first, the unrestricted provision and use of satellite terminal 
transmission and reception equipment; second, full, equitable, and non- 
discriminatory access for users to all providers of satellite space capacity. DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms also called for the separation of regulatory and 
operational functions of operators with regard to the provision and use of earth 
and space capacity and suggested a number of harmonisation measures 
facilitating the provision of Europe-wide services, e.g. mutual recognition of 
type approval and licences, and the promotion of the development of European 
standards (European Commission 1990a, p. 120).
Among other Commission DGs, the Green Paper on satellite 
communications did not prove controversial as they took little or no interest in 
the document and broadly endorsed its provisions as a logical consequence of 
the *1987 Green Paper’ on telecommunications.205 After less than six months, 
the draft Green Paper was forwarded to the cabinets in a largely unchanged 
version. There it caused little debate and the European Commission officially 
adopted the Green Paper on Satellite Communications (European Commission 
1990a) in November 1990. The publication of the Green Paper was followed by 
consultations with external actors and, a little later, the adoption of supportive 
Resolutions by the Council and the European Parliament.206 In 1991, officials in 
DG Competition turned towards drafting a Commission directive based on
. . 207Article 90 which would open satellite communications to competition. Its 
efforts to do so were a direct consequence of its responsibility for advancing 
liberalisation by means of applying general competition law and therefore
Interview  N um ber 13, Interview N um ber 14, Interview N um ber 19.
206 C ouncil R esolution  o f  19 .1 2 .1 9 9 1 , 9 2 /C  8 /0 1 ,  O fficial Journal C 8 /1 ,  14 .1 .1 9 9 2 . E uropean
Parliam ent R esolution , A 3 -0 3 4 4 /9 2 , O fficial Journal C 4 2 /3 0 , 15 .2 .1993 .
207 Interview Number 9, Interview Number 11, Interview Number 13, Interview Number 14,
Interview Number 20.
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broadly accepted by the rest of the Commission, including DG Telecoms whose 
officials made contributions to the drafting of the proposal.
When the draft directive reached a more advanced stage it started travelling 
through the Commission hierarchy. While the idea of liberalising satellite 
communications was broadly accepted among a majority of Commission actors, 
debate arose on its timing. The atmosphere between the Commission and the 
member states was generally tense at the time, due to member states’ opposition 
against the Commission’s use of Article 90 directives to liberalise
telecommunications rather than submitting draft legislation for adoption by the
• 208 Council and the European Parliament. Senior policy-makers in DG
Competition took the view that the use of the Article 90 procedure would fuel
the existing conflict over the adoption of Commission directives and lead to new
allegations of the Commission overstepping its competencies. This concern was
shared by the Legal Service that had raised doubts over the use of Article 90 in
the context of earlier Commission directives (see Chapter Three). A majority of
Commission actors therefore decided that the Commission would postpone
adopting the directive on satellite liberalisation in order to give member states
209the opportunity to comment on the Commission’s liberalisation plans. DG 
Telecoms and DG Competition arranged that a draft of the directive would be 
published as an official Commission document before its actual adoption by the 
Commission as a binding legal instrument. In 1993, the European Commission
submitted a draft directive to member states (European Commission 1993b). In
210terms of its provisions, the draft text was in line with previous versions. It 
proposed to abolish the granting of special or exclusive rights in respect of 
satellite services (with the exception of radio- and television-broadcasting to the 
public and voice telephony) and those relating to the connection of satellite 
earth station equipment. The Commission directive would also provide for
Interview N um ber 11, 20. In its rulings o f  1991 and 1992 , th e E uropean C ourt o f  Justice  
u p h eld  the C om m ission directives on  T erm inal E quipm ent and Services. R uling o f  1 9 .3 .1 9 9 1 , 
Case 2 0 2 /8 8 ,  R uling o f  17 .1 1 .1 9 9 2 , Cases C -2 7 1 /9 0 , C -2 8 1 /9 0 , G 2 8 9 -9 0 . N evertheless, m ost 
m em b er states con tin u ed  to  op p ose the ad option  o f  C om m ission  directives. For a d iscussion  see  
Sauter (1 9 9 5 ); Schm idt (1998a , p. 133 ff.).
209
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authorisation procedures applicable in member states to be based on objective,
transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. Following consultations with
member states and amendments that mainly concerned technical specifications
but left the central provisions of the directive intact, the Commission officially
211adopted the directive in October 1994.
The Open Network Provision
In parallel to the efforts designed to liberalise satellite communications, another 
policy priority of the Commission concerned the consolidation of the ONP 
conditions. Being the cornerstone of re-regulation, ONP was essentially the 
domain of DG Telecoms, due to the division of labour previously agreed 
between DG Competition and DG Telecoms (see Chapter Three). In 1991 and 
1992, DG Telecoms prepared two policy proposals for directives applying ONP 
to leased lines and to voice telephony respectively (European Commission 
1991a and 1992a). The ONP proposal on leased lines (European Commission 
1991a) of February 1991 harmonised usage conditions, tariff* principles, 
standards and ordering procedures for the provision of leased lines. The ONP 
proposal on voice telephony (European Commission 1992a) of August 1992 
regulated the harmonisation of access and use of networks and services and 
established user rights for voice telephony services and regulating access to the 
public telephone network infrastructure and the Community-wide provision of 
voice telephony services.
As with the first ONP proposal, the preparation of the proposals was based 
on close collaboration with DG Competition (see Chapter Three). There was 
little reason for debate between DG Telecoms and DG Competition because 
they had previously agreed on the substance of ONP legislation, mostly in the
context of preparing the ‘1987 Green Paper* (European Commission 1987, p.
212Gpf.). Other DGs broadly endorsed their policy priorities and made little or 
no input to the dossiers. The dossiers passed the formal decision-taking stages
211
C om m ission  D irective 9 4 /4 6 /E C  o f  1 3 .1 0 .1 9 9 4  am en d in g  D irective 8 8 /3 0 1 /E E C  and  
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without causing debates or delays. They were adopted less than twelve months 
after initiation in versions that were largely in line with earlier drafts (European
• • 213Commission 1991a and 1992a). The Council adopted the directive on leased
214lines in June 1992. The adoption of the ONP directive on voice telephony 
failed, due to a lack of agreement between the Council and the European 
Parliament because the latter voted against the proposal in the fear that users’
215interests would not be sufficiently protected.
Setting the agenda for fu ll liberalisation 
The 1992 ‘Telecommunications Review*
Following the efforts undertaken by DG Competition and DG Telecoms to 
consolidate the Commission’s approach to the telecommunications sector, the 
Commission entered a new phase of legislative policy-making in 1992. The 
existing directives called for a review during 1992 of the conditions under 
which the telecommunications sector operated in the Community.216 The 
Commissioners responsible, Sir Leon Brittan for Competition and Filippo Maria 
Pandolfi for Telecommunications, asked DG Competition and DG Telecoms to 
jointly prepare a consultative document which would review the current 
situation, examining further opportunities to liberalise telecommunications
Interview  N u m b er 9 , Interview N um ber 14.
214
C oun cil D irective o f  5 .6 .1 9 9 2  o n  the application  o f  o p en  network provision to  leased  lines, 
O fficial Jou rn al L 165 , 1 9 .6 .1992 , p. 27. T h e final version o f  the directive in clu d ed  a n u m b er o f  
am en d m en ts w hich  w ere m ainly con cession s to m em ber states con cern in g  aspects su ch  as the  
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accou n tin g  system , the con ciliation  procedure (see European C om m ission  1992c for d eta il).
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services and looking into a more far-reaching harmonisation in the context of 
ONP.217
Between DG Telecoms and DG Competition it was agreed that principal 
responsibility for the reviewing exercise would be taken by DG Competition,
because the emphasis was to be on advancing liberalisation, the domain of DG
• • 218   ,Competition. The idea was that the Commission would present an analysis of 
the current situation in the telecommunications sector together with proposals 
for future legislation. As a first step, DG Competition commissioned and 
published two expert studies (Analysis 1992; Arthur D Little 1991). The reports 
claimed that the expansion of telecommunications markets could only be 
achieved by liberalisation, arguing that the early introduction of competitive, 
long-distance intra-Community network operation and service provision were 
the most effective measures to support. They recommended that liberalisation 
be combined with the definition of ONP conditions for carriers and service
219providers and provisions of interconnection.
The assumptions made by Analysis and Arthur D Little corresponded closely 
to the policy priorities maintained in the Directorate for ‘Restrictive Practices, 
Abuse of Dominant Positions and Other Distortions of Competition I* in DG
Competition and the unit ‘Regulatory Aspects, Analyses and Studies* in the
220‘Telecommunications Policy’ Directorate in DG Telecoms. In spring 1992, 
Competition Commissioner Brittan publicly announced that the Commission 
was examining the possibility of introducing more far-reaching liberalisation, 
stating that ‘on the basis of the current review, the Commission will have the 
means to close the gap in terms of liberalisation which exists at present between 
the European telecommunications sector and those of the United States and 
Japan’ (Agence Europe, 23.4.1992). Brittan emphasised that liberalisation was
Interview N um ber 16, Interview N um ber 19, Interview N um ber 20. A lso see , for exam ple,
A gen ce Europe, 2 2 .1 0 .1 9 9 2 , 15 .12 .1992 .
218
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only at an initial stage and by no means complete and that the review currendy
221 ___in progress would not be the last one. The drafting of the review proceeded 
rapidly because DG Competition and DG Telecoms were in basic accordance on 
the substance of their strategy and resolved debate over the details in the 
context of intense consultations that took place in their established inter-service 
working groups, but also between individual Commission officials. Other DGs
did not get actively involved to shape the substance of the Commission’s
. 222 approach.
The draft Communication finalised by the two DGs in early summer 1992 
reviewed the situation of the telecommunications sector and proposed to 
abolish the public monopoly for public voice telephony between member states 
by means of a Commission directive that would liberalise public voice telephony
223during the second half of 1992. While the draft document encountered few 
problems during consultations on DG level, it attracted more serious debate in 
the cabinets and the College of Commissioners. A number of Commissioners 
were hesitant to support the initiative, finding it premature for the Commission
224to commit itself firmly to specific guidelines. In their view, the mandate 
granted to the Commission was to present an assessment document which 
would set out several possible options for future telecommunications policy 
rather than explicitly arguing in favour of extending liberalisation. Particularly 
the liberalisation of voice telephony was considered too ambitious as member 
states were expected to fundamentally oppose such plans. The College of 
Commissioners decided that for the time being the Commission would not 
pursue a strategy of adopting a Commission directive on voice telephony under 
Article 90, but first consult with outside actors. The Review was therefore to 
present several options for liberalisation.
A gen ce E urope, 2 3 .4 .1 9 9 2 . C om m unications W eek International, 2 2 .6 .1 9 9 2 .
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D G  C o m p e t i t i o n  a m e n d e d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  d r a f t  a c c o r d in g ly .  T h e  ‘ 1 9 9 2
Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications Services Sector’ (European
Commission 1992b), hereafter the ‘1992 Review’, was published in October
1992 and outlined four different options for further policies: a freezing of the
liberalisation process; the introduction of extensive regulation of tariffs and
investments; the immediate liberalisation of all voice telephony (national and
international); and an intermediate step of liberalising voice telephony between
member states (1992 Review, p. 25f.). The Review stated clearly the
Commission’s preference for liberalising as an intermediate step voice
226telephony between member states (1992 Review, p. 30). Choosing an option 
which remained behind the most radical solution, i.e. the full liberalisation of 
voice telephony, reflected a strategic consideration of DG Competition and DG
227 __Telecoms. Their intention was to present a solution that would be easier to 
accept for a majority of Commission actors and outside interests than a more 
radical reform. Taking a waiting position until the political climate turned more 
favourable enabled them to circumvent abandoning the aim of full 
liberalisation and to ensure consistency with their policy priorities.
The ‘1992 Review’ set out an assessment of the current situation in the 
sector of telecommunications services, arguing that the lines of action set out in 
the ‘1987 Green Paper’ needed to be further developed in order to fully realise 
the market’s potential. It argued that the technical, market and political context 
had changed substantially and that the introduction of new technologies such as
mobile communications and ISDN remained difficult (e.g. 1992 Review, p.
22821). The document reaffirmed that in the context of the internal market, 
there was a need for both harmonisation and liberalisation, but focused on 
competition (1992 Review, p. 7). The commitment to balancing liberalisation 
and harmonisation served to re-affirm the joint authority of DG Competition
225
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and DG Telecoms for the telecommunications sector, implying that any future 
policy initiative would be based on collaboration and their arranged division of
229labour. The document also set out other fields for which the Commission was 
considering action, most importantly announcing an examination of the 
possibility to extend the ‘Services Directive* to liberalise mobile 
communications (Review 1992, p. 35). It also announced that in order to 
evaluate the use of infrastructures for telecommunications services, DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms would initiate an exploratory study into the 
future relationship between telecommunications networks and cable television 
networks (1992 Review, p. 35). As regards re-regulation, legislation on ONP 
would be extended in order to ensure efficient and effective interconnection 
and the implementation of a Community-wide licensing scheme (1992 Review, 
p- 36).
The commitment to fuU liberalisation
The 1992 Review served as basis for wide-ranging consultations taking place 
over a period of six months and organised by DG Telecoms. During 
consultations a majority of industry actors and member states changed their
230views towards support of full liberalisation including voice telephony. While 
consultations were still underway, a new Commission was introduced. In early 
1993, Commissioner Pandolfi for Telecoms was succeeded by Martin 
Bangemann, a German liberal and previously Commissioner for Industry. For 
Competition, Commissioner Brittan was succeeded by Karel van Miert, a Belgian
Interview N um ber 14, Interview N um ber 19.
230
T h e C om m ission  received m ore than 8 0  written com m en ts from  organisations, com p an ies, 
an d  individuals. In addition , the consultation  involved a series o f  hearings with m ore than  130  
organisations as w ell as m eetin gs with th e A d-H oc H igh-Level C om m ittee o f  N ational 
Regulators. D uring consultations it em erged  that the im pact o f  tech n olog ica l ch an ge, th e  n ew  
d im en sion  o f  the Internal Market, h igh  te lep h o n e charges, the p o o r  use o f  the infrastructure, 
and international com p etition  had caused a  gradual sh ift o f  op in ion . M any operators, 
in ternational firm s an d  business users urged  the C om m ission  to ad op t a m ore far-reaching  
legislative program m e realising com p lete  liberalisation (see, for exam p le, A g en ce  E u rope,
1 6 .1 .1 9 9 3 , 1 5 .4 .1993 . Financial T im es, 2 .2 .1 9 9 3 , 11. 3 .1 9 9 3 ). M em ber states form ally en d orsed  
the gen era l aim s stated in  the 1992 Review, calling o n  the C om m ission  to prepare b efore 1 
January 1 996  proposals for the future regulatory fram ework for a liberalised  
telecom m u n ication s en vironm en t (C ouncil R esolution  o f  1 7 .1 2 .1 9 9 2 , O fficial Journal C 2 /5 ,  
6 .1 .1 9 9 3 ; A gen ce Europe, 2 2 .1 1 .1 9 9 2 ).
1 2 8
Socialist, previously Transport Commissioner. In spite of their different political 
backgrounds, van Miert and Bangemann agreed on further liberalising 
telecommunications and supported the activities of DG Competition and DG
231Telecoms to advance liberalisation. DG Competition sought a more active 
role in applying general competition law (notably Articles 85 and 86) to the 
telecommunications sector, including rulings on joint ventures and global
232alliances. The College of Commissioners soon changed its official position
233towards open support of full liberalisation of voice telephony. DG Telecoms 
and DG Competition were tasked to refine the Commission’s policy strategy by 
drafting an official document which would set out central policy objectives, lines 
of actions and timetables for their implementation.
The process of designing the new policy approach was largely limited to the 
working groups and personal contacts established between DG Telecoms and
234DG Competition. Other Commission DGs expressed either no interest in the 
two DGs’ activities or simply endorsed their ideas. DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms prepared a ‘follow-up’ Communication to the 1992 Review. Drafted 
under the main responsibility of DG Telecoms, the document set out an agenda 
for the liberalisation of telecoms services, including mobile telephony, cable 
television networks for the provision of telecommunications services, and public
Van M iert in itiated  a broad series o f  com p etition  cases for various sectors and stood  firm ly  
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voice telephony. The drafting process preceded extremely rapidly, the 
Communication being officially adopted by the European Commission in April
2351993, less than three months after the inauguration of the new Commission.
As previous drafts the Communication on ‘The Consultation on the Review 
of the Situation in the Telecommunications Sector’ (European Commission 
1993a) envisaged a consolidation of the existing regulatory environment. It 
proposed the full implementation of the directives adopted so far and the 
adoption of pending proposals in the Council. Most importantly, the 
Commission announced that it would examine the possibility to liberalise 
mobile telephony and cable television infrastructure for the provision of already 
liberalised telecommunications services (European Commission 1993a, p. 33E) 
and publish Green Papers on these issues. Furthermore, it proposed the 
opening up of public voice telephony by January 1998. As regards re-regulation, 
the Communication asked for a common definition of universal service 
principles, for the development of a framework for interconnection 
agreements, for the definition of principles for access charges, and for the 
establishment of independence of telecommunications organisations (e.g. 
concerning pricing policy). For each step to be taken, the document included 
closely defined time schedules (European Commission 1993a, Appendix, p.
2 9 )-
Within less than a year, DG Competition and DG Telecoms had developed 
their existing telecommunications policy from a consolidation of the provisions 
made in the ‘1987 Green Paper’ towards the aim of fully liberalising the sector. 
During the months to follow, DG Telecoms and DG Competition continued to 
coordinate their efforts to tackle the liberalisation of mobile telephony, 
alternative infrastructure and public voice telephony. As a first step, they 
prepared consultative documents on the different issues of liberalisation that 
were later followed by the preparation of legislative proposals under the 
leadership of DG Competition (see section three). Assigning the main 
responsibility for drafting these documents to DG Telecoms re-affirmed the
Interview Number 13, Interview Number 14, Interview Number 19, Interview Number 20.
Financial Times, 25.3.1993.
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sharing of authority between the two DGs and served as an important means to
256reduce conflict and to facilitate coordination. DG Telecoms and DG 
Competition further intensified their coordination by exchanging several staff 
between the ‘Telecommunications Policy’ directorate of DG Telecoms and the 
responsible unit in DG Competition. This process was gradually underway since
257the early 1990s. Supported by senior policy-makers in the two DGs, officials 
considered it useful to improve the information flow between the two DGs and
• 258to link the respective units more closely together. For example, Herbert 
Ungerer, one of the leading policy-makers in DG Telecoms, moved to DG 
Competition. As regards the actual staff numbers, an uneven balance remained 
between the DG Competition and DG Telecoms. In DG Competition, only a 
handful of officials dealt with telecommunications, whereas in DG Telecoms, 
more than 50 officials were responsible for telecommunications legislation. This 
difference proved significant as it increased the need for collaboration between 
the two services: officials in DG Competition continued to rely on their 
colleagues in DG Telecoms because otherwise they would not be able to cope
259with the workload. This, in turn, enabled DG Telecoms to shape the agenda 
of DG Competition on liberalising the telecommunications sector and reduced 
conflict over authority. The alliance formed between the two DGs more and 
more developed into a ‘partnership’ (Interview Number 13) of intense and 
effective coordination.
The liberalisation of mobile telephony
In the context of preparing the follow-up Communication to the ‘1992 Review’ 
(European Commission 1993a), DG Competition and DG Telecoms had agreed 
that the latter would engage in drafting a consultative document on mobile 
communications. The publication of the Green Paper on mobile and personal
256
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telephony was scheduled for early 1994 (European Commission 1993a, p. 35). 
Officials in DG Telecoms’ unit ‘Regulatory Aspects of Network Access, Satellite 
Communications, Mobile Communications, and Frequencies’ based their 
preliminary draft text on a number of external studies and consultations with
240outside actors. DG Telecoms then discussed the draft Green Paper with DG 
Competition. The two DGs shared a preference for full liberalisation of mobile 
communications. Nevertheless, coordination between them was intense since 
they did not always agree on the details. For example, they maintained different 
views concerning the balance between sectoral regulation and the reliance on 
general competition law. DG Competition wanted as little regulation as possible, 
whereas DG Telecoms wanted to set up a number of safeguards guaranteeing 
user rights and the proper functioning of a single European market for mobile 
telephony.241
DG Competition and DG Telecoms discussed most issues in the context of 
their established working groups and personal networks and were usually willing 
to compromise. For example, they debated the requirements to be imposed on 
mobile operators as regards interconnection. DG Telecoms wanted to see 
interconnection of mobile communications networks covered by an ONP 
directive and implemented by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), whereas 
DG Competition preferred a minimum of regulatory requirements limiting the
242powers of NRAs. In the course of their consultations the two DGs agreed that 
NRAs be granted supervision rights over interconnection, but without 
establishing further directives that would set out more detailed interconnection 
conditions for mobile communications (European Commission 1994a, p. 28).
The formal inter-service consultations which followed the preliminary 
consultations between DG Telecoms and DG Competition brought few changes 
to their strategy, even though a greater number of DGs now expressed an
240
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• • 243interest in telecoms policy. For example, the DGs for the Internal Market, 
Industry and Consumer Protection wanted to be consulted on the Mobile Green
244Paper. However, inter-service consultations did not encounter serious 
difficulties, as these DGs broadly agreed with the priorities set out by DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms and limited their involvement to rather specific 
aspects rather than the principles of telecommunications legislation. DG 
Internal Market shared the approach envisaged by DG Telecoms and DG 
Competition due to its linkage to the realisation of the single European market. 
DG Industry had the same Commissioner as DG Telecoms and was therefore 
generally supportive, whereas DG Consumer Protection shared the concern of 
DG Telecoms officials to guarantee user rights and made contributions on the 
issue.
As a consequence, inter-service consultations did not entail delays or 
significant amendments. The final version of the Green Paper on mobile 
telephony was submitted to the College of Commissioners after a policy 
formulation process which had lasted less than a year and was formally adopted 
in a largely uncontroversial debate in April 1994 (European Commission
2451994a). The Green Paper asked for amendments to the Services Directive in 
order to abolish special and exclusive rights for mobile telephony. For a 
consultative document, the document was considered ‘unusually prescriptive’ 
(Financial Times, 28.4.1994). Indeed, DG Telecoms and DG Competition did 
not intend to open a debate, but saw public consultations as a means ‘to
246confirm validity of the concrete approach presented by the Commission’. The 
Green Paper advocated five major changes: abolishing remaining exclusive and 
special rights in the mobile telephony sector; the removal of all restrictions on 
the provision of mobile services; full freedom for mobile network operators to 
operate and develop their networks; unrestricted and combined offering of 
services via the fixed and mobile networks; and facilitating pan-European
Interview  N um ber 9 , Interview N um ber 14, Interview N um ber 19, Interview  N u m b er 25.
244
In early 1993 , the DG  for the Internal M arket and DG Industry had b een  d ivided  in to  two 
separate DGs, o n e  for the Internal M arket and o n e  for Industry.
245
Interview  N um ber 19. A lso see  A gen ce E urope, 27 .4 .1 9 9 4 .
246
Quoted from Agence Europe, 28.4.1994. Interview Number 14, Interview Number 19.
*33
operation and service provision (European Commission 1994a, Annex D, p. 
i4of.). The Communication proposed licensing principles for mobile network 
operators, conditions to be placed on service providers, and provisions for 
interconnection. It presented an agenda for re-regulation to be achieved by 
applying the ONP framework to mobile communications, i.e. the principles of 
equality of access, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality 
(European Commission 1994a, p. 36; see section three).
The liberalisation of network infrastructure
Since the publication of the ‘1987 Green Paper’ the underlying principle of 
Commission action had been the distinction between telecommunications 
services and networks. A basic agreement on the liberalisation of all 
telecommunications services including public voice telephony had been settled 
in the context of preparing the follow-up to the ‘1992 Review’ (European 
Commission 1993a). Initial attempts had been made to tackle the liberalisation 
of satellite and mobile communications networks. The next step towards a 
liberalised telecommunications market was to think about fixed and wireless 
networks for the provision of telecommunications services, such as cable 
television (CATV) networks and other ‘alternative networks’ (e.g. example 
utility or railway infrastructures). When the Green Paper on mobile 
communications (European Commission 1994a) was published, DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms were already circulating drafts of another Green 
Paper that dealt with the liberalisation of these infrastructures for the provision 
of telecommunications services. The Commission had committed itself to 
publish a Green Paper on the issue before 1995 (European Commission 1993a,
P- 35)-
The ‘Telecommunications’ unit in DG Competition, organised within 
Directorate B (‘Restrictive Practices, Abuse of Dominant Positions and Other 
Distortions of Competition I’), argued in favour of a possible use of CATV 
networks for the provision of telecommunications services and sought to speed 
up telecommunications liberalisation by allowing operators to set up alternative 
networks to compete with state monopolies for the provision of
134
telecommunications services. Possibly, this would include voice telephony even
247before the agreed deadline of 1998. The idea was taken up by DG Telecoms 
that started to prepare a Green Paper on infrastructures and consulted with DG 
Competition on its content. The two Commission DGs were in accordance that 
increased competition in infrastructures would lead to an improvement in the 
supply of telecoms services in the single market. By a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ 
(Interview Number 19), they agreed to share the responsibility for the Green 
Paper on infrastructure. DG Telecoms would undertake the bulk of drafting 
work, but collaborate closely with DG Competition.
While there was a high extent of unity between DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms regarding the substance and details of liberalising infrastructures, the 
issue attracted debate on the political level of the Commission. The question of 
allowing the provision of voice telephony ahead of 1998 over alternative 
networks was particularly controversial because it attracted the opposition from
248several member states. Several cabinets disagreed on whether to allow 
operators to set up alternative networks for voice telephony ahead of the 1998 
deadline and on whether to include ‘alternative’ networks other than CATV 
networks. Following a compromise on cabinet level, DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms were tasked to leave open in the Green Paper the final decision which
249infrastructures to liberalise and to await member states’ reactions first. The 
Green Paper on Infrastructures would be split up into two parts, part one setting 
out general principles for infrastructure liberalisation, and part two defining the 
rules for issues such as licensing, universal service, interconnection and 
competitive safeguards, and setting timetables for action. Again, DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms took a waiting position until there would be 
sufficient support from the political level of the Commission.
As DG Competition and DG Telecoms had already sorted out their position 
on infrastructures, the preparation of the first Green Paper on infrastructures
247
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250proceeded rapidly and without any significant delays. The fact that other 
Commission actors were presented with detailed draft texts on which there was 
a high extent of unity among the two DGs reduced the scope of debate and 
speeded up the process of formal decision-taking. In October 1994, the 
European Commission adopted the first Green Paper ‘on the Liberalisation of 
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks’ (European 
Commission 1994b). The document advocated two stages for action. The first 
stage foresaw the immediate liberalisation of all existing and licensed networks 
for the carriage of already liberalised services (European Commission 1994b).251 
Public voice telephony would remain excluded and action be limited to allow 
companies to carry their telecommunications services on third party or their 
own and already authorised infrastructure. The second stage of action would 
fully liberalise infrastructure, bringing in line the general liberalisation of 
network infrastructure with the liberalisation of public voice telephony by 
January 1998. This would allow for the provision of new infrastructure for 
already liberalised services and the full use of such new as well as existing 
networks for the provision of public voice telephony, once liberalised 
(European Commission 1994b, p. 39).
The publication of Part One of the Green Paper was followed by 
consultations with outside actors that were organised by DG Telecoms. 
Consultations revealed rising support for infrastructure liberalisation 
(European Commission i994d). DG Competition and DG Telecoms turned to 
drafting the second part of the Green Paper. In parallel with these efforts, DG 
Competition started to draft a Commission directive based on Article 90(3) 
which would prescribe a liberalisation of CATV networks for the provision of
252already liberalised services (see section three). As regards the second Green 
Paper, the intention of DG Competition and DG Telecoms was to set out the
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• 253details of how to liberalise and harmonise the provision of infrastructures. 
The content of the document was agreed by the two Commission DGs in the 
context of their established working groups and, following a speedy preparation 
process, passed the formal consultation and decision-making procedures
254without attracting serious debate.
In January 1995, the European Commission adopted the final version of the 
second Green Paper on infrastructures (European Commission 1994x1). Stating 
that the ‘liberalisation of communications infrastructure is the single most 
important step to be taken in the context of European Telecommunications 
policy’ (European Commission 1994x1, p. 22), the document confirmed the 
double approach of harmonisation and liberalisation. By reaffirming the 
principles of the 1987 Green Paper (notably the balance between liberalisation 
and a common regulatory framework) it emphasised the consistency of the 
Commission’s approach (European Commission igg4d, pp. 22 and 55). As the 
first Green Paper on infrastructures, the document left open whether to
255liberalise alternative infrastructure other than CATV. As regards re-regulation, 
the Green Paper discussed the major issues involved in the future regulation of 
network infrastructure, addressing additional safeguards required for the stage 
of full infrastructure liberalisation, such as universal service, interconnection
256and interoperability, licensing procedures, and competitive safeguards.
The preparation o f legislation
Setting the policy agenda to fully liberalise the telecommunications sector and 
to complement liberalisation with re-regulation was followed by the preparation 
of legislative proposals. This process centred on implementing the provisions
253
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DG Telecoms and DG Competition had agreed on earlier. There continued to 
be a discussion that concerned the details of legislative proposals, for example 
definitions and technical specifities, but these differences were mostly solved 
through established modes of coordination that preceded formal inter-service 
consultations and therefore excluded other DGs and other Commission
257actors. DG Competition and DG Telecoms stuck to their division of work 
which gave the responsibility for liberalisation to the former and authority for 
re-regulatory measures to the latter. After consulting each other they presented 
other Commission DGs and the Legal Service with detailed draft proposals. As 
the following paragraphs will show, the overall preparation process did not take 
long and its results reflected most ideas initially expressed by the two DGs.
The liberalisation directives
Under the leadership of DG Competition and DG Telecoms that continued to 
coordinate their actions in their working groups and even smaller circles, the 
European Commission envisaged the adoption of three Commission directives 
according to the Article 90 procedure. These would liberalise mobile telephony, 
cable TV networks and public voice telephony. Drafts of all these directives were 
prepared by DG Competition that consulted DG Telecoms on its provisions. 
The preparation of a directive liberalising cable television networks had been 
underway in DG Competition even before the two Green Papers on 
infrastructure had been finalised - in spite of ongoing controversies among 
member states that concerned whether to bring forward the deadline for
258infrastructure liberalisation. DG Competition intended to grant service 
providers the opportunity to offer their services over cable television networks, 
excluding voice telephony. Officials in DG Telecoms and DG Competition 
made their intentions public, giving speeches and making frequently-quoted
259contributions to journals and conferences. There was no significant conflict
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over preparing the draft directive on infrastructure as the two DGs were in 
accordance on the provisions of the directive and the drafting authority of DG 
Competition over liberalisation.260
In December 1994, following a rapid and consistent preparation process 
which had lasted less than six months and had been based on intense 
coordination among DG Competition and DG Telecoms, the Commission 
officially adopted a draft Commission directive on the abolition of restrictions 
on the use of cable television networks (Commission Notice 1995a) - several 
weeks before Part Two of the Green Paper was published.261 The draft directive 
on liberalising infrastructure enabled the providers of telecommunications 
services to offer their services over cable television networks (excluding voice 
telephony). In order to allow consultations that were still underway with 
member states and outside interests on the Green Papers on liberalising 
infrastructure finish, the Commission decided not to publish the draft directive 
before March of the following year. During negotiations with the Council, a 
majority of member states accused the Commission of moving too fast and 
behaving undemocratically, urging the Commission to slow down its reform
plans. Following lengthy negotiations with the Council, the Commission
• 262 adopted the final version of the directive in October 1995.
The process of preparing the directives liberalising mobile and personal 
communications as well as the provision of voice telephony followed similar 
lines. In agreement with DG Telecoms, DG Competition prescribed the
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C om m unication  w hich exp la in ed  the C om m ission’s reasons and sum m arised  the results o f  the
public consu ltations (E uropean C om m ission 1995a). A lso see Rapid, 2 1 .1 2 .1 9 9 4 . In the
literature, this has b een  d ocu m en ted  by Preiskel and H igham  (1 9 9 5 ).
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C om m ission  D irective 9 5 /5 1 /E C  o f  18 .1 0 .1 9 9 5  am en d in g  D irective 9 0 /3 8 8 /E E C  with  
regard to  th e abolition  o f  restrictions o n  the use o f  cable television networks for the provision o f  
already liberalised telecom m u n ication s services. O fficial Journal L 256 , 2 6 .1 0 .1 9 9 5 , pp. 49-54 . 
T h e inter-institutional negotiations have b een  d ocu m en ted  by Financial T im es, 2 8 .1 1 .1 9 9 5 .  
E uropean V oice, 3 0 .1 1 .1 9 9 5 , 2 1 .1 2 .1 9 9 5 , 29 .2 .1 9 9 6 .
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liberalisation of mobile communications networks and provided for
• 263interconnection rules (Commission Notice 1995b). As regards public voice 
telephony, the Commission published a draft directive providing to oblige 
member states to liberalise all networks (including alternative infrastructures) 
and services other than voice telephony from 1996 and provided for the 
liberalisation of public voice telephony from 1 January 1998 (Commission 
Notice 1995c). The text also included provisions for licensing voice telephony 
services and public telecoms networks, numbering conditions, interconnection, 
and the financing of universal service. In early 1996, the Commission adopted
264the directives on mobile communications and on full competition. The 
preparation of the three liberalisation directives had proceeded without causing 
much debate in the European Commission, their content reflecting closely the 
ideas maintained by DG Competition and DG Telecoms.
Reregulation: Updating and expanding ONP
The second cornerstone of the Commission’s telecommunications policy was 
the establishment of a legislative framework regulating issues such as the access 
to networks and user conditions. While the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector was primarily directed by DG Competition, DG
265Telecoms acted as the main architect of harmonisation and re-regulation. In 
order to make their policies as coherent as possible, the two DGs stuck firmly to
their previously arranged division of labour and their common practice of
266consulting each other. They had jointly worked out the objectives of re-
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Financial T im es, 2 0 .7 .1 9 9 5 . A lso see C om m ission  M E M O /9 5 /1 5 8 , 2 7 .1 1 .1 9 9 5 .
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C om m ission  Directive 9 6 /2 /E C  o f  1 6 .0 1 .1 9 9 6  am en d in g  D irective 9 0 /3 8 8 7 E E C  with regard  
to  m ob ile  and personal com m un ication s and C om m ission  D irective 9 6 / 1 9 /E C  o f  1 3 .3 .1 9 9 6  
a m en d in g  D irective 9 0 /3 8 8 /E E C  with regard to th e im plem en tation  o f  fu ll com p etition  in  
te lecom m u n ication s m arkets. O fficial Journal L 074, 2 2 .3 .1 9 9 6 , pp. 13-24. In  its final version, 
th e directive o n  m obile com m un ication s had b een  am en d ed  slightly in  ord er to  specify  
tech n ica l specifications, the con d itions to  b e p laced  o n  operators in  licen sin g  p rocedures and  
u se o f  th e frequencies, as w ell as th e con d itions for the granting o f  additional transition periods. 
Similarly, the final version o f  the directive o n  full com p etition  in corporated  am en dm en ts
sp ecify ing the w ording o f  its provisions w ithout ch an gin g  its substance.
265
S ee  K iessling and B lon d eel (1 9 9 8 ). A gen ce Europe, 2 7 .2 .1 9 9 6 . F inancial T im es, 1 2 .9 .1996 .
266 Interview  N um ber 13, Interview N um ber 19, Interview N um ber 20, Interview  N um ber 23, 
Interview  N um ber 25.
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regulation in the context of preparing previous consultative papers, including 
installing safeguards to guarantee universal service, interconnection and 
interoperability (see section two). The drafting of legislative proposals for 
adoption by the Council and the European Parliament ran in parallel with the 
preparation of the liberalisation directives. DG Telecoms and DG Competition 
shared the basic guidelines aimed at creating a harmonised market, but differed 
as regards the details of how to realise it. Dissent mainly emerged on the 
balance between general competition law and sector-specific regulation. 
However, due to established patterns of collaboration, the two DGs were able to 
manage the process of policy coordination without getting entangled in more 
serious conflicts that would result in delays or fundamental changes of strategy.
The unit responsible in DG Telecoms’ Directorate ‘Telecommunications 
Policy’ advocated detailed harmonisation measures and a comprehensive 
regulatory framework which would address issues such as interconnection and 
universal service, as well as the convergence between telecommunications and
267television broadcasting. Their approach centred on a flexible framework
drawing on the basic principles of proportionality, transparency, non-
268discrimination and fair competition set out in the ONP framework. DG 
Competition officials tended to prefer less re-regulation than DG Telecoms. 
They feared that DG Telecoms would listen too much to member states’ 
concerns because of the need to obtain approval for the harmonisation 
measures from the Council and the European Parliament. The unit in DG 
Competition was also anxious that DG Telecoms would introduce provisions 
contradicting the provisions of the liberalisation directives adopted. Still, there 
were no serious problems because DG Competition and DG Telecoms showed
269themselves willing to compromise in the context of their consultations. In the 
end, the two Directorates General arrived at solutions they both considered 
acceptable. As with their activities on liberalisation, the efforts taken by the two
267
S ee con tribution  by C om m ission officials H aag and S ch o o f (1 9 9 4 ). Interview N u m b er 9 .
268 See C oun cil D irective 9 0 /3 8 7 /E E C  o f  28 Ju n e 1990  o n  the estab lishm ent o f  th e internal 
m arket for telecom m u n ication s services through the im plem en tation  o f  o p e n  netw ork  
provision. O fficial Journal L 192, 2 4 .7 .1 9 9 0 , pp. 1-9.
269 Interview Number 13, Interview Number 14, Interview Number 16, Interview Number 19,
Interview Number 20.
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DGs to draft legislation were greatly helped by the fact that they had worked out 
many details of legislation in the context of drafting previous consultative 
documents (e.g. European Commission 1992b; European Commission 1994b 
and d) .27°
The drafts underwent formal inter-service consultations without causing 
problems as other Commission services broadly endorsed them. The discussion 
at cabinet and Commissioners level was based on detailed draft texts on which
• 271there was a high level of unity among the administrative services. Debate was 
therefore limited to technical details and definitions. In February 1995, the 
Commission adopted a proposal on the application of ONP to voice telephony 
(European Commission 19940). This move prompted the termination of the 
procedure for the earlier proposal on the issue and incorporated most of the 
amendments made by the Council and the European Parliament in the earlier 
procedure (see section one). The proposal aimed at establishing the rights of 
users of telephone services, ensuring open and non-discriminatory access to the 
telephone network for all users (including service providers), and enhancing 
the Community-wide provision of voice telephony services (European 
Commission 1994c, p. 2). The directive applying ONP to voice telephony was 
adopted in its final version by the Council and the European Parliament in
272December 1995.
As regards interconnection, another proposal on ONP was envisaged for the 
end of 1995, but then deliberately adopted six months earlier in order to make 
its publication co-incide with the adoption of the draft Commission directive on 
full competition prepared by DG Competition (Commission Notice 1995c;
270
For exam p le, the G reen  Papers on  Infrastructure had already estab lished  the p rincip les o f  
regulatory acd on  for in tercon n ection , interoperability an d  licen sin g , e.g . the restrictions  
d efin in g  the scop e o f  licen sin g  procedures an d  con d itions. T h e G reen  Paper o n  m ob ile  
te lep h on y  (E uropean C om m ission 1994a) had p resen ted  a d etailed  agen d a  for application  o f  
the O N P fram ework to  m obile  com m unications. T h e C om m ission  p rop osed  licen sin g  
con d ition s for m obile network operators, to b e  based  o n  objective grounds, to  b e transparent, 
non-discrim inatory, and to respect the princip le o f  proportionality, an d  service providers, set 
ou t in tercon n ection  rules, and recom m en d ed  that m ob ile  network operators b e allow ed to  
install, use an d  share their own transm ission infrastructure (E uropean C om m ission  1994a, pp. 
25-30).
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Interview  N um ber 10.
272
D irective 9 5 /6 2 /E C  o f  the E uropean Parliam ent and o f  the C oun cil o f  1 3 .1 2 .1 9 9 5  o n  th e  
application  o f  O N P to voice telephony. O fficial Journal L 321, 3 0 .1 2 .1 9 9 5 .
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European Commission 1995b). Intended to reinforce the coherence of the 
Commission’s policy strategy, this move serves as another indicator of the
• • 273efficient collaboration between DG Telecoms and DG Competition. The 
proposal (European Commission 1995b) established a regulatory framework 
securing interconnection and interoperability, i.e. the linking of facilities of 
organisations providing telecoms networks and/or services, including universal 
service contributions, and requirements for non-discrimination and 
transparency. As regards licensing, the Commission acted by formally adopting 
a proposal for a directive in November 1995 (European Commission 1995c). 
The proposal set out an authorisation regime which would supervise access to 
the market and monitor compliance with the requirements imposed on 
operators. Covering both telecoms services and infrastructures it would 
prescribe the principles of objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination and 
proportionality. A compromise was made to adopt general rules rather than 
establishing a system of prior individual licensing (European Commission
v  274
1995c> P- 5)-
During 1996, the Commission prepared two more proposals on adapting 
the regulatory framework to the fully liberalised environment (containing 
provisions such as legally separating NRAs from telecoms operators), and the 
application of ONP to voice telephony and universal service (European 
Commission i995d and 1996a). For universal service the Commission
275identified definitions and objectives. The proposals underwent inter-
Interview  N um ber 13, Interview N um ber 14. A lso see  E uropean  C om m ission  M em o, 
M E M O /9 5 /1 5 8 , 2 7 .1 1 .1 9 9 5 .
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Interview N um ber 20.
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A ccord ing to this d efin ition , the provision o f  universal service w ould  fo llow  the p rincip les o f  
transparency, non-discrim ination and proportionality and  be based  o n  a m inim um  set o f  
offerings that sh ou ld  b e available o n  a C om m unity basis. Universal service ob ligations w ould  b e  
lim ited  to th e d om in an t operators. T h e fu n d in g  o f  universal service was to  b e  based  o n  access  
charges involving financial transfers betw een  d om in an t operators and n ew  m arket entrants  
(European C om m ission  1996b ). T h e C om m ission show ed itse lf flex ib le  in  regard to  the  
d efin ition  and finan cing  o f  universal service, em phasising that it was a dynam ic an d  evolving  
con cept. S ee A gen ce E urope, 1 4 .3 .1996 , 2 0 .4 .1 9 9 6 .
143
institutional procedures in the Council and the European Parliament and were
276adopted in October 1997 and February 1998 respectively.
Conclusion
In 1996 the European Commission concluded a period during which it adopted 
three major directives designed at fully liberalising the telecommunications 
sector and proposed a comprehensive re-regulatory framework (see the tables in 
the Appendix). The evolution of these measures that were to fundamentally 
transform European telecommunications markets was founded on the close 
collaboration of two Commission DGs, DG Competition and DG Telecoms. The 
chapter has shown how a relatively low level of administrative fragmentation 
enabled the Commission to produce high legislative outputs by acting rapidly 
and consistently and proposing several pieces of legislation.
In the early 1990s, the administrative fragmentation of the Commission in the 
telecommunications sector developed along lines similar to those of previous 
years (see Table 7). Only two Directorates General actively engaged in shaping 
the Commission’s legislative strategy: DG Competition with its focus on 
liberalisation and DG Telecoms that sought to create a regulatory environment 
attracting investment and promoting new services and technologies. Both DGs 
saw a need to further expand existing telecommunications legislation and were 
in accordance on continuing the combination of liberalisation with re­
regulation. With few differences on the paradigm of legislation and broad 
agreement on the allocation of authority, the two DGs were able to continue 
and intensify their collaboration. Other Commission DGs largely kept out of the 
preparation process as they were either not interested or simply endorsed the 
policy priorities advocated by DG Competition and DG Telecoms.
276
D irective 9 7 / 5 1 /E C , 0 6 .1 0 .1 9 9 7 , am en d in g  Directives 9 0 /3 8 7 /E E C  and 9 2 /4 4 /E E C  for  
the purpose o f  adaptation to a com petitive en vironm en t in  telecom m u n ication s. O fficial 
Journal L 295 , 2 9 .1 0 .1 9 9 7 , pp. 23-34. D irective 9 8 /1 0 /E C , 2 6 .2 .1 9 9 8 , o n  the application  o f  
O N P to voice te lep h on y  and o n  universal service in  a com petitive en v ir o n m en t O fficial Journal 
L 101, 1 .4 .1998 , pp. 24-47. For an overview o f  the directives’ provisions see , for exam p le, 
Sandholtz (1 9 9 8 );  Sauter (1 9 9 7 ); T hatcher (1 9 9 9 ).
1 4 4
Table 7 Indicators o f administrative fragmentation in the telecommunications sector from 1990 
to 1996
liberalisation of 
satellite
c o m m u n ic a tio n s
and
consolidation of 
ONP
‘1992
Review*
consultative 
papers on 
liberalisation
liberalisation
directives
proposals 
for re- 
regulation 
(ONP)
number of  
DGs
two two two two two
differences on 
paradigm
low low low low low
competition 
for authority
low low low low low
overall level o f  
adm. fragm.
low low low low low
From 1 9 9 0  to 1 9 9 6 , DG Competition and DG Telecoms engaged in three broad 
policy projects: first, a consolidation of existing legislation and the
implementation of the provisions of the 1 9 8 7  ‘Green Paper’ on 
Telecommunications (European Commission 1 9 8 7 ), achieved by the 
liberalisation of satellite communications and the extension of the ONP 
framework; second, the setting of a policy agenda which proposed the 
liberalisation of telecommunications services (including voice telephony) and 
networks by 1 January 1 9 9 8  to be combined with re-regulatory efforts; third, the 
implementation of this agenda by means of preparing legislation. It would be 
wrong to assume that there was at no point disagreement emerging between the 
two DGs. Conflict did occur, but it was limited to the issue of how to achieve the 
right balance between market opening and sector-specific regulation. In this 
context DG Telecoms usually argued in favour of detailed re-regulation and DG 
Competition preferred to rely on applying general competition law. The two 
DGs coordinated intensely, usually by consulting each other in their quasi­
institutionalised working groups and through personal contacts. Their 
relationship was further intensified by an exchange of staff intended to improve 
information flows and to make more efficient use of each others’ expertise. 
Coordination was also greatly facilitated by dividing the authority over 
telecommunications between the two DGs. DG Competition held primary 
responsibility for liberalisation and accepted the contributions made by DG 
Telecoms in the context of drafting consultative documents on the issue. DG
!45
Telecoms, in turn, was in charge of re-regulation on which it consulted DG 
Competition. The coordinative activities employed by DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms were the result of deliberate action rather than a consequence of 
obligatory rules. Through them the two Commission DGs were able to 
overcome their differences and to arrive at compromises they both considered 
acceptable.
Coordination among DG Telecoms and DG Competition was most intense in 
the context of drafting the consultative documents that preceded the 
preparation of legislation. It was at these occasions that the two DGs resolved 
controversy over the details of legislation. The actual drafting of legislation 
usually centred on implementing the provisions they had previously agreed on. 
DG Competition and DG Telecoms developed detailed draft texts before 
discussing them in larger and more ‘formalised’ arenas of the Commission, for 
example the obligatory inter-service consultations that included other DGs. This 
enabled them to reduce debate and to keep conflict at a low level. As a result, 
the legislative outputs produced by the Commission were high (see Table 8). 
The setting of agendas and preparation of legislative proposals proceeded 
rapidly and left few gaps between initial policy drafts and finalised versions 
adopted on the Commission’s administrative and later the political level. The 
Commission took a large number of decisions to propose legislation, indicated 
in six consultative documents and implemented by ten pieces of legislation (see 
Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11). The Commission sometimes deferred the 
proposition of legislation, but this was due to conflict that emerged on the 
political level of the Commission rather than dispute between the relevant units 
of DG Competition and DG Telecoms. The two DGs remained unified on the 
contentious issues, took a waiting position until the political climate turned 
more favourable and proceeded rapidly as soon as it did. An interesting 
conclusion which can be drawn from this is that even though conflict at the 
political level of the Commission made the taking of formal decisions more 
difficult, the Commission’s capacity to produce legislative outputs did not 
reduce significantly due to a high extent of unity at the administrative level.
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Table 8 Legislative outputs produced by the European Commission in the telecommunications
sector from 1990 101996
liberalisation  
o f  satellite 
com m uni­
cations and 
consolidation  
o f  O N P
‘1992
Review5
consultative 
papers on  
liberalisation
liberalisation
directives
proposals for
re-regulation
(O NP)
duration less than less than less than less than less than
twelve twelve twelve twelve twelve
months months months months months
consistency hi gh hi gh hi gh hi gh high
decision to
propose
legislation
■ proposition of y y y y y
legislation 
■ deferment _ * _ *
■ abandonment — — — — —
overall high high high high high
legislative
outputs
* As has been shown, postponing the decision whether to propose legislation was primarily due 
to debate which emerged on the political level o f the Commission rather than conflict on the 
administrative level.
The following chapter contrasts the patterns of fragmentation and coordination 
that were observed for the telecommunications sector from 1 9 9 0  to 1 9 9 6  with 
the situation which prevailed in the audiovisual field during the same period. In 
the audiovisual sector much higher levels of administrative fragmentation 
emerged, due to a significant increase of the number of DGs that engaged in 
preparing legislation and the differences between them. Chapter Five will show 
that this high level of fragmentation made policy coordination among the 
participating DGs quite difficult and how it resulted in considerably lower 
legislative outputs, i.e. policy-making that was slow, incoherent and 
characterised by deferment, the abandonment of legislative initiatives and only 
few decisions to propose legislation.
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Tables
Table 9 Major ‘Green Papers’ and other consultative documents published by the European
Commission in the telecommunications sector from 1990 to 1996
year title o f  docum ent DG with form al
drafting
responsibility
1990 ‘Towards European-wide systems and services -  Green 
Paper on a common approach in the field o f satellite 
communications in the European Community’ 
(European Commission 1990a)
DG Telecoms
1992 ‘1992 Review o f the situation in the telecommunications 
sector’ (European Commission 1992b)
DG Competition
*993 ‘Communication on the consultation on the Review o f  
the situation in the telecommunications sector’ 
(European Commission 1993a)
DG Telecoms
‘Developing universal service for telecommunications in a 
competitive environment’
(European Commission 1993d)
DG Telecoms
*994 ‘Green Paper on a common approach in the field o f 
mobile and personal communications in the European 
Community’ (European Commission 1994a)
DG Telecoms
‘Green Paper on the liberalisation o f telecommunications 
infrastructure and cable television networks: Part One, 
Principles and Timetable’ (European Commission 
1994b)
DG Telecoms and 
DG Competition
1995 ‘Green Paper on the liberalisation o f telecommunications 
infrastructure and cable television networks: Part Two’ 
(European Commission 1994D)
DG Telecoms and 
DG Competition
‘Communication on the consultation on the Green 
Paper on the liberalisation o f telecommunications 
infrastructure and cable television networks’ 
(European Commission 1995a)
DG Telecoms and 
DG Competition
*996 ‘Communication on universal service for 
telecommunications in the perspective of a fully 
liberalised environment’ (European Commission 1996b)
DG Telecoms
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Table 10 Liberalisation: European Commission directives adopted by means o f Article 90  
between 1990 and 1996
year directive
!994 Commission Directive 9 4 /4 6 /E C  o f 13.10.1994 amending Directive 
88 /3 0 1  /EEC and Directive 90 /388 /E E C  in particular with regard to 
satellite communications
1995 Commission Directive 9 5 /5 1 /E C  o f 18.10.1995 amending Directive 
9 0 /388 /E E C  with regard to the abolition o f restrictions on the use o f  
cable television networks for the provision o f already liberalised 
telecommunications services
l99& Commission Directive 9 6 /2 /E C  o f 16.01.1996 amending Directive 
9 0 /388 /E E C  with regard to mobile and personal communications 
Commission Directive 9 6 / 19/EC o f 13.03.1996 amending Directive 
90 /388 /E E C  with regard to the implementation o f full competition in 
telecommunications markets.
Table 11 Re-regulation: European Commission legislative proposals adopted between 1990 and 
1996
year European Com m ission proposal
1991 Proposal for a directive on the application o f ONP to leased lines 
(European Commission 1991a)
»992 Proposal for a directive on the application o f ONP to voice telephony 
(European Commission 1992a)
!994 Proposal for a directive on the application o f ONP to voice telephony 
(European Commission 1994c)
1995 Proposal for a directive on interconnection in telecommunications with 
regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through 
application o f ONP (European Commission 1995b)
Proposal for a directive on a common framework for general 
authorisations and individual licences in the field o f telecommunications 
services (European Commission 1995c)
Proposal for a directive amending Directives 90 /387 /E E C  and 
92 /4 4 /E E C  for the purpose o f adaptation to a competitive environment 
in telecommunications (European Commission i995d)
1996 Proposal for a directive on the application o f ONP to voice telephony  
and on universal service in a competitive environment (European 
Commission 1996a)
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Chapter Five: 
Battles and Conflict -  
Coordination in the Audiovisual 
Sector
Introduction
The present chapter analyses the activities of the European Commission to 
prepare audiovisual legislation from 1990 to 1996. The 1990s marked a decade 
during which the audiovisual sector in Europe underwent fundamental 
changes. As in telecommunications, these were first and foremost triggered by 
technological developments. The arrival of satellite and cable transmission as 
well as digital technology offered better picture quality and a variety of new 
kinds of audiovisual services (e.g. pay-per-view, video-on-demand, and
277teleshopping). Linked with these challenges, another big change concerned 
the increasing regulatory dimension brought about through EU-level
278legislation. During its second msgor phase of legislative policy-making, the 
European Commission pursued several initiatives. The chapter examines how its 
Directorates General developed consultative documents and legislative 
proposals around three cornerstones: the regulation of television standards, 
legislation on media ownership, and a revision of the existing directive on
T his has b een  d ocu m en ted  in  the literature. See, for exam p le, D yson  and H um phreys
(1 9 8 8 );  Cawson and H olm es (1 9 9 5 ); G oldberg e t  al. (1 9 9 8 ).
278 See, for example, Dai (1996a); Goldberg et al. (1998); Humphreys (1996).
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‘Television without Frontiers’ (see Chapter Three). These three big themes
• 279were pursued largely independently from each other and at different times.
The findings of the chapter suggest that the situation of administrative 
fragmentation observed for the 1980s greatly changed in the early 1990s. While 
fragmentation remained fairly stable in the telecommunications sector (see 
Chapter Four), it increased significantly in the audiovisual field. Most 
importantly, the number of Commission DGs that sought to actively participate 
in preparing legislation doubled from two to four. Apart from DG Culture and 
DG Internal Market, two other DGs joined the policy arena: DG Competition 
and DG Telecoms. These two DGs gradually increased their interest in defining 
the objectives and provisions of audiovisual legislation, particularly DG 
Telecoms that sought to advance its vision of the global ‘Information Society’ in 
which the self-regulating forces of the market would make most regulation 
unnecessary. DG Competition wanted to strengthen its powers to implement 
competition law to media mergers and joint ventures, preferring case-specific 
action rather than detailed sectoral regulation. DG Culture with its established 
responsibility for audiovisual issues continued to promote European 
programme and production industries and sought to regulate new audiovisual 
services (e.g. video-on-demand or pay-per-view) in a way similar to traditional 
free-to-air broadcasting. DG Internal Market aimed at further developing the 
single audiovisual market, based on a legislative framework that combined 
liberalisation with minimum rules.
The different missions and outlooks on audiovisual issues held by an 
increasing number of DGs not only meant that the policy arena was crowding, 
but also that the coordination among DGs was characterised by far greater levels 
of conflict. The four DGs differed on the objectives of Community legislation, 
for example whether and to which extent market opening should be combined 
with sector-specific rules, and sometimes even on the actual need for it. 
Fragmentation further increased due to the fact that the DGs tended to
T h e legislative efforts taken by the C om m ission  o n  the first two th em es o f  regulation  started  
around 1990 , w hereas the revision o f  ‘T elevision  w ithout Frontiers’ d id  n o t  b egin  b efore 1993 . 
For television standards and ‘T elevision  w ithout Frontiers’, the preparation o f  legislation  was 
con clu d ed  by 1995 , w hereas th e initiative o n  m ed ia  ow nership  lasted u n til 1997.
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compete for authority over audiovisual issues. DG Culture and DG Internal 
Market initially reaffirmed their arranged division of labour and authority (see 
Chapter Three), but conflict arose when DG Culture took over the 
responsibility from DG Internal Market for revising the ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ directive and thereby increased its influence at the expense of the 
latter. A situation of even greater rivalry occurred when DG Telecoms sought to 
expand its control over communications- and media-related issues, notably by 
defining a new regulatory approach for the audiovisual sector. This questioned 
the established authority of other DGs, particularly that of DG Culture. DG 
Competition largely kept out of competing for more influence because its 
interest in audiovisual issues was limited to ensure that sector-specific regulation 
did not develop at the expense of its existing powers to implement competition 
law.
The evidence presented in the chapter reveals that the high levels of 
administrative fragmentation that emerged in the audiovisual field in the early 
lggos made policy coordination among the Commission DGs rather difficult to 
manage. Due to the large number of DGs and the differences between them, 
identifying policy problems and finding solutions was a complicated process. 
Because the four DGs often saw themselves unable to agree in the context of 
consulting each other, delays and changes to the Commission’s official strategy 
frequently occurred. Conflict was not resolved but persisted and intensified. 
The Commission frequently deferred its decision whether to propose legislation 
and once even abandoned an important legislative initiative altogether. In spite 
of the intense activities of the DGs to prepare legislation, few pieces of 
legislation were actually proposed: two proposals on regulating television 
standards and the revision of the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive.
The findings of the chapter suggest that whether Commission DGs manage 
to resolve conflict and disputes that emerge in the context of legislative policy­
making crucially depends on the level of administrative fragmentation. The 
greater the number of participating DGs, the greater their differences on the 
paradigm of legislation and the fiercer their competition for influence and 
control, the more difficult is the management of policy coordination. Since 
high levels of fragmentation render many coordinative activities ineffective it is
extremely difficult for the Commission DGs to settle their conflicts, concerning 
for example the details of legislation. The more conflict persists and intensifies, 
the lower the legislative outputs produced by the European Commission.
The chapter is organised in four parts. The first part analyses the 
preparation of legislation on television standards. It shows how fragmentation 
among the DGs for Telecoms, Culture, Competition, and Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs affected the course of policy formulation and made policy 
coordination difficult to manage. From 1993 when DG Telecoms changed its 
policy agenda and other DGs reduced their interest in the dossier 
fragmentation reduced and legislative outputs increased. The second part of the 
chapter examines the preparation of consultative documents and a legislative 
proposal to regulate media ownership. The dossier attracted the interest of four 
different DGs that engaged in conflicts both over the content of a possible 
legislative initiative and over the question of which DG would lead the 
preparation process. As a consequence, policy coordination was extremely 
difficult and resulted in low legislative outputs that culminated in the 
abandonment of the initiative. The third part analyses the revision of the 
‘Television without Frontiers’ directive. It shows how the dossier attracted 
Commission DGs that diverged fundamentally over the paradigm of legislation 
and authority. A concluding section brings together the evidence gathered from 
the three sections and assesses dominant situations of administrative 
fragmentation and legislative outputs, linked with insights on the patterns of 
policy coordination that emerged during the period under study.
The regulation o f television standards
The European Commission’s attempts to establish European-wide standards for 
the transmission and reception of television broadcasting date back to the 
1980s when the Community started to provide substantial R&D resources for
developing a European broadcasting standard. This was mainly achieved
280through the EUREKA project, a collaborative research programme. 
Community institutions widely agreed that undertaking efforts towards a
280
For an overview see, for example, Peterson (1993).
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European broadcasting system would give Europe a better chance in the
•  •  281 international struggle for the domination of television technologies. The
regulation of television standards was therefore widely accepted as part of EC
industrial policy.
Up until the 1980s, the dominant standard used for the transmission and 
reception of terrestrial broadcasting in Western Europe was the traditional 
PAL/SECAM system. The arrival of satellite technology and distribution by 
direct broadcasting by satellite (DBS) which also operated using PAL or SECAM 
made it possible to carry high quality images, or High-Definition-Television 
(HDTV). However, HDTV required more bandwidth than provided by existing 
standards. Firms therefore decided to use a new transmission standard, known 
as MAC (Multiplex Analogue Component). Consumers would have to buy 
satellite dishes and set-top decoders to receive satellite television and to convert 
MAC into the existing PAL/SECAM format in order to receive the signals at all - 
and also entirely new television sets if they wanted to view them in improved 
HDTV quality.
The success of HDTV strategically depended on whether broadcasters would 
use MAC rather than PAL/SECAM technology for transmission. To achieve this 
end, the Council of Ministers passed a directive in 1986 making the use of MAC
compulsory for all direct-to-home satellite broadcasting using high power
282satellite transponders. EUREKA had developed a specific European 
broadcasting norm for MAC, called HD-MAC. HD-MAC stood for an 
evolutionary approach because it would not make existing TV sets obsolete as 
did the Japanese standards and could be implemented by an interim norm 
called D 2-MAC which was receivable by traditional and new wide-screen
281
S ee Dai (1 9 9 6 ); Cawson and  H olm es (1 9 9 5 ); Kaitatzi-W hitlock (1 9 9 6 ); Peterson  (1 9 9 3 ).
282
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specifications o f  the M A C /packet family o f  standards for  d irect satellite television  broadcasting. 
O fficial Journal, L 3 1 1 /2 8 ,  6 .1 1 .1 9 8 6 . T h e MAC D irective was backed by two C ouncil D ecision s  
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International Radio C om m ittee in  1990. O fficial Journal L 142, 2 5 .5 .1 9 8 9 , p. 1. C ouncil 
D ecision  8 9 /3 3 7 /E E C  o f  7 .1 2 .1 9 8 9  o n  H igh-D efinition  T elevision . O fficial Journal L 363 , 13. 
12. 1989 , p. 30 .
*54
• • 283television sets that operated according to the 16/9 format. However, the 1986 
Directive largely failed in achieving its purpose, mainly due to its vague 
formulations. Start-up satellite broadcasters in Europe did not transmit from the 
high-powered satellites the Directive referred to, but instead broadcast 
programmes on medium-powered telecommunications satellites enabling them
284to use the normal PAL system. Operators were therefore able to strategically 
circumvent regulation. Also, rather than paying the premium for MAG decoders 
offering higher picture quality, consumers preferred the simpler and cheaper 
PAL services offered by traditional broadcasts. Instead of a unified standard, the 
directive had produced a double market in which the traditional PAL/SECAM 
standards co-existed with the new, but rarely used HDTV standards.
The first directive
Setting the policy agenda
The 1986 ‘MAG directive’ expired at the end of 1991. This prompted the 
European Commission to initiate a revision exercise in early 1990. 
Responsibility for preparing legislation on television standards was taken by DG 
Telecoms as part of its authority for the overall communications sector and, 
more specifically, its responsibility for the Eureka project and the technical
285aspects of communications policy. This was broadly accepted by other 
Commission DGs. A division called ‘Telecommunications and Broadcasting’ was 
set up within the directorate for telecommunications policy that had been 
responsible for preparing legislation to liberalise and re-regulate 
telecommunications thus far (see Chapters Three and Four).
283
S ee, for exam p le, Dai (1996a); P eterson  (1 9 9 3 ).
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In this con text, the so-called ‘BskyB Affair’ in  the U K  in  1 9 9 0 /9 1  was the m ost serious  
backlash for th e C om m unity’s MAC strategy. R upert M urdoch’s Sky C h an n el co n tin u ed  to  
broadcast in  PAL using th e Astra satellite w hich operated  o n  low  pow er an d  freq u en cies and  
therefore fe ll outside the scop e o f  the MAC Directive. W hen  Sky was m erged  w ith th e BSB 
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The central concern in DG Telecoms was to promote the definition and 
implementation of a European broadcasting norm, preferably by proposing an
extension of the existing MAC Directive to include HD-MAC as the sole
286standard. According to DG Telecoms, this would serve to remove the existing 
legal uncertainty and to fulfil the aim of building up a specifically European
287system for High-Definition-Television (HDTV). Its main intention was to 
make the use of MAC standards more binding for all satellite types and to avoid 
the ‘loopholes’ that had caused the problems in implementing the 1986 MAC 
Directive. For DG Telecoms, the revision of the MAC Directive represented a 
‘routine standardisation exercise’ (Interview Number 5), but also a window of 
opportunity through which the DG could further consolidate its position within 
the Commission.288
Apart from DG Telecoms, three other DGs sought to participate in revising 
the existing directive: first and foremost DG Culture and, to a more limited 
extent, the DGs for Competition as well as Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs. Officials in DG Culture considered the issue of television standards
289being part of their domain to prepare legislation on audiovisual issues. DG 
Culture principally welcomed a strengthening of existing provisions (European 
Commission 1990b, pp. 29-33). priority was to grant a transition period for 
simulcast in old (i.e. PAL) and new (i.e. MAC) standards to be followed by a 
deadline for all satellite broadcasters to use the MAC standard rather than 
prescribing the use of a new standard straightaway as envisaged by DG
290Telecoms. The main intention behind this was DG Culture’s interest to ease 
the financial burden occurring for broadcasters and consumers because of the 
new standard. The interest of DG Competition and DG Internal Market and
286
Interview  N um ber 5. Similar observations have b een  stated by D ai (1 9 9 6 a ).
287
B esides, eq u ip m en t m anufacturers w ere to b e en couraged  to invest in  th e n ew  tech n ology  by 
m eans o f  support program m es and voluntary industry agreem ents. For an  overview see, for
exam p le, Kaitatzi-W hidock (1 9 9 6 ).
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Interview  N um ber 5, Interview N u m b er 12, Interview N um ber 21. A lso se e  A gen ce  E urope,
2 8 .2 .1 9 9 0 , 1 0 .6 .1 9 9 0 , 1 3 .7 .1990 . U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission d o c u m e n t  ‘O b je t  Strategic p ou r  
l ’in trod u ction  d e  la  TVH D en  E urope -  Suites a d o n n er  aux travaux d u  grou p e interservice’, 
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Industrial Affairs to shape the revision process was initially less marked than that 
of DG Culture, but would prove significant when drafting reached a more 
advanced stage (see below).
Agenda-setting started in 1990 when DG Telecoms undertook efforts to 
make the Community commit itself to a strengthening of the existing MAC 
directive. Since DG Telecoms regarded the revision a routine exercise, it did not 
consider it necessary to first prepare a consultative document which would
• 291explore different options of legislative action. Instead, it turned straightaway 
towards drafting a revised directive. It produced a number of internal working 
documents to serve as basis for consultations with outside actors and other 
Commission DGs. In these documents, DG Telecoms stated that in order to 
create an appropriate framework for the European-wide introduction of High 
Definition Television (HDTV), the Commission would have to propose to
• 292reinforce standards by means of revising the existing MAC directive. DG 
Telecoms committed itself to put forward a proposal for a revision during the 
second half of 1990.
The preparation of legislation
DG Telecoms faced an environment in which the substance of its policy 
approach, i.e. the strengthening of regulation on television standards, was 
watched with scepticism by several DGs: DG Culture, DG Competition and DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs. While DG Telecoms and DG Culture 
basically agreed that the European system of HDTV needed a strengthening by 
means of regulation, they had less common ground on both the objectives and 
the details of legislation. DG Culture that was mainly concerned about the 
programming and production industry tended to be sceptical about what it
Interview  N um ber 5.
292
U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission  d ocu m ents. ‘H igh  D efin ition  T elevision  -  E lem ents o f  a Strategy  
for E u rop e’, approved by the C om m ission in  its m eetin g  o f  16 .1 1 .1 9 8 8 . ‘Paper o n  H D TV  for  
M eetin g  o f  C om m issioners o n  A udiovisual Policy’, n o te  prepared by D G  XIII, dated  17 .1 .1 9 8 9 . 
U n p u b lish ed  draft o f  E uropean C om m ission (1 9 9 0 c ) , dated  3 .4 .1 9 8 9 .
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293considered the ‘technology-driven’ approach of DG Telecoms. It accused DG 
Telecoms of being ‘in the companies’ pockets’ (Interview Number 12), 
particularly in those of the manufacturing firms. While DG Culture argued in 
favour of permitting the simulcast of services in old and new standards during a 
transition period, DG Telecoms favoured a more radical approach, prescribing 
D 2-MAC as an interim standard to be replaced by HD-MAC. In the view of DG 
Telecoms, this would encourage the European manufacturing industry, i.e. 
companies such as Thomson and Philips, to increase their share in producing 
consumer electronics, and therefore increase investment in the European
294Community. DG Culture, in turn, warned that a costly compulsory standard 
would cause unnecessary burdens to be placed on the television production 
industry and the broadcasters. Further conflict arose due to the interest taken 
by two other Commission DGs: DG Competition and DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs. DG Competition took little interest in influencing the details 
of the dossier, but spoke clearly against regulation which would in any way 
restrict the free market and which it considered ‘excessive* (Interview Number
29512). Similarly, DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs supported to revise 
the existing directive, but favoured a less strict regulatory approach than DG 
Telecoms because it wanted to encourage investment in the consumer 
electronics industry.296
During the second half of 1990, DG Telecoms circulated informal drafts of 
a revised proposal for the MAC directive among interested Commission DGs. 
These drafts prescribed D2-MAC as an interim standard to be replaced by HD- 
MAC. No agreement could be reached on their central provisions. DG 
Competition and DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs expressed
293
U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission  docu m ent. ‘Objet: Strategic p our l ’in trod u cd on  d e la  TVH D en  
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Ross (1 9 9 5 , p. 126).
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scepticism, considering the provisions too strict, whereas DG Culture insisted on
297allowing for the co-existence of old and new standards. The dossier was not 
accepted -  neither in the preliminary talks between the DGs involved nor 
during formal inter-service consultations. As a consequence its provisions were 
debated by the cabinets. The cabinet meetings included the cabinets of 
Telecommunications Commissioner Filippo Maria Pandolfi, Culture 
Commissioner Jean Dondelinger, Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan,
298and Industry Commissioner Martin Bangemann. At cabinet level, divisions 
existed similarly to those that had occurred among the Commission DGs. The 
cabinet of Commissioner Pandolfi gave priority to a uniform standard (i.e. D2- 
MAC) which would apply to all satellite types. The Dondelinger cabinet opposed 
the imposition of an interim standard without allowing simulcast in old PAL 
standards, whereas the cabinets of Brittan and Bangemann favoured a relaxation 
rather than a strengthening of rules.
Finding agreement on cabinet level was difficult and referring the draft text 
back and forth between the DGs and the cabinets for re-drafting and further
299
discussion was a time-consuming process. Eventually, the cabinets reached a 
compromise which committed the Commission to the interim standard (i.e. D2- 
MAC), but left it up to member states whether to make it mandatory or to allow 
simulcast in old and new standards. DG Telecoms was tasked with finalising a 
draft proposal which would incorporate the revised strategy for adoption by the 
College of Commissioners. More than one year later than expected and less 
than six months before the existing MAC directive expired, the European 
Commission adopted its final proposal on the ‘Adoption of Standards for 
Satellite Broadcasting of Television Signals’ (European Commission 199id) in
Interview  N um ber 5 , Interview N um ber 12, Interview N um ber 15.
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159
300 __
July 1991. The proposal prescribed that HD-MAC would be the only HDTV 
standard and be achieved through the D2-MAC interim standard. New services 
and operational satellites would be obliged to use D 2-MAC exclusively, whereas 
existing services would be allowed to continue simulcast in old and new 
standards without any mention of a date ending it. The finalised version of the 
proposal differed substantially from the priorities set by DG Telecoms that had 
centred on making the use of D 2-MAC obligatory without granting such 
significant exemptions. The final adoption of the directive on standards for 
satellite broadcasting of television signals by the European Parliament and the
301Council took place in May 1992.
The second directive
Apart from preparing the proposal on the ‘Adoption of Standards for Satellite 
Broadcasting of Television Signals’ (European Commission 199id), the 
European Commission engaged in drafting a Memorandum of Understanding
302(MOU) as well as an ‘Action Plan’ to encourage the use of MAC standards. 
The MOU, a legally binding document to be signed by representatives of the 
satellite industry, programme producers, broadcasters, and equipment 
manufacturers, prescribed coordinated action to promote the D 2-MAC 
standard, contained reciprocal commitments of industry representatives and a
T h e finalising o f  the proposal was further delayed, m ainly b ecause T elecom s C om m issioner  
Pandolfi co n tin u ed  to con su lt with the industry and frequendy ch an ged  his position . P and olfi 
bypassed usual procedures by subm itting his ow n draft proposal to  his fellow  C om m issioners for  
ad option . For several m onths, the proposal travelled u p  an d  dow n th e C om m ission  hierarchy  
and m ade litd e progress. Interview N um ber 5 , Interview N um ber 15 and  Financial T im es,
2 8 .2 .1 9 9 1 . Sim ilar observations have b een  stated by Ross (1 9 9 5 , pp. 127 an d  182).
301
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by the E uropean  Parliam ent and th e C ouncil took  p lace in  May 1992 . In ord er to  gain  approval 
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302
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303system of financial incentives. The ‘Action Plan’ was set up to encourage the 
use of D 2-MAC by providing funding to cover the additional costs incurring on 
broadcasting companies, cable distributors, and programme producers when 
using the new D 2-MAC standard. In May 1992, the European Commission 
adopted a proposal for a Council decision on the ‘Action Plan’ (European 
Commission i992d).304
As regards the regulating of television standards the European Commission 
began to fundamentally change direction in early 1993. This was due to several 
reasons. In January 1993, Philips, one of the leading manufacturers of 
consumer electronics, announced that it would suspend its planned 
manufacturing of programme receivers operating on the HD-MAC standard
•  305and would instead develop equipment for digital transmission. Practically 
overnight, the provisions of the directive on television standards became useless. 
Another important change concerned the Commission itself. In early 1993, a 
new Commission was introduced. This implied a far-reaching re-organisation on 
the level of Commissioners, their cabinets, and the senior management of the 
DGs. Telecommunications Commissioner Pandolfi was succeeded by Martin 
Bangemann whose policy priorities for television standards differed substantially 
from his predecessor. In DG Telecoms new staff were appointed to deal with the 
issue of television standards in the unit for the ‘Relationship between 
telecommunications and broadcasting’. Following the organisational changes 
and recent events, DG Telecoms undertook a re-definition of its existing policy 
on television standards. Shortly after coming to office, Telecoms Commissioner 
Martin Bangemann declared that under his management, the Commission’s
In the course o f  con su lting  with the industry o n  the co n ten t o f  the M O U , the C om m ission  
m ade th e d ocu m en t m ore flexib le, replacing it by a declaration  o f  in te n t  Industry  
representatives ad opted  the M O U  in  Ju n e 1992. See Financial T im es, 2 6 .4 .1 9 9 1 , 8 .5 .1 9 9 1 ,
5 .6 .1 9 9 2 , 16 .6 .1992 . A gen ce E urope, 2 6 .4 .1 9 9 2 , 6 .6 .1 9 9 2 , 17 .6 .1 9 9 2 . Rapid, 16 .6 .1 9 9 2 . 
C om m ission  Press R elease I P /9 1 /4 2 ,  2 7 .6 .1 9 9 1 . U np ub lished  C om m ission  d ocu m ents. ‘Draft 
M em orandum  o f  U nderstand ing’, undated, prepared by DG  XIII. ‘Draft M em orandum  o f  
U nd erstand ing’, dated  6 .5 .1 9 9 2 , prepared  by D G  XIII.
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• 306policy on regulating television standards would have humbler ambitions. 
Instead of prescribing the use of a specific transmission standard the 
Commission would concentrate on the promotion of 16/9 technology 
regardless of standards. The officials responsible in DG Telecoms took up this 
change of emphasis. It was agreed that the Commission would shift away from 
enforcing standards to simply promoting the demand for digital technology and 
applying general competition rules in cases where firms used restrictive
307practices. In the view of DG Telecoms, this would help the interim standard 
D2-MAC develop in parallel with the new digital transmission standards with no 
regulatory intervention being needed.
In order to adapt existing regulation to these new priorities, DG Telecoms 
decided that the 1992 directive on television Standards would have to be 
repealed as soon as possible, even though the directive did not formally expire
308before December 1998. Although formally the dossier formally involved a 
large number of Commission DGs, it was generally accepted that the repeal 
directive would be prepared by DG Telecoms without intervention from other 
DGs. The main reason for this was that apart from DG Telecoms, other DGs had 
ceased to express an interest in actively influencing the preparation process. 
First of all, the authority of DG Telecoms to lead the Commission’s strategy on
309television standards was broadly accepted. As regards the policy approach to 
be taken, DG Culture had largely lost interest in the issue and turned towards 
activities it considered of greater relevance to its organisational self-interest . 
This was mostly due to its newly-established authority for monitoring the 
implementation and revising the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive (see
310section three). The DGs for Competition and Industry broadly endorsed the 
refined strategy prevailing in DG Telecoms because it had already indicated that
306
A gen ce Europe, 5 .1 .1 9 9 3 , 2 0 .2 .1 9 9 3 , 14 .3 .1993 . Financial T im es, 9 .2 .1 9 9 3 , 1 9 .2 .1 9 9 3 , 
4 -4 -1 9 9 3-
307
Interview N um ber 5, Interview N um ber 12. F inancial T im es, 13-3-1993 . 2 1 .4 .1 9 9 3 . A gen ce  
E urope, 2 1 .4 .1 9 9 3 , 8 .5 .1 9 9 3 . E uropean C om m ission  Press R elease I P /9 3 /1 8 4  o f  1 2 .3 .1993 . 
E uropean C om m ission  M em o, M E M O /9 3 /5 2 , 6 .1 2 .1 9 9 3 .
308
Interview N um ber 5 , Interview N um ber 12, Interview N um ber 15.
309
Interview N um ber 5 , Interview N um ber 12, Interview N um ber 15.
310
Interview Number 12,21.
1 6 2
•  •  311it would propose much less regulation than before. Hence there was much 
greater unity on the paradigm of legislation.
During the months to follow, the reduced level of administrative 
fragmentation greatly facilitated the preparation of legislation. The preparation 
of the new proposal on television standards was almost exclusively managed by 
DG Telecoms and passed the obligatory procedures without meeting problems. 
The proposal adopted by the Commissioners closely reflected the ideas 
promoted in DG Telecoms and passed the Commission hierarchies within less 
than six months. The Commission published a draft directive on the ‘use of 
standards for the transmission of television signals’ in November 1993 
(European Commission 1993c). The proposal envisaged a market-driven 
approach to the promotion of television standards. Instead of prescribing the 
use of a specifically European broadcasting norm, its provisions concentrated 
on facilitating the 16/9 format without imposing specific transmission 
standards. Also the directive left open which standards to use for conditional 
access systems and other gateway technologies (see Chapter Six). The draft 
directive was published together with a Communication (European Commission 
1993d) in which DG Telecoms envisaged funding of digital technology, mainly 
in the context of the Commission’s ‘Fourth Framework Programme’, as well as 
standardisation on the basis of voluntary agreements among industry actors, 
standardisation bodies, and through international co-operation (European
312Commission 1993d, p. S5f.). The directive was adopted under the co-decision
313
procedure in October 1995.
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Legislation on media ownership
Apart from its activities to regulate standards for the transmission of television 
broadcasting and to revise existing legislation on ‘Television without Frontiers’, 
the European Commission undertook legislative efforts to harmonise rules on 
media ownership and concentration. Since the late 1980s, media companies 
had become increasingly engaged in mergers and acquisitions to raise capital 
for the financial investment required by new technologies (e.g. cable and digital 
transmission) and the provision of new audiovisual services, such as specialised 
channels, video-on-demand and pay-per-view.314 Large media companies 
emerged, leading to a situation of cross-media ownership and media 
concentration, with possibly harmful effects on cultural diversity and pluralism. 
In virtually all EU member states, restrictions on media ownership existed, 
particularly on television broadcasting which has had a strong tradition of
315regulation. Since the late 1980s, these rules came increasingly under
316pressure. Member states such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom 
loosened restrictions on media ownership. At the same time, a ‘patchwork’ of 
different rules continued to prevail across EU member states, concerning, for 
example, the type, scope and methods of applying restrictions on ownership 
(European Commission 1992c). Community-wide regulation of media 
ownership did not exist. The European Commission was empowered to rule on 
media mergers and takeovers in the context of applying general competition 
law and the Merger Regulation, but before the 1990s its activities in this field
317were of limited significance.
314
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a  case o f  audiovisual policy.
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The European Community first took up the issue of legislating on media 
concentration and ownership in the late 1980s. As other audiovisual issues it 
was first raised by the European Parliament. In the context of the Commission’s 
Green Paper on ‘Television without Frontiers’ (see Chapter Three) the 
European Parliament had requested that media pluralism be addressed by
318Community legislation. A majority of MEPs were concerned about pluralism 
and expressed these concerns in a variety of documents, such as the ‘Barzanti
319Report’. However, as the Commission did not consider such provisions 
necessary at the time, the Directive ‘Television without Frontiers* did not 
contain any anti-concentration measures.320 In the early 1990s, the European 
Parliament intensified its calls for legislation on media ownership and suggested
321EU regulation.
Setting the policy agenda
In the European Commission, the issue of media ownership was first addressed 
by DG Culture. In the context of drafting its Communication on Audiovisual 
Policy published in 1990 (European Commission 1990b), the DG showed itself 
concerned that the European audiovisual sector would grow at the expense of 
pluralism and diversity (European Commission 1990b, p. 21). DG Culture 
recommended the encouragement of a diversity of television programmes by 
means of regulation. The dominant view of DG Culture and its unit ‘Audiovisual 
Policy’ was that existing legal instruments in operation at member state level 
were insufficient to preserve media pluralism and that Community competition
con tro l o f  con centration  betw een  undertakings; Official Journal L 395 , 3 0 .1 2 .1 9 8 9 . For an  
overview o f  the C om m ission’s d ecisions o n  m ed ia ow nership  u n d er EU  com p etition  law d uring
th e 1990s see  H arcourt (1 9 9 8 ); G oldberg et al. (1 9 9 8 ).
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law might fail to effectively control media concentration, mainly because of 
difficulties in defining the rapidly changing media markets and in specifically
322addressing issues of pluralism. In its Communication, DG Culture also warned 
that purely national legislation could be circumvented by international media 
companies.
Some of the concerns expressed by DG Culture at the time were shared by 
the DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs. DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs had an interest in removing the fragmentation of national 
markets by means of regulatory harmonisation (see Chapter Three). It 
considered a disparity of rules as creating a situation of legal uncertainty and a
323potential obstacle of international activities of European media operators. In 
spite of their different missions for and outlooks on the audiovisual sector, DG 
Culture and DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs agreed that the 
Commission should study the question of whether to propose Community 
legislation on media ownership. Hence, a central conclusion of the Commission 
‘Communication on Audiovisual Policy’ was that
‘on the account of the importance it attaches to the objective of 
maintaining pluralism, the Commission is studying the question 
with a view to a possible proposal for a Directive, whose aim would 
be to harmonize certain aspects of national legislation in this field’ 
(European Commission 1990b, p. 19).
It was agreed that the Commission would address the issue of media
concentration in a separate document, a Green Paper that would explore the
possibilities for proposing Community legislation, its possible scope and
content.
The preparation of the 1992 ‘Green Paper’ on media ownership
Following the publication of the Commission ‘Communication on Audiovisual 
Policy’ (European Commission 1990b), it was agreed by the senior
322
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managements of the DGs Culture and the Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
that the responsibility for drafting a consultative document on media ownership 
would be taken by the latter. Senior policy-makers considered the staff of DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs to have greater legal expertise to develop
• 324a legally-sound Commission strategy. As legislation on ‘Television without 
Frontiers’, regulation of media ownership would have to be based on the Treaty 
provisions for the single market and therefore be the primary responsibility of 
DG Internal Market (see Chapter Three). This was generally accepted in the 
two DGs and it was arranged that DG Internal Market would consult DG Culture 
on the contents of the document. In DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, 
the issue was allocated to the division called ‘Media and Data Protection’ within 
Directorate F (‘Approximation of Law, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom 
to Provide Services; the Professions’). Previously the division had dealt with 
monitoring the implementation of the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive.
The view taken by the officials in DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
was mostly driven by the internal market philosophy, centring on regulated 
liberalisation and support of the European media industry vis-a-vis powerful US
325companies. They approached the issue of media ownership from a legal 
perspective, advocating a harmonisation of national legislation in order to 
create a single market in which media companies faced a coherent regulatory 
environment. In agreement with the senior level of the Directorate General, the 
officials responsible undertook the drafting of a consultative document arguing 
for a Council directive according to Article 100 on the approximation of laws. 
They aimed at providing an outline of the legal situation regarding media 
ownership rules across member states and a discussion establishing the legal 
basis for a Community initiative, centring on the realisation of the internal 
market. This was to be followed by proposals for a possible directive.
Interview N um ber 4 . A nother reason b eh in d  the d ecision  was that it was generally  accep ted  
in th e C om m ission  that bu ild in g  any regulatory initiative o n  purely cultural con cern s w ould  run  
in to  serious problem s tou ch in g  on  m em ber states’ sovereignty and that th e C om m ission ’s m ed ia  
and audiovisual policy therefore was to b e primarily d evelop ed  in  the co n tex t o f  th e sin g le
m arket program m e (see C hapter T h ree).
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During the early stages of agenda-setting, DG Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs officials engaged in preliminary consultations with outside interests. 
Industry representatives and member states showed themselves divided as 
regards whether to establish Community rules and tended to oppose a 
legislative initiative. Nevertheless, DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
was determined to act. In the Commission, it engaged in preliminary 
consultations with DG Culture. Their consultations mostly took place in working 
groups and meetings that preceded more formal inter-service consultations and 
therefore excluded other Commission DGs. As the two DGs agreed on the need 
for legislation and its substance, the consultations did not encounter serious 
difficulties and centred on the details of the approach to be taken.
While DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs was mostly interested in 
realising the single market for audiovisual services and products, DG Culture 
took a keen interest in maintaining pluralism and a diversity of programmes. A 
concession made by DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs to DG Culture 
was to give the issue of pluralism attention in the Green Paper. The two DGs 
agreed that the Green Paper would contain a section on pluralism and include 
it as an objective to the legal reasoning of why Community regulation would be
327necessary. They also arranged to add the word ‘pluralism’ to the title of the 
Green Paper. Based on the pre-consultations with DG Culture, DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs prepared a draft document which argued for the 
adoption of a directive and outlined the central aims and provisions of possible 
legislation. Harmonisation would cover all activities of media companies, 
whether local, national or transnational. The scope of harmonisation would be 
television and radio broadcasting, the press sector possibly being dealt with as 
well. Legislation would define what constituted a media controller and provide 
for statistical methodology to measure audiences.
M ost large m ed ia  com p anies op p osed  a C om m unity initiative, w hereas sm aller com p an ies  
and producers w elcom ed  i t  M em ber states show ed  them selves h esitan t to express clear  
positions at the tim e, as it was still unclear w hat th e C om m ission  w ould  p rop ose. Interview  
N um ber 4 , Interview N um ber 6 , Interview N um ber 7. A gen ce E urope, 1 .9 .1994 . Financial
T im es, 1 0 .8 .1994 .
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The draft Green Paper did, however, also meet with opposition which was 
mosdy expressed by DG Competition. While other DGs either simply endorsed 
the strategy presented by DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs or took little 
interest in the dossier, DG Competition expressed doubts over whether a
328directive regulating media ownership was really needed. Officials in DG 
Competition tended to view the directive an ‘interventionist’ strategy bearing 
the tendency towards ‘over-regulation’ which would counteract its liberalisation 
philosophy centring on the application of general competition law and the 
1989 Merger Regulation. They asked DG Internal Market to present in the 
Green Paper several options the Commission might take towards controlling 
media concentration rather than simply proposing the adoption of a directive.
Diverging over the very need for legislation, DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs and DG Competition were unable to agree on a compromise, 
first in their preliminary talks, then in the context of obligatory inter-service 
consultations.329 As a consequence, the dossier was forwarded to discussion in 
the cabinets. The cabinets involved were those of Martin Bangemann for the 
Internal Market, Jean Dondelinger for Culture and Audiovisual Affairs, and Sir 
Leon Brittan for Competition. The divisions among the cabinets largely 
corresponded to those expressed on DG level and centred on the relationship 
between Bangemann and Brittan. Bangemann’s cabinet defended the existing 
draft, whereas Brittan’s cabinet demanded that regulation be kept at a minimum 
level and the Commission would rely on the Merger Regulation and general
330 •competition law instead. The discussion between the cabinets was time- 
consuming and further delayed the policy formulation process. Together with 
referring the draft Green Paper on media concentration back and forth 
between DG and cabinet level, re-drafting took considerably more time than 
foreseen. Among the cabinets, divisions intensified, particularly when industrial
331players and national representatives increased their lobbying activities. 
Eventually, the cabinets agreed that the Commission would not commit itself to a
328
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specified strategy, but defer the proposition of legislation and first await the 
results of public consultations. In the Green Paper it would present several 
options for Community action in the field without indicating any preference.
The 1992 ‘Green Paper * on media ownership
After DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs had amended the draft 
document accordingly, the European Commission officially adopted its Green 
Paper on ‘Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Single Market’ (European 
Commission lggse) in December igg2. The document was limited to providing 
a detailed outline of the existing regulatory situation in member states, followed 
by a discussion of the legal basis for Community action. These parts were 
formulated in a largely unchanged version of previous drafts prepared by DG 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs and therefore revealed the commitment
332of DG Internal Market and Industrial Affairs to propose a directive. However 
the overall message of the document had changed substantially. The need for 
legislative action was assessed in the light of several Community objectives: the 
completion and the functioning of the single market; industrial policy aims; 
audiovisual policy aims; and the respect of fundamental human rights 
(European Commission igg2e, p. 58-60). Most importantly, the Green Paper 
presented three possible options for Community action: no action; a 
harmonisation of legislation by means of a directive; and a non-binding 
recommendation which would ask national authorities to increase transparency 
concerning the implementation of media ownership rules. The Commission 
gave no preference to any of these options and as regards to the option of 
proposing a directive it abstained from defining its content, design, coverage 
and scope.333
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The preparation of legislation
In early 1993, a new Commission came into office. This entailed several 
organisational changes on Commissioner, cabinet and DG level. DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs was split into two different DGs, one called DG 
Internal Market and Financial Affairs (DG XV), and one called DG Industry 
(DG III). For the Internal Market, Commissioner Vanni d’Archirafi took over 
from Martin Bangemann. In the newly-organised DG Internal Market, the unit 
responsible for the media ownership dossier was re-named ‘The Media, 
Commercial Communications and Unfair Competition’ and staffed with new 
officials as most officials who had previously been involved were transferred 
other units (e.g. ‘Data Protection’).
After the publication of the ‘1992 Green Paper’ on pluralism and media 
ownership (European Commission 1992c), the Commission awaited reactions 
from outside interests as to which of the options presented should be taken. 
The consultations were primarily conducted by DG Internal Market. The 
hearings and written procedures initiated by the Commission revealed that no 
common position existed among outside actors, but that the general climate
354gradually turned more favourable for a Community initiative. In early 1994, 
after consultations had finished DG Internal Market undertook efforts to 
prepare a follow-up Communication to the ‘1992 Green Paper’. It planned to 
proceed with proposing the adoption of a directive, seeing its position 
strengthened by the new Commissioner Vanni d’Archirafi who argued in favour 
of a directive as well as by requests made by the European Parliament and
535several outside interests that called for a harmonisation of rules.
DG Internal Market began preparing the follow-up Communication which, 
besides a commitment to a legislative initiative, was to include more detailed 
propositions for a directive harmonising media ownership rules and timetables. 
Following the single market logic, the draft document argued in favour of
Interview N um ber 2, Interview N um ber 4 , Interview N um ber 6 . U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission  
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ensuring the freedom of establishment of media enterprises and the free 
movement of media services. It proposed rules of limited scope that excluded, 
for example, ‘internal pluralism’ which touched on the structure of 
broadcasters and the content of programmes.336 The idea was to propose 
minimum rules that would grant member states a high degree of flexibility. The 
so-called ‘audience share’ would serve as a criterion to assess dominance in 
media markets rather than the mere number of channels owned by a media 
company. The draft also envisaged transparency mechanisms obliging media 
companies to provide relevant information to national authorities.
Other Commission DGs continued to express a great interest in shaping the 
Commission’s strategy for media ownership and conflict re-remerged. As with 
the 1992 Green Paper, DG Internal Market engaged in preliminary 
consultations with DG Culture. Between the two DGs, debate remained limited
to the details, most importantly the question of how much account should be
337taken of cultural issues. DG Culture wanted to see the aim of pluralism be 
covered by the directive, for example by making pluralism and the diversity of 
content one of its objectives. At the same time, conflict between the two DGs 
remained low because officials in DG Culture expressed less interest in the 
dossier than they had in the 1992 Green Paper. This was largely due to the fact 
that DG Internal Market had already incorporated many of the concerns 
expressed by DG Culture. Another reason was that DG Culture changed its 
responsibilities that now included the implementation of the ‘Television 
without Frontiers’ directive (see section three). In this context, the senior 
management of the DG decided that the media ownership dossier was no 
longer of primary interest to the DG and its realisation no longer part of its
358mission. Senior policy-makers assumed that DG Culture would lose too much
U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission d ocum ents. ‘N o te  o n  draft proposal o n  pluralism  in  m ed ia  
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time and effort engaging in the dossier and therefore decided that the service 
would bring itself less into inter-service consultations.
A crowding policy arena
Although DG Culture gradually withdrew from actively influencing the media 
ownership dossier, administrative fragmentation did not reduce as one might 
expect but did in fact magnify, due to an increase in the number of 
participating DGs. The gap left by DG Culture was filled by another Commission 
DG that considerably intensified its interest in influencing the preparation of 
the media ownership dossier: DG Telecoms. In fact, its participation caused 
much greater conflict on the administrative level of the Commission than that 
of DG Culture had previously done. This was due to the emergence of greater 
differences on the paradigm of legislation and more competition for policy 
authority. The policy arena was now filled by four DGs: DG Internal Market, 
DG Competition, DG Telecoms, and, to a more limited extent, DG Culture.
DG Competition continued to consider the dossier as relevant to its own 
activities to rule on media ownership. Since the late 1980s, DG Competition 
had become more active in the media sector, implementing EU competition law
339and the 1989 Merger Regulation to vet on mergers. In the context of these 
activities, officials in DG Competition came to view existing competition 
instruments as inadequate for controlling media ownership. The application of 
general competition law implied difficulties concerning the definition of the 
media markets and the Merger Regulation was limited in its applicability due to
340its very high turnover thresholds. After the publication of the ‘1992 Green 
Paper’ on pluralism and media concentration, DG Competition became more 
supportive of Community legislation covering media ownership. Controversy 
between DG Internal Market and DG Competition reduced in so far as DG
For a com prehensive overview o n  C om m ission decisions on  m ed ia  com p etition  m atters see  
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Competition now welcomed a legislative initiative. While the two DGs agreed 
on the need for a directive, they continued to differ on the objectives and the 
details of the approach to be taken. For example, DG Competition asked for the 
definition of the ‘audience share’ to be brought in balance with its application 
of general competition law. Furthermore, it opposed the idea discussed in DG 
Internal Market of setting up an independent authority to monitor media 
concentration. In the view of DG Competition, such an authority would imply a 
loss of competence for DG Competition to monitor and assess media
542concentration.
Even greater influence over the definition of policy priorities was sought by 
DG Telecoms. The DG took an increasing interest in media-related issues, 
including the media ownership dossier, which was closely linked to the efforts 
undertaken by the Directorate ‘Telecommunications Policy’ to develop the 
Commission’s approach to what it called the ‘Information Society’. The term 
‘Information Society’ stood for the emergence of a variety of new 
communications services and applications linked to the audiovisual and 
telecommunications sectors, such as teleshopping, home-banking, and video-on- 
demand. It implied an emphasis on the information and communication 
industries as being key areas for growth and employment in the European 
Union and referred to efforts made by the European Commission to develop a 
new regulatory paradigm for the emerging services and applications (European 
Commission 1994c).
The attempts made by DG Telecoms to define a policy agenda for the 
‘Information Society’ were significantly influenced by the recommendations of 
the ‘Bangemann Group’(High-Level Group on the Information Society 1994), 
a group composed of representatives of the industry, users and consumers and 
chaired by Martin Bangemann, then Commissioner for Telecommunications 
and Industry. In the Commission, the ‘Information Society’ served as an
Interview  N um ber 6 , Interview N um ber 10. S peech  given  by van M iert, d ocu m en ted  in  R apid
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umbrella term for a wide range of policy initiatives, including audiovisual
343 __issues. The ‘Bangemann Report’ gave priority to a deregulation of markets by 
eliminating existing technical constraints, abolishing public monopolies, and 
establishing a minimum of regulation. In July 1994, on the initiative of the 
Bangemann cabinet, the Commission adopted the so-called ‘Action Plan’ 
(European Commission 1994c). Modelled closely on the ‘Bangemann Report’, 
it was intended to establish a Commission work programme for legislative 
measures to be taken in the context of the ‘Information Society’. Due to its 
linkage with the highly popular ‘Bangemann Report’, the ideas expressed in the 
‘Action Plan’ soon amounted to one of the leading doctrines in the 
Commission.344
As regards the audiovisual sector, the main interest of DG Telecoms was to 
define a policy approach for regulating the information and communications 
technologies which ran along lines similar to those established for the 
telecommunications sector - based on far-reaching liberalisation and a ‘soft’ 
regulatory approach (see Chapter Four). In this context, it argued in favour of 
proposing as little regulation as possible to leave room for the application of
345new technologies. Against this background it was not surprising that the 
approach taken by DG Telecoms towards the media ownership dossier differed
M ost o f  these initiatives are outside the scope o f  this thesis. As observed  by Levy (1 9 9 9 , p. 
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546significantly from that of DG Internal Market. DG Telecoms was sceptical of 
what it called the ‘over-regulation’ (Interview Number 15) envisaged by DG 
Internal Market and called for excluding new audiovisual services (e.g. pay-per- 
view and video-on-demand) from the scope of any legal instrument. It also 
wanted to limit the regulatory framework to ownership issues emerging in the 
context of traditional media, i.e. broadcasting and print media, and to leave the 
provision of new audiovisual services untouched. DG Telecoms also opposed 
what it considered a too narrow definition of media ownership in terms of legal 
ownership because that would not take account of the control maintained by
• 547companies over access to networks and users. Underlying the opposition 
expressed by DG Telecoms were doubts whether media ownership legislation on 
Community level was needed at all.
To a significant extent, the disagreement among DG Internal Market and 
DG Telecoms on the content of legislation overlapped with a conflict over 
authority for media-related issues. The determination of DG Telecoms to define 
the Commission’s agenda for the ‘Information Society* implied a questioning of
548the established authority of DG Culture and DG Internal Market. 
Administrative fragmentation as regards media ownership therefore 
significantly increased. Three to four DGs actively participated in the 
preparation of the follow-up Communication. To varying extents, these DGs 
differed not only on the details, but also on the fundamental objectives of and 
the need for legislation. Furthermore, disagreement was linked to the question 
which DG would take authority over media-related issues. As a consequence, 
informal talks between the DGs were of little effect and quickly led into the 
more formalised inter-service consultations during which DG Competition and 
DG Telecoms made their approval of proposing a directive dependent on what
549would be proposed in terms of nature, level, scope and definitions. Since
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inter-service consultations did not lead to mutual agreement, the cabinets got 
involved to discuss the provisions of the follow-up Communication. The 
divisions occurring on cabinet level largely mirrored those between the DGs and 
centred both on the details of a possible directive, such as the audience share, as 
well as the actual need for a directive regulating media ownership.350
It took several cabinet meetings to achieve a compromise. The Commission 
once again deferred taking a decision on whether to propose a directive and 
arranged that it would simply state that a legislative initiative might be 
appropriate - without defining its scope and provisions. The Communication 
would introduce and define criteria such as the ‘audience share’ and a ‘media 
controller’, but refrain from identifying definite thresholds. Referring the draft 
text back and forth between the cabinets and the DGs took more time than DG 
Internal Market had anticipated and the Commission adopted the final version 
of the follow-up Communication on media pluralism and concentration 
(European Commission 1994!) several months later than foreseen in October 
1994. Its provisions represented a significant departure from earlier versions 
prepared by DG Internal Market The document stated that a Community 
initiative might prove necessary and that a final decision on the matter would be 
subject to a new round of consultations.
Preparing a draft directive
The consultations announced by the follow-up Communication on media 
ownership (European Commission 1994^ lasted until early 1995. The 
Commission announced that it would give a definite position on whether to
351propose a directive during the second half of the year. This was delayed, not 
because of conflict among Commission DGs, but due to the re-organisation of 
the European Commission which took place in January 1995. The new 
Commissioner for the Internal Market, Mario Monti, extended the 
consultations to a third round to last until June 1995. During this final phase a
350
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majority of outside interests expressed approval of a regulatory initiative and 
concentrated on the content of EU legislation rather than the actual need for
. 352 It.
In September 1995, Commissioner Monti formally asked DG Internal 
Market to prepare a proposal for a directive for adoption by the Commission in
353early 1996. The European Commission’s Work Programme for 1996 listed 
the protection of pluralism in the media in the context of upcoming legislative 
proposals (European Commission 1995^ p. 22). Due to the divisions that had 
previously occurred it was arranged to closely orient the drafting process
354towards the discussion on cabinet level. While the Internal Market cabinet 
continued to argue in favour of a directive, other cabinets varied between 
approval, hesitation and opposition, depending on the issue under 
consideration. This created an overall atmosphere of what interviewees 
described as ‘lukewarm support’ (Interview Number 6, Interview Number 7) for 
a media ownership directive.
With discussions still going on cabinet level, DG Internal Market engaged in 
further modifying its proposal for a directive. The draft texts avoided a high 
level of regulation. The main provisions were to oblige national authorities to 
prevent firms reaching more than 30 per cent of a country’s television or radio
355audience to grow any bigger. Owners of more than one media type (print, 
broadcasting et cetera) would be allowed a total audience share of 10 per cent. 
The Commission would leave it up to member states to monitor the situation on 
their own territory. Public television stations were to be excluded from the
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scope of the directive. DG Internal Market engaged in formal inter-service 
consultations with other DGs, mostly with DG Competition and DG Telecoms 
that expressed greatest interest in the dossier. These DGs continued to defend 
their own policy agendas for the dossier and there was ongoing conflict between 
them on the objectives of legislation, centring on the question how much 
regulation was needed to achieve media pluralism.
The interest expressed by DG Telecoms in the media ownership dossier 
continued to be great. The DG published studies and policy papers taking 
account of media ownership (e.g. KPMG 1996) that serve as a useful indicator 
of its determination to gain more authority over media-related issues. DG 
Telecoms continued to be generally less concerned about concentration than 
DG Internal Market and held the view that with an ever-increasing number of
357television channels pluralism would eventually be self-fulfilling. DG Telecoms 
therefore still doubted whether a directive should be proposed at all, but did 
not oppose it in principle given that certain conditions were met. For example, 
DG Telecoms argued against the inclusion of specialised channels to the scope 
of the directive and the granting of derogations for public broadcasters and 
asked DG Internal Market to raise audience share ceilings for multimedia
358ownership. Also, a directive would have to contain provisions for a speedy 
revision in order to enable the Commission to adapt legislation to the changes 
caused by digital technology. The relationship between DG Competition and 
DG Internal Market was less troubled, centring on the details of the directive on 
media ownership, such as the ‘audience share’, and what constituted a
359‘controller’ of media markets. During inter-service consultations, DG Internal
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Market responded to most of the concerns raised by DG Telecoms and DG 
Competition and modified the draft text accordingly.
Policy coordination continued to be difficult, delayed and characterised by 
frequent changes to draft texts. In July 1996, DG Internal Market eventually 
managed to forward a draft text for a directive - first to the cabinets and then to 
the College of Commissioners that debated the draft proposal after the drafting 
of a directive had been underway for more than one year,. The draft text 
represented a framework directive limiting media ownership on the basis of an
• 360audience share of 30 per cent of a country’s television or radio audience. It 
obliged member states to provide legislative limits on the control of television 
and radio broadcasting services as well as the control of media belonging to 
more than one category (i.e. multi-media concentration, including the press). 
Exemptions were granted for local media and non-profit oriented broadcasting. 
The draft directive also established transparency measures that would oblige 
member states to ensure that undertakings communicated relevant information 
to the responsible authorities.
In the College of Commissioners, there was no majority for the proposal
361mainly because several Commissioners considered its provisions too rigid. 
This led to the formal rejection of the proposal. The rejection was prompted by 
a new drafting process on DG level, with new drafts being discussed in the 
College in October 1996 and March 1997. Again, no agreement was reached, 
mostly because the debate increasingly centred on the question whether to
362propose any legislation at all. In spring 1997, following several years of 
conflict and prolonged policy formulation that had taken their departure on 
DG level and continued on cabinet and Commissioner level, the proposal was
360
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withdrawn from the official Commission agenda. The European Commission 
has never formally abandoned the initiative on media ownership nor has it 
resumed a formal drafting procedure. Hence, the withdrawal has effectively
364been an abandonment. The European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee have continued to call for legislation on media ownership 
until the present day but the high extent of conflict in the Commission has
366continued and made a new drafting round extremely unlikely.
The revision of the ‘Television without Frontiers* directive
The directive ‘Television without Frontiers’, commonly called the broadcasting 
directive, had entered into force in October 1990.366 ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ represented the centrepiece of Community legislation of the 
audiovisual sector because it combined liberalisation with re-regulation and 
covered a wide range of issues, including advertising, quotas for the broadcast of 
European and so-called ‘independent’ productions, the right-of-reply, and the 
protection of young people from harmful programmes (see Chapter Three). In 
the European Commission, setting the agenda for a revision of the 1990 
directive started in 1993. For the Commission, the main reason prompting the 
revision was the insufficient implementation of the directive’s provisions in 
member states. In the early 1990s, in a response to a record of implementation 
which was largely a ‘history of national non-compliance’ (Fraser 1997, p. 219) 
the European Commission initiated several infringement proceedings against 
almost all member states. Several outside actors affected by the directive called 
for updating and clarifying legislation as some of its provisions were vague and
363
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unclear, particularly the flexible wording on the quotas for European and 
independent productions. New audiovisual services had emerged (e.g. 
teleshopping) which fell outside the scope of the existing directive (European 
Commission 1995c).
Setting the policy agenda
In the European Commission, the initiative for preparing a revised proposal for 
the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive was not taken by DG Internal Market 
as one might expect after it had prepared the first proposal during the 1980s 
(see Chapter Three). In 1993, the dossier was allocated to DG Culture. This was 
a consequence of the ‘screening’ procedure which had taken place in the 
Commission during 1992 and served as a basis for re-organising the policy 
responsibilities of several Directorates General.367 According to senior decision­
makers in the Commission, allocating the centrepiece of the Community’s 
audiovisual policy to DG Culture would serve to affirm the role of the
368 __traditionally weak DG. The decision was backed by Commission President 
Jacques Delors who was said to have an interest in strengthening the position of 
DG Culture. In DG Culture, formal responsibility for ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ was taken by the unit called ‘Audiovisual Policy’ organised within 
Directorate C ‘Culture and Audiovisual Policy’.
The broadcasting directive had no expiry date, but Article 26 of the 
directive required the Commission to present a report on its implementation
369together with proposals for amendments it deemed necessary. DG Culture 
engaged in preparing a document which reported on implementation and was 
published as a Commission Communication (European Commission i994g) in
367
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March 1994. In the report, DG Culture declared that the flexible wording of the 
directive had so far impeded effective implementation in most member states. 
The so-called ‘quota’ for European works and ‘independent’ productions to be 
broadcast on television programmes which was enshrined in Articles 4 and 5 of 
the directive had been watered down during the Council negotiation in 1989 
and created what was widely referred to as a ‘loophole system’ (Financial Times, 
14.12.1994). Instead of defining exact quotas, the 1990 directive was limited to 
prescribing a quota as ‘a majority of works’ to be fulfilled ‘where practicable and 
by appropriate means’. In the view taken by DG Culture, existing 
implementation problems could only be remedied by strengthening the 
wording of Articles 4 and 5. In the implementation report, it stated that ‘the 
Commission would make it clear that the question of refining and 
strengthening the system set up by Articles 4 and 5 is now under consideration’ 
(European Commission i994g, pp. 21-22). The senior management of the DG 
decided that before making more detailed propositions a complete assessment 
of the directive’s implementation would be made and outside interests be 
consulted. The preparation and adoption of the Communication had been 
largely uncontroversial in the Commission because the document mostly 
contained member states’ reports on implementing Articles 4 and 5 and did not 
make more specific provisions.370
The preparation of legislation
With consultations with outside interests still being underway, DG Culture 
engaged in efforts to define more closely its policy approach towards a revision 
of ‘Television without Frontiers’ and to prepare a draft directive. Industry 
interests and member states were divided, either opposing or preferring a
371 __strengthening of the directive’s provisions. The officials in DG Culture 
concentrated on removing the ‘loophole’ concerning the quotas and instead
372imposing specified criteria on member states. Other changes referred to the
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inclusion of new audiovisual services to the broadcasting directive, such as video- 
on-demand and teleshopping, as these services were not regulated on 
Community level thus far. Before preparing more formal drafts of a revision, 
DG Culture engaged in preliminary consultations with interested Commission 
DGs. Two other DGs sought to participate in preparing a revised directive: DG 
Internal Market and DG Telecoms. While they broadly accepted the idea of a 
revision, the details and substance of the revised directive were subject to 
considerable debate.
DG Internal Market had a great interest in the revision process mainly 
because the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive was part of the internal 
market project and because the DG had previously been tasked with the dossier 
(see Chapter Three).373 The officials who used to be responsible had been 
transferred to other units such as ‘Data Protection’, but were now consulted on 
a revision. While they principally endorsed the idea of a revision and of 
strengthening Articles 4 and 5, they differed with DG Culture on the other 
objectives to be realised in the directive. Most importantly, DG Internal Market 
opposed the inclusion of new audiovisual services within the scope of the
directive. Although it had lost responsibility for the broadcasting directive, DG
374Internal Market continued to keep a strong interest in audiovisual issues.
Apart from preparing legislation on media ownership (see section two), the DG
375engaged in developing a regulatory approach for new audiovisual services. 
The idea of DG Culture to include new audiovisual services to the scope of the 
‘Television without Frontiers’ directive therefore attracted opposition by DG 
Internal Market. Hence, to a significant extent, the differences between DG 
Culture and DG Internal Market on the paradigm of legislation reflected an 
underlying conflict over authority.
The ideas proposed by DG Culture on revising the broadcasting directive 
stood in even greater contrast to the views expressed in DG Telecoms. DG 
Telecoms was greatly intensifying its interest in the audiovisual sector at the
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time, mostly in the context of its ‘Information Society* initiative which included 
a ‘light-touch’ regulatory model (see section two). Quite naturally, this interest 
included the broadcasting directive. In order to encourage the application of 
new technologies and new audiovisual services DG Telecoms argued in favour of
376proposing as little regulation as possible. According to DG Telecoms, the 
availability of a great range of applications and services would sooner or later 
automatically result in greater consumer choice and diversity. As regards 
‘Television without Frontiers* the DG preferred to phase out the quotas on 
European and ‘independent’ productions. Similarly to DG Internal Market, DG 
Telecoms opposed the inclusion of new audiovisual services to the scope of the 
directive mainly because it took the view that these services fell under its own 
competence. It preferred to limit regulation to simply promoting new 
communications technologies and services and argued that the broadcasting
377directive should only cover ‘traditional’ television broadcasting.
The conflict between the three participating DGs was of a multi-dimensional 
nature, touching not only on the details of legislation, but also on its paradigm 
and the question of influence and control. The question of whether to include 
new audiovisual services to the scope of the broadcasting directive and whether 
to strengthen the quotas could not be solved in the context of preliminary 
consultations between the DGs concerned. When the obligatory inter-service 
consultations also failed to achieve a compromise, the dossier was increasingly 
discussed on cabinet level. The debate led in the cabinets largely reflected the 
divisions that had occurred among the DGs. It centred on the issues of new 
audiovisual services and the quotas. Several Commissioners made their views 
publicly known. For example, Telecoms Commissioner Martin Bangemann 
publicly called the quotas ‘a misguided approach and soon a thing of the past* 
(Financial Times, 13.7.1994). At the insistence of his colleagues, Culture 
Commissioner de Pinheiro announced a departure from the priorities
376
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previously announced by DG Culture, committing his service to ‘clarify’ existing
378quota rules rather than strengthening them.
Several draft texts of the directive circulated back and forth between the 
cabinets and the DGs for re-drafting and new rounds of discussions. DG Culture 
had to make substantial amendments to the draft text, partially re-instating the 
‘loophole’ for the quotas using the original wording for Articles 4 and 5 of the 
1990 directive. The preparation was delayed by several months and continued
379on all levels of the Commission, including the Directorates General. In May 
1995, the European Commission formally adopted its proposal revising the 
‘Television without Frontiers’ directive (European Commission 1995c). Rather 
than strengthening its provisions or expanding its scope, the proposal aimed at 
increasing the legal certainty of the directive. The quota rules were partially 
strengthened, but to be phased out after a period of ten years. As regards 
television advertising, teleshopping was included in the articles relevant to 
advertising, but other new audiovisual services were excluded from the scope of 
the directive.
In the Council, the draft directive on ‘Television without Frontiers’ met with 
divergent positions among member states centring on the quota rules.380 In
381November 1995, the Council decided to leave the quota rules as they were. 
Reaching agreement between the Council and the European Parliament during 
the co-decision procedure proved difficult In June 1997, the broadcasting 
directive was finally adopted, largely sticking to the quota provisions of the
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• 582previous directive. On the initiative of the European Parliament, some new 
provisions had been introduced, covering, for example, the broadcast of major 
sports events and the establishment of a Contact Committee of national experts.
Conclusion
The period from 1990 to 1996 saw several initiatives in which the European 
Commission engaged to refine and expand existing audiovisual legislation. The 
Directorates General debated three major themes of legislation: the regulation 
of television standards, measures designed to limit media ownership and 
concentration, and a revision of the existing directive ‘Television without 
Frontiers’. Legislative action was prepared for by the drafting of several 
consultative documents. Eventually, the Commission adopted fewer legislative 
proposals than expected: two proposals on regulating television standards as 
well as a proposal revising ‘Television without Frontiers’. Although the 
Commission pursued the three themes of legislation separately from each other, 
similar developments could be identified with a view towards the factors under 
study. The case studies revealed high levels of administrative fragmentation that 
were linked with low legislative outputs, i.e. slow and inconsistent policy-making 
which resulted in few decisions to propose legislation and, on several occasions, 
in deferment and abandonment.
In the early 1990s, the audiovisual arena on the administrative level of the 
Commission got rather crowded, occupied by three to four Directorates 
General. The situation stood in stark contrast to the first phase of audiovisual 
policy-making in the 1980s (see Chapter Three) as well as to the developments 
that could be observed for the telecommunications sector during the first half 
of the 1990s (see Chapter Four). In addition to DG Culture and DG Internal 
Market, DG Competition and DG Telecoms joined the setting of DGs. Not only 
did twice as many DGs actively engage in drafting legislation, but there were also 
much higher levels of conflict between them. While DG Culture and DG
S82
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Internal largely stuck to their established policy agendas which emphasised 
detailed regulation (DG Culture) and internal market and liberalisation 
concerns (DG Internal Market), DG Competition and DG Telecoms entered the 
arena with a new set of policy priorities. The main interest of DG Competition 
was to ensure that audiovisual legislation did not develop in contradiction to its 
application of general competition law and that it would not amount to what it 
considered to be over-detailed and over-strict regulation. DG Telecoms was 
concerned to advance its vision of the global ‘Information Society’ on the basis 
of a legislative framework which would establish as little regulation as possible 
and instead entail a greater reliance on market forces.
The distinct interests and sectoral outlooks maintained in the participating DGs 
gave rise to substantial controversy over the paradigm of legislation. For each 
legislative initiative, the DGs differed not only on the details of legislation, but 
also on its primary objectives, for example how much regulation should be 
introduced and how much space be left to the self-regulating forces of the 
market. In the context of the media ownership initiative, disagreement even 
stretched to the question of whether Community legislation should be proposed 
at all. Furthermore, a competition for authority emerged on several occasions. 
While DG Competition’s main interest was to ensure that its existing powers to 
rule on media mergers and acquisitions were not curtailed by means of 
Community legislation, the other DGs competed for control over defining 
legislative solutions. For example, little conflict existed between DG Internal 
Market and DG Culture on the authority for the media ownership dossier, but 
rivalry emerged in the context of the ‘Television without Frontiers’ dossier. The 
most serious conflict arose on media ownership and the broadcasting directive 
due to the fact that DG Telecoms sought to increase its influence on audiovisual 
policy in general. These attempts were strongly opposed by other DGs that saw 
their established responsibilities questioned. Together, the large number of 
DGs, their differences on the substance of and need for legislation, as well as 
the competition for policy authority amounted to high levels of administrative 
fragmentation (see Table 12).
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Table 12 Indicators of administrative fragmentation in the audiovisual sector from 1990 to 1996
first directive 
on television  
standards
second  
directive on  
television  
standards
m edia
ownership
‘T elevision
without
Frontiers’
number o f DGs four one four three
differences on 
paradigm
high low high high
competition for 
authority
low low high high
overall level o f 
adm. fragm.
moderate-
hiSi,
low high high
As a result of the high level of administrative fragmentation, coordination was 
extremely difficult to cope with by the participating Commission DGs. More 
informal means of coordination that had been effective during previous years 
and were proving indispensable for coordination in the telecommunications 
sector, for example preliminary consultations conducted at the lower levels of 
the DG hierarchies, were of limited effect to resolve controversy (see Chapters 
Three and Four). Finding themselves in a situation that was characterised by 
rivalry and fundamental conflict it was difficult if not impossible for the 
participating DGs to arrive at compromises. Their debate quickly acquired a 
confrontational style and quickly moved into the larger and more ‘politicised’ 
arenas of the Commission, notably the cabinets and the College of 
Commissioners. Here the divisions largely mirrored those that had occurred 
among the DGs. The fact that in these arenas the very basics of the 
Commission’s legislative strategy had to be discussed once again, for example 
whether to propose legislation at all, served to prolong the preparation process 
even further and made changes to initial drafts more likely.
Due to the high levels of fragmentation and the limited effect of coordinative 
activities the participating DGs were not able to overcome conflict and dispute. 
In contrast to the telecommunications sector where the DGs involved managed 
to resolve controversy on legislative provisions, conflict persisted and 
intensified. Hence the legislative outputs produced by the Commission were 
rather low (see Table 13). Deferments frequendy occurred and substantial gaps 
between initial policy drafts and finalised versions were common. The lowest 
legislative outputs could be observed for the case of media ownership: following
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long delays and several deferments of the decision whether to propose 
legislation the Commission abandoned the dossier altogether. The Commission 
produced a large number of consultative documents many of which studied the 
question of whether to establish Community legislation but avoided a 
commitment to propose legislation (seeTable 14). The only exception from the 
patterns of fragmentation and coordination was the preparation of the second 
directive on television standards. Due to reduced levels of administrative 
fragmentation, the Commission was able to act rapidly and consistently and to 
propose legislation without deferments.
Table 13 Legislative outputs produced by the European Commission in the audiovisual sector 
from 1 9 9 0  to 1 9 9 6
first directive 
on  television  
standards
second  
directive on  
television  
standards
m edia
ownership
T e lev is io n
without
Frontiers’
duration between twelve less than twelve more than two more than two
and 24 months months years years
consistency moderate l'i-1' low low
decision to
propose
legislation
■ proposition of y y y
legislation
■deferment y y
■ abandonment — — y —
overall legislative moderate high low low
outputs
1 9 °
Table 14 Major European Commission consultative documents and legislative proposals
adopted in the audiovisual sector between 1990 and 1996
year type o f  docum ent title o f  docum ent DG  with 
form al 
drafting  
responsibility
199° consultative paper ‘Communication on Audiovisual Policy’ 
(European Commission 1990b)
DG Culture
1991 legislative
proposal
‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the Adoption 
of Standards for Satellite Broadcasting o f Television 
Signals’ (European Commission 199id )
DG Telecoms
!992 consultative paper Commission Communication on ‘Pluralism and 
media concentration in the single market. An 
assessment o f the need for Community action’ 
(European Commission 1992c)
DG Internal 
Market and 
Industrial 
Affairs
1993 consultative paper ‘Digital Television -  The Framework for a 
Community Policy’ (European Commission 1993d)
DG Telecoms
legislative
proposal
‘Commission proposal for a directive on the use o f  
standards for the transmission o f television signals’ 
(European Commission 1993c)
DG Telecoms
!994 consultative paper Follow-Up to the Consultation Process relating to 
the Green Paper on ‘Pluralism and Media 
Concentration in the Internal Market -  An 
Assessment o f the Need for Community Action’ 
(European Commission 19949
DG Internal 
Market
consultative paper Communication on ‘The application o f the 
directive ‘Television without Frontiers” 
(European Commission i994g)
DG Culture
!995 legislative
proposal
Report on the Application o f Directive 
8 9 /5 5 2 /EEC and Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive amending  
Council Directive 89 /552 /E E C  on the 
coordination o f certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action un Member 
States concerning the pursuit o f television 
broadcasting activities 
(European Commission 1995c)
DG Culture
*996 informal
legislative
proposal
several informal draft proposals fora  directive on 
media ownership
DG Internal 
Market
The following chapter examines the most recent phase of legislative policy­
making the European Commission completed in the audiovisual field thus far. 
Chapter Six will show that the high level of administrative fragmentation 
observed for the first half of the 1 9 9 0 s endured and at times even intensified 
and demonstrates how this situation affected the Commission’s legislative 
outputs.
l 9 l
Part Three: 
The
European
Commission’s
Changing
Policy
Agendas,
1 9 9 7  — g o o o
Chapter Six: 
From Rivalry to Mutual Avoidance 
-  Coordination in the Audiovisual 
Sector
Introduction
This chapter examines the most recent phase of legislative policy-making 
undertaken by the European Commission in the audiovisual field. On the 
national and the European Union level the debates that were led on media and 
audiovisual policy in the late 1990s were shaped by the growing enthusiasm of 
policy-makers for the ‘Information Society’ and ‘Convergence’. ‘Convergence’ 
referred to the changes triggered by the coming together of information 
technology, telecommunications and audiovisual sectors and the emergence of 
new markets and services. The European Commission was at the forefront to 
contribute to this debate which centred on the question of how the existing 
regulatory frameworks should respond to the challenge of ‘Convergence’ (e.g. 
Levy 1999). From 1997 a process was underway in the Commission to set an 
agenda for adapting existing legislation. Surprisingly only two legislative 
proposals emerged from it -  notwithstanding several attempts made by different 
Commission DGs to prepare a greater number of pieces of legislation. Between 
1997 and 2000, the European Commission prepared several consultative papers 
aimed at refining the existing legislative framework, most importantly the 1997 
‘Green Paper on Convergence’ (European Commission 1997a). Apart from 
proposing draft legislation to further develop existing legislation on television 
standards (see Chapter Five), the Commission abstained from legislative action. 
The present chapter shows that analysing these attempts with a view towards 
understanding why they failed is extremely important to further our
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understanding of how administrative fragmentation affects the Commission’s 
legislative outputs.
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that the high levels of 
administrative fragmentation observed for the first half of the 1990s (see 
Chapter Five) endured and at times even intensified. Four, sometimes five 
Commission DGs actively engaged in setting policy agendas and preparing 
legislation: DG Telecoms, DG Culture, DG Internal Market, DG Competition 
and sometimes DG Industry. As in previous years, these DGs maintained 
contrasting outlooks on and interests in audiovisual legislation. DG Culture 
continued to defend public service broadcasting and advocated detailed 
regulation of audiovisual services and networks. DG Internal Market sought to 
advance the realisation of the internal market and to regulate new issues, for 
example electronic commerce and intellectual property rights, on the basis of 
minimum rules. DG Competition wanted to further consolidate the application 
of competition law and avoid changing the existing balance between sector- 
specific regulation and case-by-case action. DG Telecoms continued to develop 
what it considered an entirely new model of audiovisual regulation, aimed at 
subsuming audiovisual legislation under the umbrella of a new legislative 
framework modelled on the regulation of telecommunications. The different 
policy priorities and organisational interests maintained in the participating 
DGs resulted in high levels of conflict between them. First of all, the DGs 
differed substantially on the paradigm of legislation, including the question of 
what should be the objectives of legislation as well as whether the Commission 
ought to take any legislative action at all. Furthermore, there continued to be a 
competition for authority which mainly related to what other DGs perceived as 
the increasing dominance of DG Telecoms that sought to expand its influence 
on audiovisual policy.
As shown in Chapter Five, coordination among the participating DGs had 
been characterised by conflict and dispute for several years. It now turned to be 
even more difficult to cope with, the dominant picture being one of 
confrontation and rivalry. The high levels of administrative fragmentation did 
not simply render coordinative activities, such as preliminary consultations, less 
effective. In anticipation of irreconcilable differences between each other, the
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Commission DGs refrained from using them at all. A central argument 
emerging from this is that due to the absence of coordinative activities conflict 
persisted and at times even intensified. Legislative policy-making was therefore 
slow and characterised by delays and incoherence. With the exception of 
legislation that developed the existing policy on television standards the 
Commission did not produce any legislative proposals -  in spite of its original 
intention to do so. Instead action was limited to the drafting of documents of a 
purely consultative nature that avoided a commitment to propose legislation. 
The proposition of legislation was deferred and later abandoned. Together, 
these low legislative outputs amounted to a Commission behaviour which can 
best be described as institutional inertia.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first section analyses the 
attempts made by the Commission under the leadership of DG Telecoms to 
install a new framework which would ‘merge’ the regulation of the audiovisual 
with that of the telecommunications sector. It shows how the attempts of DG 
Telecoms to initiate a new legislative framework failed due to a high level of 
administrative fragmentation and irreconcilable differences between the 
participating DGs. The second section traces the ensuing efforts taken by the 
Commission DGs to refine the objectives and instruments of audiovisual 
legislation. It demonstrates how irresolvable conflict continued to largely 
prevent legislative action and made the Commission keep the established 
sectoral model of regulation. A final section presents some concluding remarks 
on how administrative fragmentation operated to shape the process of 
coordination among the DGs in the late 1990s and how it translated into 
legislative outputs.
Setting the policy agenda
Since the mid-1990s, much of the Commission’s audiovisual agenda had come 
to be defined in the context of the ‘Information Society’. The term stood for a 
variety of new communications services and applications and served as an 
overarching framework for a variety of activities undertaken by the Commission 
many of which touched the audiovisual sector (see Chapter Five). As regards
195
legislation, it implied far-reaching liberalisation, a greater reliance on market 
forces and a minimum of regulatory intervention. Towards the end of the 
1990s, the ‘Information Society’ started to become overtaken by the initiative 
on ‘convergence’ (European Voice 12.12.1996). The term of ‘convergence’ 
refers to the blurring of boundaries between the formerly distinct sectors of 
information technology, telecommunications and the audiovisual. Put in simple 
terms, it has been expressed as the ‘ability of different network platforms to 
carry essentially similar kinds of services, or the coming together of consumer 
devices such as the telephone, television and personal computer’ (European
383Commission 1997a, p. 8). Technological convergence has been linked to a 
number of new services and applications, such as electronic commerce, home 
banking, voice telephony over the internet, and near-video on demand.
While the possibility of technological convergence has been largely 
undisputed, its implications for other areas, for example markets and consumer 
behaviour, have been far more controversial and subject to speculation and
384debate. The extent to which ‘convergence’ would lead to a new regulatory 
model remained even more disputed. In the European Commission the debate 
on how ‘convergence’ would affect legislation turned out to be one of the most 
heated ones led in recent years. Its starting point was that DG Telecoms sought 
to refine existing audiovisual regulation and undertook efforts to build a new 
framework. It then encountered significant opposition to its ideas from other 
Commission DGs.
The emergence of a new policy paradigm
In 1996, a small group of officials in DG Telecoms turned towards setting the 
agenda for developing a new regulatory model in the context of ‘convergence’. 
At the time, DG Telecoms was still in the middle of collaborating with DG 
Competition on proposing a comprehensive regulatory framework for 
telecommunications (see Chapter Four). Most of the officials who dealt with
For a d etailed  literature accou n t o f  the p h en o m en o n  o f  con vergen ce see , for exam p le, Levy 
( 1 9 9 9 )-384
This has been documented by Harcourt (2003); Ward (2003).
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‘convergence’ were organised in the unit called ‘Relationship between 
Telecommunications and Audiovisual Media’ in Directorate A 
(‘Telecommunications, Trans-European Networks and Postal Services’).385 The 
unit had previously been responsible for the preparation of legislative proposals 
for television standards (see Chapter Five). After the adoption of the revised 
legislative proposal on television standards (European Commission 1993c), the 
officials were looking for a new policy target. Given the rising popularity of the 
‘Information Society’ initiative (see Chapter Five) and the success of telecoms 
liberalisation (see Chapter Four), the unit intended to develop a new regulatory 
model on whose basis the existing audiovisual framework could be updated and
386refined. Examining how to regulate the new services and markets in which the 
traditional sectors of telecommunications, information technology and media 
blurred seemed an excellent opportunity to increase the unit’s prestige and also 
the influence of DG Telecoms on communications and media-related issues,
387notably vis-a-vis DG Culture and DG Internal Market. Indeed, the group 
would make the ‘convergence* initiative one of the major themes debated in the 
Commission during 1997.
In the view of the unit in DG Telecoms, the development of a modem, 
integrated communications market was crucially dependent not only on an 
efficient infrastructure capable of offering the full range of new services, but 
also on measures that would keep the European communications market open 
to competition and provide the regulatory safeguards necessary to attract new
388market entrants. Assuming that technological convergence would make 
formerly distinct sectoral boundaries blur, the group wanted to develop an
389entirely new model of regulation. It intended to replace existing vertical 
regulation, i.e. the application of different rules to different services (e.g. cable
T h e grou p  was jo in e d  by o n e  p erson  from  th e m ore sen ior  m an agem en t o f  D G  T elecom s as 
w ell as o n e  official from  the ‘T elecom m u n ication s L egislation ’ u n it
386
Interview  N u m ber 15, Interview N u m ber 17, Interview  N u m ber 21, Interview  N um ber 24.
387
Interview  N u m ber 10, Interview N u m b er 15, Interview  N u m ber 21.
388
S ee C ock b om e, C lem ents and W atson-Brown (1 9 9 9 ), all D G  T elecom s officials at th e tim e.
389
U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission  d ocu m en t, draft ‘G reen  Paper o n  C on vergen ce’, prepared  by DG  
T elecom s d uring  1997  (u n d ated ). Interview  N u m b er 10, Interview N u m b er 15, Interview  
N u m b er 21 , Interview  N um ber 24.
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television broadcasts versus voice telephony) that depended on the network on 
which they were delivered (e.g. cable, satellite), with so-called horizontal 
regulation. Horizontal regulation would apply the same regulatory model to the 
entire communications and media sector and distinguish only between the 
regulation of content and infrastructure. DG Telecoms envisaged a ‘light’ 
regulatory regime, assuming that the opportunities offered by the market would 
automatically entail greater consumer choice and innovation. The new 
framework would not only regulate telecommunications, but also the 
audiovisual sector and include both carriage and content. As regards carriage 
(i.e. infrastructure), the idea was to extend the regulatory principles for 
telecoms infrastructure to audiovisual networks, whereas for content (e.g. 
programme standards), the unit responsible in DG Telecoms envisaged the 
reliance on self-regulation and the regulating forces of the market. This implied 
a gradual phasing out of existing legislation.
The approach was basically in line with the overall thrust in DG Telecoms 
which emphasised competition, the promotion of new kinds of services and
390applications, and a minimum of re-regulation (see Chapter Four). In 1996, 
on the initiative of the unit responsible, the Commission adopted two 
Communications on the Information Society, one on ‘The New Emerging 
Priorities’ (European Commission 1996!) and one on ‘Preparing the Next 
Steps’ (European Commission ig^6g). The two documents emphasised the 
importance of the ‘Information Society’, calling for improving the business 
environment and investing in the future. As regards regulatory principles, they 
proposed that
‘over-hasty legislation should (...) be avoided until it is clear where 
and what type of intervention is required. In addition, it is 
important to remove any obstacles that may inhibit businesses 
from taking new initiatives and committing investments to them’ 
(European Commission 1996^ p. 1).
The two documents were intended as consultative papers and as they did 
not make specific proposals for Commission action, their adoption did not 
attract significant debate in the Commission.
390 Interview Number 10, Interview Number 15, Interview Number 21, Interview Number 24.
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In order to develop more detailed policy propositions, DG Telecoms 
commissioned a study from KPMG to analyse the phenomenon of 
‘convergence’ and to recommend broad policy lines. The study was intended to 
serve as basis for the policy recommendations to be given in a Green Paper, a 
consultative Commission document. The Report published by KPMG in 
September 1996 argued that neither existing audiovisual nor 
telecommunications regulation could be applied unmodified to the new 
industry and services and claimed that in order to minimise regulatory 
intervention the European Union should support a market-led approach which 
would be primarily based on implementing general competition law (KPMG 
1996, p. 25). The recommendations made by KPMG closely corresponded to 
the ideas circulating in the unit responsible in DG Telecoms. In autumn 1996, 
DG Telecoms organised public hearings on the central issues raised in the 
KPMG study, mostly with industry and business interests. Then there was an 
interruption until the actual drafting of a Green Paper on ‘Convergence’
391began. In early summer 1997 the unit prepared an initial draft document, 
entitled ‘Green Paper on the Regulatory Implications of the Convergence of the
392Telecommunications, Audiovisual and Information Technology Sectors’. It 
was modelled on previous Green Papers on the liberalisation of telecoms, 
presenting an outline of the current market and regulatory situation and
393proposing lines of action to be taken.
Most of the draft’s recommendations were based on the KPMG study,
394adapting its central definitions, assumptions and recommendations. The draft 
identified a number of regulatory barriers to convergence, including a lack of
391
T h e m ain  reason for this was that besides its activities o n  ‘C on vergen ce’, th e u n it was heavily  
involved  in  the C om m ission’s in frin gem en t p roceed in gs against the K ingdom  o f  Spain  for non-  
com p lian ce with the directive on  television standards (D irective 9 5 /4 7 /E E C ) . T h e  case was 
co m p lex  and highly-charged and because the u n it was staffed w ith on ly  th ree officials at the  
tim e, it con su m ed  m ost o f  their tim e. This led  to th e p o stp o n em en t o f  th e  drafting o f  its
consultative d ocu m en t o n  convergence. Interview N um ber 24.
392
U np u b lish ed  C om m ission docu m ent, ‘D etailed  C om m entary G reen  Paper o n  C on vergen ce’,
prepared by DG Culture, October 1 9 9 7 .
393
Interview N um ber 24. U np ub lished  C om m ission d ocu m en t, ‘D eta iled  C om m entary G reen  
Paper o n  C onvergence’ prepared  by DG Culture, O ctob er 1997. T h e drafting was su pp orted  by 
an official w ho had b een  closely involved in  the drawing u p  o f  th e  G reen  Papers o n
Infrastructure and M obile T elep h on y  (European C om m ission  1994a, 1994b , 1 9 9 4 c).
394
Interview Number 15, Interview Number 21, Interview Number 24.
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‘technological neutrality’ of existing regulation and the fact that the provision 
of audiovisual services was not liberalised under existing legislation.395 DG 
Telecoms proposed that competition policy ought to be the main tool of 
regulation -  besides there should be a reliance on self-regulation and the self- 
fulfilling mechanisms of the market. The document proposed to keep 
regulatory intervention at a minimum. Highlighting the potential uncertainty 
which might result from ongoing sector-specific regulation, the text called for 
so-called ‘horizontal regulation’, i.e. a new single regulatory model for the 
telecommunications and the audiovisual sectors based on the separation 
between infrastructure and content.396 The intention of DG Telecoms was to 
present the option of a single regulatory model together with two other options, 
either a continuation of sector-specific regulation or a progressive adaptation of 
rules to new services. The Commission would express a clear preference for 
horizontal regulation.
Furthermore DG Telecoms planned to make detailed provisions both for 
the regulation of audiovisual content and carriage. On content, it suggested 
limiting regulation to free-to-air broadcasting and to treat other audiovisual
397services in the same way as traditional telecommunications services. Provisions 
were made for market entry with suggestions to liberalise cable television 
networks not only for the provision of telephony, but also for the carriage of 
audiovisual services; for access, proposing to extend existing legislation on 
access to telecommunications services to new audiovisual services; for licensing, 
arguing in favour of no licensing at all or general authorisation and declaration 
procedures at most; and for the so-called public interest, suggesting that its 
objectives were to be re-assessed on the basis of costs.
T ech n olog ica l neutrality im plies that a service is regulated  in  the sam e m anner, irrespectively  
o f  th e network it is delivered  by (e.g . cable, satellite) (E uropean C om m ission  1999c, p . 3 ). 
U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission d ocu m en t, draft ‘G reen  Paper o n  C on vergen ce’, p rep ared  by DG  
T elecom s during 1997  (un dated ).
396
Interview  N um ber 15, Interview N um ber 21.
397
U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission  d ocu m en t, ‘G reen Paper o n  C on vergen ce’, p rep ared  by DG  
T elecom s during 1997  (un dated ).
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The preparation of the ‘Green Paper9 on Convergence
During the drafting of the Green Paper, the unit in DG Telecoms deliberately 
refrained from consulting on a preliminary basis with other Commission DGs. 
This stood in contrast to arrangements made earlier by the senior managements 
of the Directorates General for Telecoms and Culture that had agreed the two 
services would collaborate closely as the convergence issue touched on DG 
Culture’s established authority over the audiovisual sector and, more
398specifically, content issues. The main reason was that the unit taking 
responsibility in DG Telecoms anticipated significant opposition to its ideas 
from other DGs, because they implied a questioning of their authority for the 
audiovisual field. Greatest resistance was feared from DG Culture whose 
approach towards regulating content and public interest issues was 
fundamentally different from the ideas of DG Telecoms. While DG Telecoms 
placed emphasis on the self-regulating power of market forces and the 
application of general competition law, it viewed DG Culture as biased in favour 
of public service broadcasters and independent producers as well as towards
399what it considered excessive levels of regulation (see Chapter Five).
In order to prevent DG Culture from bringing in its views and causing wide­
spread controversy in the Commission, the unit ‘avoided’ (Interview Number 
15) debating the dossier with other DGs before a final draft was ready for
400submission to formal inter-service consultations. The officials involved 
reckoned that building on the support of Telecommunications Commissioner 
Martin Bangemann and his cabinet, the protest of DG Culture would then be 
simply ‘swept away’ (Interview Number 12). The unit also wanted to sidestep 
lengthy consultations with other Commission DGs that might express an interest 
in the dossier, including DG Competition, DG Internal Market and, to a more 
limited extent, the DG for Industry. Requesting a formal response from other 
DGs on the draft text within only ten days, DG Telecoms intended to shorten
398
U np ub lished  C om m ission d ocu m en t, draft ‘G reen Paper o n  C on vergen ce’, p repared  by DG  
T elecom s, dated  16 .10 .1997 .
399
Interview N um ber 15, Interview N u m ber 22. U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission  d o cu m en t, n o te  on  
‘C onvergence G reen Paper’, prepared by D G  T elecom s, d ated  2 1 .1 0 .1 9 9 7
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Interview Number 17, Interview Number 2 2 .
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discussion between Commission DGs and to force them to produce their 
feedback in a hurry. When in mid-October 1997 the draft Green Paper reached 
the Commission services formally associated with the dossier, the unusual 
behaviour of DG Telecoms met with annoyance and protest from several
401Commission DGs. As DG Telecoms had deliberately refrained from 
coordinating with other DGs the debate very quickly acquired a ‘confrontational 
style’ (Interview Number 24). For example, DG Culture responded to the 24 
pages long draft document by sending a 28 page long commentary. Other 
Commission DGs, including the DGs Internal Market, Competition, and 
Industry also expressed their irritation at DG Telecoms bypassing usual 
procedures. The Commissioner for Culture and Audiovisual Affairs, Marcelino 
Oreja, demanded that the interservice consultations be suspended and a new 
drafting process launched. In late October, the Secretariat General put a halt to 
the procedure and formally asked DG Telecoms to extend the consultation
402period and to engage in a more constructive dialogue with DG Culture. 
Taking a decision on the ‘convergence’ dossier was officially deferred. Instead 
of repressing conflict on the content of the future regulatory strategy on 
‘convergence’ and on which Commission DG would define it, DG Telecoms 
found itself in a situation of confrontation, outspoken rivalry and ‘jealousy’ 
(Interview Number 24).
Discussions now mostly took place on the senior management level of the 
different Directorates General and, when the controversial issues could not be
403solved, moved on to the cabinets. The main debates continued to centre on 
DG Telecoms and DG Culture and discussions were led in what interviewees
404referred to as an atmosphere of confrontation and hostility. Foremost, DG
401
Interview N um ber 15, Interview N um ber 21, Interview N um ber 24. E uropean  V oice, 
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Interview N um ber 24. U n p ub lished  C om m ission d ocu m en t, n o te  o n  ‘C onsultation  
interservice lan cee par la DG  XIII sur un  projet d e  livre vert co n ce m a n t les im plications  
reglem entaires d e  la convergen ce dans les secteurs des telecom m u n ication s, d e l ’audiovisuel e t  
d es tech n o log ies d e l ’in fo r m a tio n ; d em an d e d e la D G  X  d e su spension  tem poraire d e la  
p rocedu re consultation  interservice’, prepared by the Secretariat G eneral, dated  2 4 .1 0 .1 9 9 7 .
403
Interview N um ber 10, Interview N um ber 15, Interview N um ber 21.
404
Interview Number 15, Interview Number 21.
2 0 2
Culture and DG Telecoms disagreed on the content of the ‘convergence’ 
strategy, but their dispute also overlapped with a struggle for influence and 
control. DG Culture considered itself as the main authority on audiovisual 
issues, mainly because of its responsibility for the ‘Television without Frontiers’ 
directive. DG Culture believed that if DG Telecoms realised the vision of a 
single regulatory framework it would see its own role significantly reduced.405 
The units in Directorate D (‘Culture and Audiovisual Policy’) therefore accused 
the unit in DG Telecoms of overstepping its competencies and questioning the 
role of DG Culture as a key policy-maker in the audiovisual sector. In its formal 
responses to the draft Green Paper, DG Culture criticised the Green Paper for 
making comments and proposals on subjects not falling within the competence 
of DG Telecoms, such as the content of audiovisual services, public interest
• 406regulation, media pluralism and cultural diversity. It therefore called for a 
rewriting of several sections of the Green Paper.
As regards the content of the Green Paper, DG Culture disagreed with most 
definitions and recommendations made in the draft. It demanded that the 
Green Paper be devoted to analysing the nature of convergence rather than 
jumping to conclusions about its regulatory implications. DG Culture accused 
DG Telecoms of taking convergence as an ideological concept rather than 
demonstrating that it actually took place. Contending that the activities in the 
different sectors had already sufficiently blurred, DG Culture considered it 
premature to regulate a market yet to be defined -  a position which was shared
407by other Commission DGs, including DG Competition and DG Industry. DG 
Culture also raised doubts on the use of the KPMG study as it so clearly 
expressed the preferences of DG Telecoms. Indeed, the study was subject to 
debate even within DG Telecoms due to its bias towards the preferences of the
Interview  N um ber 10, Interview N um ber 15, Interview N um ber 17, Interview  N u m b er 21, 
Interview  N um ber 24. E uropean V oice, 13 .11 .1997 .
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408unit responsible. Questioning the substance of the approach set out by DG 
Telecoms as well as the need for a new regulatory model, DG Culture called for 
splitting up the document into two separate Green Papers. The first document 
should analyse the phenomenon of convergence, whereas a second one should 
analyse all policy implications, without being biased towards the option of a 
single regulatory model.
DG Telecoms also faced significant opposition from other Commission DGs. 
Controversy concerned policy authority as well as the paradigm of legislation. 
DG Internal Market and DG Competition and, to a more limited extent, DG 
Industry expressed fierce opposition which was related mainly to the fear that 
their existing competences on media-related issues might be diminished or 
modified. Their main criticism was that the draft text presumed too much about 
the future shape of regulation without analysing alternative regulatory
409models. In order to prevent their responsibilities being questioned, for 
example on the regulation of electronic commerce, intellectual property rights, 
data protection, and copyright, senior-level policy-makers in DG Internal Market 
expressed a preference for the progressive adaptation of the existing regulatory
410framework. The DG also doubted the feasibility of the provisions made by DG 
Telecoms and contended that a framework advocating as little regulation as 
possible would take sufficient account of the problems emerging in the 
audiovisual and telecommunications sectors. It therefore called for presenting 
the regulatory options in a more neutral way, opening a debate rather than 
limiting it to the sole option of a single regulatory framework.
DG Competition also disagreed widely with DG Telecoms over the 
Convergence Green Paper. As regards the audiovisual sector, its main interest 
was to consolidate the use of its powers to rule on media mergers and joint
408
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409
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ventures provided for by general competition law and the Merger Regulation. 
Since the mid-1990s, DG Competition had produced a number of important 
decisions, such as the rejection of the joint ventures between Bertelsmann, 
Kirch and Deutsche Telekom for the provision of technical services for pay-tv in
4111994. The main objections raised by senior policy-makers in DG Competition 
against the Convergence Green Paper was that as it stood, it would have 
fundamental implications for the Commission’s powers to implement 
competition rules in the media sector, particularly under the Merger
412Regulation. In the context of possible modifications to sector-specific
regulation, the draft text discussed competition law concepts and terminology, 
for example market definitions. DG Competition objected to this as its officials 
believed that it was too early for the Commission to take a position on how 
competition rules were to be applied in a ‘converged’ environment before 
‘convergence’ had actually become a reality. DG Competition also called on DG 
Telecoms to distinguish more clearly between areas in which existing 
competition law was to be applied and other areas for which new legislative 
measures could be introduced.
Many contentious issues could not be resolved between the different DGs 
and therefore shifted from the formal inter-service consultations to the cabinets
413for discussion. At the time, the atmosphere among the Commissioner cabinets 
as regards media-related issues was generally tense. Mostly this was due to the 
ongoing struggles surrounding the preparation of a directive limiting media
414ownership (see Chapter Five). The cabinets of the Commissioners for Culture, 
Internal Market and Competition re-affirmed most of the criticisms expressed 
on DG level. The debate led on cabinet level was time-consuming: when 
disagreement endured, the cabinet of Telecoms Commissioner Bangemann 
distanced itself from the draft Green Paper produced in DG Telecoms.
411
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Bangemann was said to prefer a more ‘consultative’ paper in order to gain
415sufficient internal support. Responding to the pressure exerted by 
Commissioners and cabinets, the Director General of DG Telecoms, Robert 
Verrue, called for a rewriting exercise and asked the unit responsible in DG 
Telecoms to collaborate more closely with other DGs, particularly DG Culture. 
The persistence of conflict had effectively resulted in another deferment of the 
decision whether to propose legislation.
In an attempt to re-affirm the authority of DG Culture for issues traditionally 
associated with the audiovisual sector, particularly content, Commissioners 
Oreja and Bangemann agreed to allocate joint responsibility for the Green 
Paper to DG Culture and DG Telecoms. A joint working group which brought 
together officials of DG Culture and DG Telecoms was set up to draft the final 
version of the Convergence Green Paper. During their talks, the cabinets had 
agreed that they wanted the Green Paper to be ready for presentation at the 
December meeting of Telecoms Ministers as it should represent a ‘milestone’ 
on leading the telecommunications and media sector into the next century. 
Rather than provoking an outcry from established sectoral interests, they 
wanted to make the Green Paper trigger a debate and attract favourable 
opinions. DG Telecoms was therefore brought increasingly under pressure to 
produce a draft that would refrain from proposing radical solutions, but be
416acceptable to a majority of actors within and outside the Commission.
The 1997 ‘Green Paper9 on Convergence
After intense negotiations on the different levels of the Commission hierarchy, 
the Commission agreed on a draft Green Paper jointly submitted by DG Culture 
and DG Telecoms in December 1997 (European Commission 1997a). The final 
version of the Green Paper was adopted several months later than foreseen and
415
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417differed significantly from earlier drafts. Entitled ‘Green Paper on the 
Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology 
Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation’, its central message reflected the 
far-reaching concessions DG Telecoms had made other DGs opposing a firm 
commitment towards a single regulatory model. The Green Paper stated that
‘whilst digitalisation means that convergence is well advanced at 
the level of technology, this Green Paper does not automatically 
assume that convergence at one level inevitably leads to the same 
degree of convergence at other levels. Equally, there is no 
assumption that convergence in technologies, industries, services 
and/or markets will necessarily imply a need for a uniform 
regulatory environment (...). This Green Paper responds to the 
requirement for debate. It is consciously interrogative. It analyses 
issues, it identifies options and poses questions for public 
comment. It does not take positions at this stage nor reach 
conclusions’ (European Commission 1997a, p. 4).
The Green Paper presented three options for legislative action: the building on 
current structures; the development of a separate model for new activities to co­
exist with telecommunications and broadcasting regulation; and the progressive 
introduction of a new regulatory model to cover the whole range of existing and 
new services (European Commission 1997a, p. 40). The Commission did not 
indicate a clear preference for any of these options nor did it present a 
timetable for action. Instead, it emphasised that the Commission would await 
the results of public consultations and monitor market developments before 
committing itself to any of these options (European Commission 1997a, p. 4).
The provisions made in the Convergence Green Paper differed 
fundamentally from earlier versions produced by DG Telecoms as they 
incorporated the criticisms made by the participating DGs and cabinets. For 
example, whilst reflecting on refining or developing sector-specific regulation, 
the document stated that the application of competition rules would continue 
to play a key role in the ‘Information Society’ sector (European Commission 
1997a, p. 13). This represented a concession made by DG Telecoms to DG
417 Interview Number 15, Interview Number 17, Interview Number 21, Interview Number 24.
European Voice, 12.12.1996.
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418Competition. Another concession to DG Competition was that the Green 
Paper refrained from ultimately defining markets for the purposes of applying 
EU competition law. Due to intervention by DG Internal Market, the Green 
Paper excluded an examination of policy issues related to electronic commerce, 
intellectual property rights, copyright, media pluralism, data protection, 
encryption and digital signatures (European Commission 1997a, p. 7). DG 
Culture had successfully insisted on excluding questions of content and public 
service and managed to realise ‘80 to 90 per cent of what we wanted* (Interview 
Number 21). For example, the original proposition to treat different services or 
applications carried over the same network the same regardless of their actual 
differences in terms of content was replaced with a confirmation of sectoral 
specifities:
‘for example, whilst a film, a song, a railway timetable and a phone 
conversation may all be carried in digital form, this does not result 
in the user treating these different services/activities as 
interchangeable. In the same way, regulatory approaches to each 
of these services, whilst potentially based on similar general 
principles, are likely to continue to be tailored to the specific 
characteristics of these different services’ (European Commission
»997a.P- 25)-
Due to high extents of conflict prevailing among a large number of Commission 
DGs, the Commission had deferred taking a definite decision over the 
Commission’s future regulatory approach for the audiovisual domain. During 
the months to follow, key actors in the European Commission engaged in 
further attempts to define a framework for legislative action.
The preparation of legislation
The public consultations on the Convergence Green Paper (European 
Commission 1997a) lasted from December 1997 until May 1998 and were led 
by DG Telecoms. In spite of its limited proposals, the Convergence Green Paper 
caused substantial debate among MEPs, member states, broadcasting regulators
Interview Number 24.
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419and industry interests. The Commission announced a second consultation 
period on the more specific issues raised in the Green Paper which lasted until 
November 1998. Consultations with outside interests still being underway, the 
participating DGs engaged in a discussion on how to proceed. In the context of 
several formal inter-service meetings that involved all interested Commission 
DGs as well as other services such as the Legal Service, DG Culture continued to 
oppose any expansion of DG Telecoms’ authority to content regulation and to 
object against a ‘horizontal’ model of regulation which would cover all networks 
and services irrespectively of the content they carried. DG Telecoms increasingly 
recognised that attempts to ‘merge’ telecommunications with audiovisual policy 
and to gain authority over content and public service issues would continue to 
meet with serious opposition from several DGs. Realising the vision of 
‘convergent’ regulation would probably imply to engage in lengthy conflict with 
other Commission DGs, with few chances of success. A majority of officials in 
DG Telecoms believed that such disputes might hamper the DG’s efforts to 
regulate telecoms infrastructure and services and possibly reduce its general 
standing in the Commission -  and was therefore not as desirable as it might 
have seemed at first.420
The senior management of DG Telecoms and the Bangemann cabinet 
decided that for the time being, DG Telecoms would limit the scope of its
421activities. This implied that the Commission’s regulatory response to 
technological convergence would be split according to established sector- 
specific responsibilities. Any regulatory reform would consist of a mixture of 
adjusting existing legislation and progressively introducing new measures. The 
regulation of infrastructure would remain the responsibility of DG Telecoms 
that would seek to develop legislation combining the regulation of telecoms and 
broadcasting networks (see below). Regulating content and public interest 
issues would remain domain of DG Culture, DG Internal Market would
419
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continue to draft legislation on market conditions applying to new services such 
as electronic commerce, and DG Competition would apply general competition 
rules to the media sector. The European Commission confirmed these aims in a 
Communication on the ‘Results of the Public Consultations on the Green 
Paper’ (European Commission 1999a) a document which was adopted in 
March 1999 under the joint responsibility of DG Culture and DG Telecoms. 
Summarising the key messages that had emerged from consultations, the 
Communication affirmed that the Commission would continue to develop 
content regulation separately from that of carriage, either by adjustments to 
existing legislation or by new legal measures. The main message emerging from 
the document was that most of what used to constitute sectoral policies would 
continue in the near future.
After the debacle of a single or ‘convergent’ regulatory model subsuming 
audiovisual legislation under the umbrella of the telecommunications 
framework, the European Commission’s audiovisual policy largely continued 
along established lines. DG Culture kept responsibility for policy issues related 
to content, DG Telecoms maintained authority over carriage and network 
issues, DG Internal Market further developed regulation for issues such as data 
protection, and DG Competition continued to apply general competition law to 
media mergers and joint ventures, ruling on abuses of dominant positions and
422anti-competitive positions. To a majority of Commission actors it was clear 
that the controversy over the definition of policy priorities for the audiovisual 
domain and over which DG would take responsibility remained unsolved. They 
believed that stirring up this conflict again would entail more time-consuming 
battles and that in order to realise their other policy priorities it would be best
423to avoid or to keep out of such debates. Rather than engaging in any further 
conflict with other DGs, a common strategy turned out to be what interviewees
422
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referred to as ‘a policy of mutual avoidance’, ‘burying one’s head in the sand’ 
and ‘trying not to stir up any more battles’ (Interview Number 15 and 29) The 
result can largely be described as institutional inertia: the European 
Commission stuck to a minimum of action and produced very few legislative 
outputs.
Legislation on television standards and conditional access
In the months that followed the adoption of the 1997 ‘Convergence Green 
Paper’ (European Commission 1997a) the responsible directorate in DG 
Telecoms responded to the struggles that surrounded audiovisual policy by 
sticking to its established activities. First and foremost, it concentrated on 
further developing the EU’s telecommunications policy in the context of a far- 
reaching review exercise (see Chapter Seven). As regards audiovisual policy, DG 
Telecoms directed its attention to the regulation of television standards. Since 
the late 1980s legislation on television standards had represented a 
cornerstone of the Commission’s audiovisual policy (see Chapter Five). The 
existing Directive on the use of standards for the transmission of television 
signals adopted by the Council and the European Parliament in 1995 promoted 
the development of television services in wide-screen 16/9 format, irrespectively
424of the transmission standard used.
The 1995 directive on television standards had no expiry date, but required 
regular revision and therefore prompted DG Telecoms to look into possible 
amendments. An issue that gained particular relevance in the wider context of 
television standards was the issue of conditional access. With increasing 
digitalisation new audiovisual services emerged (e.g. pay-tv, video-on-demand 
and electronic publishing), many of them based on so-called conditional access. 
Conditional access meant that the access to such services was conditional on a 
prior authorisation aiming at ensuring the remuneration of the service, for 
example by means of decoders or smart cards. In the view of DG Telecoms the 
use made by operators of proprietary standards for granting conditional access
424
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to their services raised new regulatory issues, for example how to ensure the
425interconnection and interoperability of different types of networks. The 
existing directive on television standards obliged conditional access operators to 
provide access to their digital television services under fair, reasonable and non- 
discriminatory terms, but made no provisions for new gateway technologies nor 
for protecting conditional access systems against piracy.426
Responsibility for the revision of the existing directive on television 
standards was taken by DG Telecoms. Being a direct consequence of its 
established authority over television standards (see Chapter Five) this was 
broadly accepted among other Commission DGs. In fact, other DGs took little 
interest in the revision since they consented to the policy priorities expressed by
427DG Telecoms and the need for revising existing legislation. On the initiative 
of DG Internal Market, the European Commission had already adopted a 
proposal for a directive on the legal protection of services based on or 
consisting of conditional access (European Commission 1997c) in July 1997 
which proposed provisions against illicit devices granting unauthorised access to 
conditional access services, notably by prohibiting their commercial
428manufacturing, distribution and marketing. DG Telecoms now engaged in 
further developing the Commission’s policy on conditional access. An idea that 
had followed from the principle of ‘technological neutrality’ promoted by DG 
Telecoms was to combine the regulation of access and interconnection in
429telecommunications with that of broadcasting.
In November 1999, on the initiative of DG Telecoms, which had been re­
named ‘DG Information Society’ (commonly called ‘DG InfSo’) after the re­
European C om m ission (1 9 9 7 c ). For a detailed  literature accou n t o f  th e issue o f  con d ition a l 
access see, for exam p le, Levy (1 9 9 9 , p. 6 4 f.).
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organisation of the European Commission in March 1999, the Commission 
adopted a Communication (European Commission i999d) reporting on the 
1995 directive on television standards. The document announced that the 
regulation of conditional access for broadcasting would have to be combined 
with that for telecommunications in a new directive (European Commission 
i999d, p. 3). The idea did not cause much controversy among other 
Commission DGs because it did not question existing regulation on other 
audiovisual issues (for example content) nor the authority of other DGs.430 The 
adoption of the Communication (European Commission i999d) was therefore 
largely uncontroversial and, as intended by DG Telecoms, fell together with that 
of the 1999 ‘Telecommunications Review’ (European Commission 1999c; see 
Chapter Seven). In July 2000, the Commission adopted a proposal for a 
directive on access and interconnection (European Commission 200oj) 
intended to repeal the existing directives on television standards (Directive 
95/47/E C  of 24.10.1995) and on interconnection (Directive 97/33/EC  of 
30.06.1997). The proposal carried over existing obligations of the directive on 
television standards to provide conditional access on fair, reasonable and non- 
discriminatory terms and included provisions that allowed for extending these 
obligations in relation to new gateways following refined market analysis
431procedures. Hereby the European Commission concluded its most recent 
activities to propose audiovisual legislation thus far. As the following paragraphs 
show the Commission did engage in, but did not realise its attempts to propose 
other pieces of legislation, due to ongoing conflict and internal debate.
(Non-) Action to refine audiovisual legislation
While under the leadership of DG Telecoms the European Commission was 
able to produce legislative proposals on the issue of television standards and 
conditional access, a different situation can be observed for the remainder of
Interview N um ber 12, Interview N um ber 15.
431
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the Commission’s legislative policy-making. A central but still unresolved issue 
concerned EU audiovisual legislation more generally. The controversies 
surrounding the preparation of the 1997 ‘Convergence Green Paper’ 
(European Commission 1997a) had caused a vacuum in which uncertainty 
persisted as regards the objectives, direction, and scope of EU-wide legislation. 
The DGs that held an interest in audiovisual legislation mostly stuck to their 
established activities. DG Telecoms concentrated on promoting new 
technologies and proposing legislation on conditional access. DG Competition 
continued to apply general competition law and the Merger Regulation. DG 
Internal Market engaged in efforts to further develop regulation for media- 
related issues such as data protection and electronic commerce. DG Culture 
focused on content-related issues and on further developing and monitoring 
the implementation of the MEDIA Programme, a series of support measures 
aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of the European audiovisual
• 432industry by supporting productions and the training of professionals. In the 
Commission, conflict on these initiatives was generally low as they fell under the 
undisputed responsibility of DG Culture and largely represented a continuation
433of existing policies.
Due to its general responsibility for the audiovisual domain DG Culture also 
considered to refine the European Commission’s overall approach to regulating 
the audiovisual sector. Its main interest was to establish a more coherent vision 
of audiovisual policy that would, for example, balance industrial and cultural 
policy aims and provide a comprehensive framework for future legislative 
action. In 1998, the ‘Culture and Audiovisual Policy’ unit prepared a
432
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consultative document designed to oudine fundamental principles of the 
Commission’s future audiovisual policy. In the view of DG Culture, the 
document would serve to re-affirm the authority of DG Culture to define the 
lines of the Commission’s audiovisual policy, particularly vis-a-vis the DG 
Telecoms ‘domination network’ (Interview Number 29). For example, DG 
Culture intended to state that audiovisual regulation ought to take account of 
public interest objectives rather than being solely directed at economic and 
industrial policy aims. At the same time, it was generally accepted that in order 
not to stir new confrontation with other Commission DGs, DG Culture would 
better abstain from making detailed recommendations for regulation. Hence in 
its draft Communication on ‘Audiovisual Policy: Next Steps’ (European 
Commission 1998b) DG Culture did not propose new lines of action, but made 
general statements and detailed suggestions only for the MEDIA Programme. In 
order not to get entangled in a new round of friction, DG Culture did neither 
question existing pieces of legislation nor call for any revisions.434
Apart from the preparation of consultative papers on the Commission’s 
future audiovisual policy, DG Culture refrained from initiating action. In the 
context of its responsibility for the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive, it 
prepared a number of reports on its implementation (e.g. European 
Commission 2001, 2002). A revision of the broadcasting directive began in June 
2001, but has not gathered sufficient support in the Commission thus far to
435lead to formal legislative proposals. Some officials in the DG have come to 
take the position that the directive needs further updating and clarification 
because it leaves a number of issues unaddressed, for example audiovisual 
content delivered via the internet, area-specific advertising, and the granting of 
access to events of major importance for society.436 However mostly in 
anticipation of new conflict with other Commission DGs, the senior
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C om m ission  o n  audiovisual policy was the C om m unication  ‘Principles an d  G u id elin es for the  
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o f  princip les o f  regulatory intervention , accord ing to w hich regulation  ou g h t to b e  lim ited  to  a
m in im u m  necessary to guarantee legal certainty and tech n olog ica l neutrality.
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management of DG Culture decided that for the time being, the Commission 
would continue to carefully monitor the implementation of ‘Television without 
Frontiers’ and defer presenting proposals for a revision.437 Coordination on 
audiovisual legislation has therefore been largely absent. With the exception of 
legislative action on conditional access (see above), the European Commission 
has exhibited a behaviour of institutional inertia and has infinitely delayed or 
deferred the proposition of legislation.
Conclusion
The analysis of the most recent phase of legislative policy-making in the 
audiovisual sector showed that in spite of the challenges posed to existing 
legislation due to market and technological developments the Commission 
remained rather passive in so far as it proposed only very little binding 
legislation. This should not lead us to conclude that the Commission did not 
pursue any legislative initiatives. Quite the opposite was the case: its Directorates 
General engaged in extensive efforts to develop a new regulatory framework for 
audiovisual issues. Trying to explain the gap between initial plans and 
expectations and what the Commission actually did revealed that fragmentation 
and conflict on the administrative level of the Commission are inextricably 
linked to its capacity to produce legislative outputs.
As regards administrative fragmentation, the evidence presented in this chapter 
uncovered a continuation if not an intensification of the patterns observed for 
the first half of the 1990s (see Chapter Five). The main trigger of fragmentation 
continued to be the high number of Commission DGs that actively sought to 
determine the Commission’s audiovisual agenda. Four to five DGs sought to 
influence this process: DG Culture, DG Telecoms, DG Competition, DG 
Internal Market, and sometimes DG Industry. Furthermore, the DGs differed
In this con text, it  is in teresting to  know  that sin ce early 2 0 0 0  a senior-level official from  D G  
T elecom s w ho had b een  a key figure in  the con text o f  the ‘con vergen ce’ initiative has b een  
h ead  o f  the u n it ‘Culture and Audiovisual Policy’ in  D G  Education  an d  C ulture. In  the view o f  
several officials in  DG  E ducation and Culture this has resulted in  a 'DG  InfSo flavour’ (Interview  
N u m b er 10) to the DG  w hich m akes the proposition  o f  legislation  a lon g  th e lines traditionally  
rep resen ted  by DG  Education and Culture even  m ore unlikely. Interview N u m ber 21 , Interview  
N u m b er 27, Interview N um ber 29.
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substantially on the paradigm of legislation and on the division of authority (see 
Table 15). This became most evident in the context of the preparation of the 
1 9 9 7  ‘Convergence Green Paper’ (European Commission 1 9 9 7 a). Leadership 
was sought by DG Telecoms against the will of other DGs that feared for their 
established responsibilities and powers. DG Culture feared for its traditional 
responsibility to define audiovisual policy. DG Internal Market had an interest 
in controlling the definition of policy solutions for issues coming up in the 
context of new media and audiovisual services, for example data protection. DG 
Competition opposed anything that would diminish its role to rule on media 
mergers and acquisitions by means of general competition law. Linked to these 
underlying struggles for authority and based on their distinct and sometimes 
contrasting oudooks on audiovisual issues, the DGs also widely disagreed on the 
objectives of and the need for legislation. DG Telecoms sought to increase the 
role self-regulation and to give up sector-specific legislation, but other DGs 
argued in favour of leaving established sectoral models of regulation in place, 
either because they generally opposed ‘merging’ audiovisual with 
telecommunications legislation or because they did not consider the timing 
right.
Table 15 Indicators o f administrative fragmentation in the audiovisual sector from 1997 to 2000
initiative on  
‘convergence’
legislative 
proposals on  
television  
standards
other audiovisual 
legislation incl. 
‘T elevision  without 
Frontiers’
number o f DGs five one four
differences on 
paradigm
high low high
competition for 
authority
high low high
overall level o f adm. 
fragm.
high low high
Due to the high levels of administrative fragmentation, coordination among the 
participating DGs turned out to be extremely difficult to manage, particularly in 
the context of the preparation of the 1 9 9 7  ‘Convergence Green Paper’. In 
anticipation of irresolvable debate with other DGs, DG Telecoms deliberately 
abstained from consulting with them on a preliminary or informal basis and 
thereby broke with common routines intended to facilitate coordination.
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Instead coordination was confined to the formal inter-service consultations in 
which the debate quickly took on a confrontational style. As most issues 
remained unresolved the discussion moved on to the cabinet level. The ensuing 
multiplication of actors and an atmosphere of hostility and politicisation 
delayed the preparation process and made substantial changes to the initial 
proposals produced by DG Telecoms inevitable. Due to the absence of 
coordinating activities controversy and conflict were far from being settled, but 
endured and intensified. DG Telecoms had to give up its vision of creating 
‘convergent’ regulation and was made to substantially amend the draft 
document. The decision whether to propose an entirely new regulatory 
framework was first deferred and later abandoned when the Commission, at the 
insistence of other Commission DGs and the cabinets, decided to leave 
established models of sectoral regulation in place.
The controversy that surrounded the preparation and adoption of the 1997 
‘Convergence Green Paper’ was followed by a stage of Commission policy­
making that can best be described as institutional inertia. Audiovisual policy 
remained a battlefield in which the different DGs continued to maintain 
contrasting policy agendas and jealously protected their competences. Mosdy in 
an anticipation of irreconcilable differences they stuck to what they considered 
uncontroversial activities, for example the drafting of consultative papers that 
were limited to general statements. Otherwise they engaged in a policy of 
mutual avoidance. The overall result was low legislative outputs, with a 
minimum of legislative action being proposed (see Table 16 and Table 17). The 
Commission has largely put on hold the refinement of its general audiovisual 
agenda and the revision of the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive, leaving it 
open whether and when it will propose legislation.
The following chapter which concludes the empirical analysis presented in the 
thesis examines the legislative efforts taken by the European Commission from 
1997 to 2000 in the telecommunications sector. It shows that in contrast to the 
developments observed for the audiovisual field, the Commission was 
characterised by much less administrative fragmentation and therefore 
managed to produce higher legislative outputs. The analysis seeks to uncover to
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what extent established configurations of fragmentation and outputs persisted 
and to assess dominant patterns of coordination.
Table 16 Legislative outputs produced by the European Commission in the audiovisual sector 
from 1997 to 2000
initiative on  
‘convergence’
legislative 
proposals on  
television  
standards
other audiovisual 
legislation incl. 
‘T elevision  without 
Frontiers’
duration more than two 
years
less than twelve 
months
more than two 
years
consistency low high low
decision to propose 
legislation
■ proposition o f legislation — y —
■deferment — y
■ abandonment y — —
overall legislative outputs low high low
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Table 17 Central documents and legislative proposals adopted by the European Commission in
the audiovisual sector between 1997 and 2000
year type o f  
docum ent
title o f  docum ent DG  with form al
drafting
responsibility
1997 consultative
document
Green Paper on the Convergence o f the 
Telecommunications, Media and 
Information Technology Sectors, and the 
Implications for Regulation (European 
Commission 1997a)
DG Culture and 
DG Telecoms
legislative
proposal
Proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council Directive on the Legal Protection 
o f Services based on, or consisting of, 
Conditional Access (European Commission 
i 997c)
DG Internal 
Market
!998 consultative
document
Commission Communication ‘Audiovisual 
Policy: Next Steps’ (European Commission 
1998b)
DG Culture
consultative
document
Commission Communication ‘The Digital 
Age: European Audiovisual Policy’ 
(European Commission 1998c)
DG Culture
*999 consultative
document
Results o f the Public Consultations on the 
Convergence Green Paper (European 
Commission 1999a)
DG Culture and 
DG Telecoms
consultative
document
Principles and Guidelines for the 
Audiovisual Policy in the Digital Age 
(European Commission 1999b)
DG Culture
consultative
document
The Development o f the Market for Digital 
Television in the European Union: Report 
in the context o f Directive 9 5 /4 7 /E C  o f  
the European Parliament and o f the 
Council o f 24th October 1995 on the use o f  
standards for the transmission o f television 
signals (European Commission ipppd)
DG
T elecom s/InfSo
2000 legislative
proposal
Proposal for a Directive o f  the European 
Parliament and o f the Council on Access to, 
and Interconnection of, Electronic 
Communications Networks and Associated 
Facilities (European Commission 200oj)
DG
T elecom s/InfSo
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Chapter Seven: 
An Ongoing Alliance -  
Coordination in the 
Telecommunications Sector
Introduction
The final chapter of the empirical analysis examines the most recent stages of 
agenda-setting and policy formulation that took place in the European 
Commission in the context of its legislative activities in the telecommunications 
sector. Having prepared the 1996 ‘Telecoms Package’ which consisted of 
several legislative proposals aimed at the full liberalisation of 
telecommunications services and networks and at creating a comprehensive re- 
regulatory framework (see Chapter Four), the Directorates General of the 
Commission turned towards taking efforts to expand and refine existing 
legislation. Due to new market and technological developments and the fact 
that that competition in the telecommunications sector remained far from 
complete, they took the view that existing legislation needed updating and 
clarification. Apart from consolidating legislation on networks and 
infrastructures, the Commission engaged in an internal discussion on how to 
further develop the regulatory framework. The Commission DGs produced a 
central consultative document setting out the future legislative approach, called 
the ‘1999 Telecoms Review’ (European Commission 1999c), and subsequently 
drafted a comprehensive package of re-regulatory and liberalisation directives.
The analysis reveals that the low levels of administrative fragmentation that 
were observed for the first half of the 1990s largely persisted and that the 
alliance between DG Telecoms and DG Competition continued to be the most
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prominent feature of the Commission’s legislative policy-making. In contrast to 
the high levels of administrative fragmentation that developed in the 
audiovisual field, there was a much lower level of fragmentation. In this context, 
a crucial factor appeared to be the small number of DGs: besides DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms, the DGs of the Commission largely refrained 
from seeking to actively shape the preparation of legislation. Also there was a 
high level of agreement between DG Telecoms and DG Competition 
concerning both the aims of legislation and the allocation of authority over 
defining them. As in previous years, the two DGs agreed to combine a policy of 
liberalisation with minimum re-regulation and split authority accordingly, 
assigning liberalisation to DG Competition and re-regulation to DG Telecoms.
Interestingly there was now more debate between the two DGs on the details 
of legislation that there had used to be during previous years. In particular, 
there was a tendency towards greater conflict on how to balance liberalisation 
and regulation. In this context, DG Competition and DG Telecoms differed 
somewhat from their established positions: DG Telecoms came to argue in 
favour of relaxing sectoral rules and giving priority to the application of general 
competition law, whereas DG Competition leant towards maintaining existing 
levels of regulation in order to provide a legally sound basis to market opening. 
The evidence reveals that DG Telecoms and DG Competition were able to cope 
with the increased levels of conflict over the definition of legislative provisions, 
due to their accordance on the paradigm of legislation and low conflict on 
influence and control. Because the overall level of administrative fragmentation 
remained low the two DGs were able to coordinate their actions, mosdy by 
relying on established activities, including a division of labour and informal 
consultations. Through these activities DG Competition and DG Telecoms 
managed to solve their debates and were able to produce high legislative 
outputs. As a consequence, policy-making was fast and consistent and resulted 
in the proposition of several pieces of legislation. A central argument emerging 
from the analysis is that even an increase of conflict among Commission DGs 
does not necessarily result in blockage and inability to act, provided that it does 
not relate to the paradigm of legislation and the allocation of policy authority.
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The chapter is structured into four parts that are oriented towards the 
central stages and dominant themes of legislative policy-making. The first 
section analyses the consolidation of legislation concerning cable networks by 
means of preparing a ‘cable ownership’ directive. The second section examines 
the setting of a new policy agenda intended to respond to recent market and 
technological challenges. The third section analyses the preparation of 
legislation which was mostly designed to consolidate and simplify the existing 
legal framework. In all these sections it is shown how DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms settled their conflict through coordination activities. This is followed 
by a concluding section which summarises the patterns of fragmentation, 
coordination and legislative outputs that emerged during the late 1990s.
The consolidation of existing legislation
An issue emerging soon after the adoption of the ‘1996 Telecoms Package’ was 
how to further promote the liberalisation of cable television networks. 
Commission Directive 95 /51 /EC, also called the ‘Cable Directive’, allowed the 
use of cable television networks for the provision of all liberalised 
telecommunications services that from 1 January 1998 included public voice 
telephony. The directive had also established a separation of accounts placed on 
operators that joindy provided telecommunications and cable television 
networks. Both the 1995 ‘Cable Directive’ and the Commission Directive on full 
competition contained provisions for the European Commission to carry out an 
assessment of the situation in the cable television sector by January 1998, with 
particular regard to the effects on competition of existing legislation 
concerning the joint provision of telecoms and cable TV networks by a single 
operator and the restrictions existing on the provision of cable TV capacity over
438telecommunications networks (European Commission i9p8d, p. 4).
438
C om m ission  D irective 9 5 /5 1 /E C  o f  1 8 .10 .1995  am en din g  D irective 9 0 /3 8 8 /E E C  with  
regard to the abolition  o f  restrictions on  the use o f  cable television networks for th e provision o f  
already liberalised telecom m u n ication s services. C om m ission D irective 9 6 / 1 9 /E C  o f  1 3 .3 .1 9 9 6  
am en d in g  D irective 9 0 /3 8 8 /E E C  with regard to the im plem en tation  o f  fu ll com p etition  in  
telecom m u n ication s markets. O fficial Journal L 74, 2 2 .3 .1 9 9 6 , pp. 13-24.
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In order to fulfil its obligation to review, the European Commission 
prepared a Communication examining whether further legislative action was 
required to open up cable television networks for the provision of 
telecommunications services. Because the issue was part of liberalising the 
telecommunications sector, it undisputedly fell into the domain of DG 
Competition and its unit ‘Liberalisation directives, Article 90 cases’.439 The unit 
viewed the dossier as a consolidation exercise which would serve to continue
• • • • • 440existing policies to liberalise the telecommunications sector. The central issue 
at stake was whether the joint provision of telecommunications and cable TV 
networks by former monopolists would stifle the development of the 
telecommunications and the multi-media sector. Hence, the key question to 
decide on was the extent to which incumbent telecommunications operators 
owning cable TV networks should be allowed to hold on to their assets. One 
option was be to oblige operators to split off their cable TV networks and make 
them into separate organisations if they maintained a significant ownership 
interest in the cable TV infrastructure. A second, less radical solution was a 
separation of accounts by obliging companies to create a 100 per cent 
subsidiary. That either of these options would be achieved by a Commission 
directive based on Article 86 (ex-Article 90) was endorsed by both DG 
Competition and the rest of the Commission as the dossier was widely accepted
441to build on the provisions of existing Commission directives.
In order to explore the available options, DG Competition commissioned 
two expert studies that were based on recent market developments and 
consultations with industry interests (Arthur D Little International 1997; 
Coudert 1997). The studies argued that the accounting separation established 
by the 1995 ‘Cable Directive’ was insufficient to facilitate more competition in 
the emerging multi-media sector. The unit responsible in DG Competition took
439
At the tim e, the u n it was organised  w ithin D irectorate C ( ‘Inform ation , C om m unication ,
M ultim edia’), D ivision ‘Posts, telecom m u n ication s and inform ation  society coord in a tion ’.
440
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
441
Interview N um ber 23, Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28. W ith th e Treaty o f  
A m sterdam  en ter in g  in to  force o n  1 May 1999  the con solidation  o f  the Treaty establish ing th e  
E uropean C om m unity and the Treaty o n  th e E uropean U n io n  en ta iled  a renu m berin g  o f  
Articles. A rticle 9 0  was renum bered  Article 86 . For reasons o f  consistency, th e new  num bers are 
used  throu gh ou t the entire chapter.
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up most of the reports’ recommendations and planned to propose the 
obligatory legal separation of telecommunications and cable TV networks by
442means of creating a 100 per cent subsidiary. The officials intended to prepare 
a draft Commission directive to be published together with an explanatory 
document which would serve as a basis for consultations with outside actors.
The ideas emerging from DG Competition were widely shared by other 
Commission DGs, including DG Telecoms that shared responsibility with DG 
Competition for the telecommunications sector (see Chapters Three and Four). 
Back in 1996 when the 1995 ‘Cable Directive’ had entered into force, DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms had informally agreed that there would be
443another Commission directive on cable ownership. DG Telecoms also 
consented to the basic objectives of legislation. DG Competition drafted the 
directive on cable ownership in late 1997. As there was no serious conflict on its 
provisions the Commission officially adopted the draft directive in March 1998 
(European Commission i998d). The draft text clearly reflected the ideas of DG 
Competition. It proposed the legal separation of telecommunications and cable 
TV networks if owned by the same company by means of creating a 100 per cent 
subsidiary. As argued by DG Competition, the more radical option of full 
divestment was not needed, mainly because a structural separation of companies 
was already underway in several member states. Instead, the Commission would 
investigate whether full divestment was necessary on a case-by-case basis, based 
on the application of general competition law (European Commission i998d). 
In respect to the restrictions on the provision of cable TV capacity over 
telecommunications networks existing in member states, the Commission 
proposed to maintain the status quo because only two member states currently 
maintained such restrictions. DG Competition considered the situation 
undefined and decided to keep it under review while taking individual action 
based on general competition law to prevent dominant positions.
The publication of the draft directive was followed by consultations with 
outside actors. The European Commission officially adopted the Cable
Interview Number 27.
Interview Number 9, Interview Number 27, Interview Number 28.
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• • • 444Ownership Directive in June 1999. The final directive represented a largely 
unchanged version of the draft The directive prescribed that no 
telecommunications operator operated its cable TV network using the same 
legal entity when it was controlled by a member state or being granted special 
rights, was dominant in a substantial part of the market for public 
telecommunications networks and services or when it operated a cable 
television network established under special or exclusive rights in the same 
geographic area.
Setting the policy agenda
Besides engaging in a consolidation of legislation on cable ownership, the 
European Commission engaged in attempts to refine the overall legislative 
framework for telecommunications. In the context of monitoring the 
implementation of existing legislation, DG Competition and DG Telecoms 
jointly prepared and published five reports (European Commission i997d, 
1997e» 199^e> 199$f, 1999e)- The main conclusion of these reports was that 
there continued to be obstacles to full competition that resulted from member 
states’ failures to implement the rules and from ‘possible limitations in the 
framework itself (European Commission 1999c, p. 11). According to DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms the legislative framework needed updating,
445clarification and simplification. The existing directives called on the 
Commission to undertake a review of their operation in the light of market and 
technological changes and to make recommendations for possible updates and 
clarifications (European Commission 1999c, p. 3).
From the second half of 1998 onwards the European Commission engaged 
in re-assessing existing legislation. This was done in the context of preparing a 
review, a consultative document which would set policy aims and propose
T h e ad option  o f  the directive had b een  delayed  by a few  m ore m onths d u e  to th e  
resignation  o f  the C om m ission  in  January 1999 . Interview N um ber 28. C om m ission  D irective
19 9 9 /6 4 /E C  o f  23 J u n e 1999  am en din g  D irective 9 0 /3 8 8 /E E C  in  ord er to ensu re that 
telecom m u n ication s networks and cable TV networks ow ned  by a sin gle operator are separate 
lega l entities. O fficial Journal, L 175, 10 .7 .1999 , pp. 39-42.
445
Interview Number 9, Interview Number 27, Interview Number 28.
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regulatory change. As for previous consultative documents concerning the 
telecommunications sector, formal drafting responsibility for the dossier was 
allocated to DG Telecoms and its unit ‘Telecommunications Legislation’ 
organised in Directorate A ‘Telecommunications, Trans-European Networks 
and Services, and Postal Services’ (see Chapter Four). As a first step, DG 
Telecoms commissioned several studies that examined regulatory issues such as 
interconnection, licensing, the convergence of different kinds of networks and
446services, and the scope for updating existing regulation. Its intention was to
447finalise a review document during 1999.
In the context of drafting the review document DG Telecoms also took up 
the central messages that emerged from the public consultations on the 1997 
‘Green Paper on Convergence’ (European Commission 1997a). One was that 
there would be an ongoing need to distinguish between the regulation of 
content and carriage (see Chapter Six). Calls were made to exclude content in 
the widest sense (e.g. television programmes and their licensing, electronic 
banking and electronic commerce) from the new regulatory model and to 
regulate it instead by separate measures taken either on EU or member states 
level (European Commission 1997a, p. 7). Another message was that regulation 
ought to be oriented towards the principle of ‘technological neutrality’ and not 
to ‘impose, nor discriminate in favour of the use of a particular type of 
technology, but (...) ensure that the same service is regulated in an equivalent 
manner, irrespective of the means by which it is delivered’ (European
448Commission 1999c, p. 3). The expert studies pointed to similar directions, 
recommending a regulatory framework covering all communications
449infrastructure (i.e. all telecommunications and broadcasting networks). In DG 
Telecoms the term ‘electronic communications’ increasingly replaced and
446
For an overview o f  and  detailed  references to these studies see  E uropean  C om m ission
( 19 9 9 c > P- 5®f«)
447
European V oice , 2 .7 .1998 .
448
A ccord ing to DG  T elecom s, ‘the current legislative fram ework is n o t  tech n olog ica lly  neutral. 
D ifferent rules apply, for exam ple, to services provided  over m obile  an d  fixed  networks, and to  
access to frequ en cies for telecom s and broadcasting networks ( . . . ) .  As far as p ossib le therefore, 
regulation  o f  com m unications services sh ould  n o t d ifferentiate b etw een  tech n o log ies  over
w hich such  services are delivered’ (European C om m ission 1999c, p. 13).
449
See European Commission (1999c, p. 58f.) for detail.
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combined existing terms such as ‘telecommunications’ and ‘broadcasting’ 
(European Commission 1999c, p. 4).
According to DG Telecoms, the new regulatory framework would have to 
fulfil several aims.450 First, it should remedy the shortcomings of existing 
legislation and reinforce competition. Secondly, it would have to clarify and 
simplify existing rules, reducing the overall number of legal measure being in 
force from twenty to a total of six. Finally, DG Telecoms preferred to limit 
regulation to a minimum and to rely on self- and market-regulation instead.451 
In the view taken by the unit responsible, less regulation would be needed in 
the long term because greater competition would automatically entail greater 
user choice, lower prices and fair access to networks.
Apart from DG Competition, other Commission DGs took little interest in 
the review exercise. As with the preparation of previous consultative documents 
on telecommunications coordination was mostly limited to the working groups
452established between the two DGs (see Chapter Four). DG Competition and 
DG Telecoms agreed on the need for updating and clarifying existing 
legislation and it was generally accepted that the former would keep 
responsibility for liberalisation whereas the latter would concentrate on re­
regulation. Since late 1998 informal drafts of the review document circulated 
between DG Telecoms and DG Competition. It took several months until these 
drafts reached a more advanced stage - not because of conflict between the two 
DGs but because times were rather turbulent. In January 1999, the European 
Commission resigned. When a new Commission took over in March 1999, a 
fundamental re-organisation took place which caused considerable uncertainty
453in the DGs concerning their internal structures and working procedures. 
During these days many legislative activities undertaken by the Commission 
proceeded more slowly or came to a halt. In the context of re-organisation, DG 
Telecoms was re-named ‘DG Information Society’, commonly called ‘DG InfSo’.
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28. A lso see  E uropean C om m ission  (1 9 9 9 c ).
451
Interview N um ber 9 , Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
452
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
453
Interview Number 27, Interview Number 28.
2 2 8
While DG Telecoms and DG Competition were in accordance on the 
paradigm of legislation and the division of authority they were less unified on 
the details of legislation the Commission would propose. For example, the two 
DGs differed over what constituted electronic communications services, what 
requirements to place on national incumbents, the setting of thresholds for 
SMP (Significant Market Power), and how to define the universal service
454concept. DG Competition argued in favour of sector-specific regulation, 
whereas DG Information Society advocated a greater reliance on market forces 
and leant towards applying general competition law. To some extent the two 
Commission DGs now took positions that contrasted with those they had 
traditionally held, i.e. a preference for sector-specific legislation in DG 
Telecoms versus an opposition to over-strict or over-detailed regulation in DG
455Competition (see Chapter Four).
In spite of the controversy that prevailed between DG Information Society 
and DG Competition on several issues, policy coordination did not encounter 
serious difficulties. Based on their mutual agreement on the objectives of 
legislation and the absence of struggles for authority, the two DGs managed to 
cope with the situation of conflict, mostly by relying on their established modes 
of collaboration, notably their inter-service working groups and through
456personal contacts between officials. Coordination was also facilitated by 
informally arranged division of work that assigned the responsibility for 
regulation to DG InfSo and left issues of liberalisation to DG Competition (also 
see below). These coordination routes enabled the two DGs to overcome debate 
and conflict and to arrive at compromises they both considered acceptable. 
Other Commission actors, including the senior levels of the DG hierarchies, the 
Legal Service and the cabinets, were supplied with detailed versions of the review 
document. These versions reflected a high extent of unity between DG 
Information Society and DG Competition and therefore reduced the scope of
454
U n p u b lish ed  C om m ission  docum ents. ‘Subject: M eeting o f  national adm inistrations and  
regulators -  17 J u n e  1 9 9 9 ’, prepared by DG  C om petition , J u n e 1999. Draft o f  ‘Review o f  the  
R egulatory Fram ework for E lectronic C om m unications Services: Infrastructure, Transm ission  
and A ccess Services’, prepared by DG  Inform ation Society, dated  3 1 .8 .1 9 9 9 .
455
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
456
Interview Number 27, Interview Number 28.
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debate and conflict potential among other actors. The dossier passed the formal 
decision-taking procedures and was formally adopted in a largely unchanged 
version after a rapid preparation process in November 1999 (European 
Commission 1999c).
The 1999 ‘Review’
According to the Communication, entided ‘Towards a new framework for
electronic communications infrastructure and associated services. The 1999
Communications Review’ (European Commission 1999c), the most defining
principle of the future regulatory framework was ‘to create a regulatory regime
which can be rolled back as competition strengthens, with the ultimate objective
of controlling market power through the application of Community
competition law’ (European Commission 1999c, p. 49). In view of the
Commission, this implied encouraging self-regulatory initiatives taken by market
players (‘codes or practice’), to make existing regulation subject to regular
reviews, and to foster the application of general competition law to the
electronic communications sector. The Review envisaged regulation being
technologically neutral in the sense that it would not discriminate in favour of
or against the use of a particular technology, for example mobile versus fixed
telephony. The document announced several harmonising directives for
adoption by the Council and the European Parliament under co-decision
procedure, covering licensing and authorisation, access and interconnection,
457universal service, and institutional and specific competition issues.
On licensing and authorisation, the Commission declared that the existing 
principles governing licensing, i.e. non-discrimination, transparency, 
proportionality and objectivity, would remain valid, but that the aim was to 
simplify licensing procedures (European Commission 1999c, p. 2of.). The new 
framework would require national regulators to use general authorisations for 
both telecommunications and broadcast networks. As regards access and 
interconnection, the Review proposed establishing common principles for all
457
T h e Review also proposed  m easures o n  data p rotection , the m an agem en t o f  radio spectrum , 
as w ell as num bering, n am ing and addressing. B ecause the focu s o f  this study is on  the ‘classic’ 
them es o f  telecom m u n ication s legislation , these issues are n o t d ealt w ith here.
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communications infrastructure (European Commission 1999c, p. 25b). 
Regulation would cover new issues such as the access to the so-called ‘local loop’ 
(see section three), mobile network infrastructure, and broadband cable 
networks including the issue of conditional access (see Chapter Six).
In terms of universal service, the European Commission declared that it did 
not consider it necessary to extend the scope of universal service or change its 
definition or funding, but that it would keep the situation under review and 
propose measures to develop pricing principles to ensure affordability
458(European Commission 1999c, p. 37f.). As regards institutional issues, the
• 459Review argued in favour of improving the committee procedures. A so-called 
‘framework directive’ would cover the provisions for the new advisory 
committees as well as the role and tasks of NRAs (National Regulatory 
Authorities) with the aim to ensure their being properly resourced, 
independent and actively promoting the opening up of national markets. Other 
key issues addressed in the Review related to the balance between sector-specific 
regulation and the application of general competition rules. For example, the 
Review suggested to replace the existing concept of SMP which regulated 
whether NRAs could place ex-ante obligations on new market entrants 
concerning cost-orientation and non-discrimination by the concept of 
‘dominant position’. It also contained a commitment of the Commission to 
consolidate and simplify the existing liberalisation directives in one legal 
measure (European Commission 1999c, p. 15).
458
T h e ex isting  directives on  universal service (Directive 9 7 /3 3 /E C  and  9 8 /  1 0 /E C ) required  
NRAs to  p lace obligations o n  network operators to ensure that a  m inim um  o f  services w ere 
available to th e public at an affordable price, in clu d in g  the provision o f  vo ice teleph ony, fax,
and  the access to  the in te rn e t
459
U n d er th e ex isting legislative fram ework the E uropean C om m ission  co-operated  with  
m em ber states and regulatory authorities in  a  num ber o f  form al com m ittees taking over  
advisory and  regulatory functions, in clu d ing  the O N P com m ittee, the L icensing C om m ittee and  
the H igh  Level Regulators Group. See E uropean C om m ission (1 9 9 9 c , p. 5 if )  for detail. In the  
‘1999  Review’ the C om m ission suggested  to replace ex isting  com m ittees by n ew  groups, 
in clu d in g  th e C om m unications C om m ittee and the H igh  Level C om m unications G roup.
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The preparation of legislation
As foreseen in the ‘1999 Review’, the European Commission engaged in 
preparing several legislative proposals. Since these proposals mainly 
implemented what had previously been agreed on by DG Information Society 
and DG Competition, there was little conflict on their provisions.460 
Furthermore, DG Information Society and DG Competition largely stuck to 
their established division of authority which allocated re-regulation to the 
former and liberalisation to the latter and therefore managed to reduce debate 
on competences. A centrepiece of the package were the harmonisation 
directives on access and interconnection, authorisation and licensing, universal 
service, and institutional issues -  all being the responsibility of DG Information 
Society and commonly referred to as the ‘2000 Telecoms Package’. Other 
important themes of legislation concerned liberalisation: the opening of local 
network to competition and updating the existing liberalisation directives. They 
fell into the domain of DG Competition.
The 2000 Telecoms Package9
On basis of the ‘1999 Review’ (European Commission 1999c), DG Information 
Society conducted consultations with outside actors that lasted until February
4612000. Even before consultations were finished, DG Information Society 
proceeded with the drafting of harmonisation directives. It decided that it 
would realise most ideas set out in the ‘Review’, including some aspects that
462were disputed among outside interests. An exception were the thresholds to 
be put in place for access and interconnection by means of the concept of SMP.
Interview N um ber 21 , Interview N um ber 22, Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
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NRAs, industry associations, con su m er b odies, and  operators principally w elcom ed  the  
propositions m ade by the C om m ission, b ut d isagreed  w idely o n  the details. T h eir  respective  
views w ere closely linked  to  their respective positions in  the national telecom m u n ication s  
markets. Incum bents op p osed  what they con sid ered  to o  m uch  regulation  envisaged  by the  
E uropean C om m ission, w hereas new  m arket entrants asked for m ore deta iled  and stricter 
regulation  for several areas. T h e NRAs show ed them selves w orried ab out th eir  tasks b e in g  
prescribed by the C om m ission and their powers possibly b e in g  curtailed. Interview  N um ber 27  
and 28. F inancial T im es, 9 .1 1 .1 9 9 9 .
462
European Commission (2000a, pp. 20-21). Interview Number 28. Financial Times,
16.3.2000.
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The thresholds were subject to criticism from a number of outside actors and 
DG Competition came to take the position that using two different thresholds 
(i.e. SMP and ‘dominance’) was too complicated and risky from a legal point of
463view. As issues of market definition were the authority of DG Competition, DG 
Information Society consulted intensely with DG Competition on adjusting the 
SMP criteria. The two DGs agreed that the existing SMP threshold of 25 per 
cent would no longer be part of the SMP definition. Instead, they decided to 
base the definition on a single concept, that of ‘dominant position’ (European 
Commission 2000a, p. 23-24).
Debate between DG Information Society and DG Competition remained 
limited to the issue of thresholds and DG Information Society proceeded 
rapidly in drafting a Communication on ‘The Results of the Public 
Consultations on the 1999 Communications Review’ (European Commission 
2000a). The unit in DG Competition did not object to the other conclusions 
drawn in the document by DG InfSo. Nor did other Commission DGs interfere, 
mainly because they considered the dossier the exclusive responsibility of DG 
Information Society and because DG Information Society did not address issues 
that fell into related policy domains, for example audiovisual content or 
electronic commerce, as it had tried to do in the context of preparing the
464Green Paper on ‘Convergence’ (see Chapter Six). As a consequence, the 
document did not cause difficulties on the administrative level of the European 
Commission. The adoption by the cabinets and Commissioners was similarly 
uncontroversial and took place less than two months after public consultations 
had finished. In the Communication (European Commission 2000a), DG 
Information Society confirmed the maintenance of sector-specific ex-ante 
regulation in parallel with competition rules. Regulation would cover all 
communications infrastructures and associated telecommunications services. It 
announced that the Commission would soon publish proposals for a ‘framework
463
E xisting legislation  com b in ed  SMP with the co n cep t o f  d om in an t p osition . T h e C om m ission  
p rop osed  to base the new  thresholds on  the con cep t o f  d om in an t p osition  in  particular m arkets, 
calcu lated  in  a m anner con sistent with general com p etition  law practice. Interview N um ber 23, 
Interview  N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28. A lso see  Financial T im es, 2 6 .4 .2 0 0 0 , 4 .5 .2 0 0 0 ,
8 .6 .2 0 0 0 .
464 Interview Number 21, Interview Number 22, Interview Number 27, Interview Number 28,
Interview Number 29.
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directive’ regulating institutional issues, together with proposals for specific 
directives covering licensing and authorisations, access and interconnection, 
and universal service, based on the principles and policy objectives set out in the 
‘1999 Review’.
Determined to make the rest of the Commission commit itself to its chosen 
strategy, DG Information Society circulated four working documents among 
other Commission DGs and outside actors (European Commission 2000b, 
2000c, 200od, 2000e). These documents consisted of informal, but detailed 
proposals for the harmonisation directives. In the working documents, DG 
Information Society announced the publication of the draft directives for June 
2000. During May and June 2000, DG Information Society engaged in 
consultations with DG Competition. Other DGs largely kept out of the debate as
465they continued to endorse the policy priorities of DG Information Society.
The objections raised by DG Competition against the ideas of DG 
Information Society focused on details and mainly reflected the concern to
466ensure consistency with the existing directives and the Treaties. More serious 
conflict did not emerge, largely because the two DGs had already worked out a 
compromise on central provisions in the context of preparing the ‘1999 Review’ 
(see section two). Following consultations with DG Competition, DG 
Information Society modified some provisions, concerning for example access 
and interconnection, SMP and market analysis procedures. However, the final 
versions of the harmonisation proposals adopted on the administrative level of 
the Commission differed from the earlier versions published by DG Information 
Society in terms of details rather than substance. In line with its previously 
announced time schedule the Commission officially adopted its proposals for 
the framework directive, the directives on authorisation, access and
467interconnection, and universal services in June 2000. In the Council and the
465
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
466
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28. E uropean C om m ission (2 0 0 0 b , 2000c , 2 0 0 o d , 
2 0 o o e , 2 0 o o h , 20oo i, 20ooj, 2000k ).
467 European Commission (200oh, 200oi, 20oqj, 2000k).
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468European Parliament, the proposals proved controversial. Particularly the 
powers assigned to the Commission to overrule NRAs if it believed that they 
were not following EU law correcdy attracted opposition from member states.469 
The European Commission had to amend each proposal twice. The final 
versions of the directives were adopted in December 2001 and required 
member states to implement the new regulatory framework by 25 July 2003.470
Unbundling the *Local Loop9
In spite of the full liberalisation of telecommunications by 1 January 1998, 
competition continued to remain restricted in some areas, particularly the local 
access network. Even though the use of new and alternative infrastructure (e.g. 
cable TV networks) by new entrants had increased user choice, alternatives did 
not exist in many places and the power of incumbents remained unchallenged 
in several member states (European Commission 2000I, p. 2). In this context, 
the local access network continued to be what the Commission called ‘one of 
the least competitive segments of the liberalised telecoms markets’ (ibid.). 
Requests were made both within and outside the European Commission to 
unbundle what was called the ‘local loop’. The term ‘local loop’ refers to the 
physical circuit between the customer’s premises and the telecoms operator’s 
local switch or equivalent facility in the local access network. New market 
entrants viewed this ‘bottleneck’ an urgent matter because in spite of the
Initially, it had b een  agreed  that the C ouncil and  the Parliam ent w ould  ad opt th e proposals 
by u sing  the ‘fast-track p roced u re’ agreed  at the Am sterdam  Sum m it o f  1997  im plying that the  
Parliam ent w ould  vote with a view to m aking the proposals im m ediately acceptable to  a majority
o f  m em ber states and therefore g et round  the usual secon d  reading.
469
Interview N um ber 2, Interview N um ber 7, Interview N um ber 28. E uropean  V oice ,
2 1 .1 2 .2 0 0 0 , 1 .2 .2001 , 2 9 .1 1 .2 0 0 1 . Financial T im es, 1 .2 .2001 , 2 .2 .2 0 0 1 , 6 .4 .2 0 0 1 , 3 .8 .2 0 0 1 . 
European V oice , 2 9 .1 1 .2 0 0 1 . T h e ou tcom e was that the C om m ission  w ould  b e  granted  veto
powers b u t on ly  in  circum stances in  w hich trade betw een  m em ber states was affected .
470
D irective 2 0 0 2 / 19 /E C  o f  the E uropean Parliam ent and o f  th e C oun cil o f  7 M arch o n  access 
to, and  in tercon n ection  of, e lectron ic com m unications networks and associated facilities (Access 
D irective). D irective 2 0 0 2 /2 0 /E C  o f  the E uropean Parliam ent an d  o f  th e C ouncil o f  7 M arch  
on  the authorisation o f  e lectron ic com m un ication s networks an d  services (Authorisation  
D irective). D irective 2 0 0 2 /2 1  /E C  o f  the E uropean Parliam ent and o f  th e C oun cil o f  7 M arch  
on  a com m on  regulatory fram ework for electron ic com m un ication s networks an d  services 
(Fram ework D irective). D irective 2 0 0 2 /2 2 /E C  o f  the European Parliam ent an d  o f  the C ouncil 
o f  7 M arch o n  universal service and users’ rights relating to e lectron ic  com m un ication s  
networks and services (Universal Service D irective). All p ub lish ed  in  O fficial Journal L 108, 
2 4 .4 .2 0 0 2 .
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liberalisation of public voice telephony the incumbents’ power remained 
practically unchanged.
In the European Commission, the issue of unbundling the local loop was of 
particular interest to DG Competition, due to its established responsibility to
471open the telecommunications sector to competition. Since 1998, the activities 
of the unit responsible for competition in telecommunications had included 
initiating legal procedures against member states’ governments failing to 
implement full liberalisation, applying general competition law on antitrust and 
mergers, and drawing up guidelines on market definition and the assessment of
472SMP for the purpose of ex-ante regulation (see above). As regards opening the
local access network, DG Competition argued that the mere application of
general competition rules to the abuse of a dominant position was insufficient
to resolve problems of access to local networks because it only dealt ex-j)ost with 
473such abuse. Hence sector-specific regulation would be needed in order to
avoid an undue duplication of procedures and to establish greater legal clarity.
DG Competition preferred a harmonisation directive to be adopted by the
European Parliament and the Council, preferably within the ONP framework
474that would combine elements of market opening with regulatory safeguards.
DG Competition began to raise its concerns on competition in the local 
loop in the context of consulting with DG Information Society on the provisions 
of the ‘1999 Review’. According to the unit responsible in DG Competition, the
471
Interview  N um ber 9 , Interview N um ber 23, Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28. 
E uropean C om m ission (2 0 0 0 n , p. 5 ) . Speech  given by H erbert U n gerer o f  DG  C om p etition  o n  
‘Ensuring efficien t access to b ottlen eck  network facilities. T h e case o f  telecom m u n ication s in
the E uropean  U n io n ’, in  F lorence o n  13 .11 .1998 .
472
By the en d  o f  1998 , there were 89  in frin gem en t proceed in gs o p en  against m em b er states, 20  
relating to liberalisation and 59  to the harm onisation  directives. S ee, for exam p le, Financial 
T im es, 17 .2 .2 0 0 0 , 2 2 .5 .2 0 0 0 , 16 .6 .2000 . As regards antitrust and m ergers, D G  C om p etition  
ruled  o n  th e abuse o f  d om in ant positions in  a num ber o f  cases, in clu d in g  issues such  as unfair  
p ricing and  in cum bents refusing access and in tercon n ection . For an overview o f  cases see
h ttp ://w w w .e u r o p a .eu .in t/co m m /co m p e titio n /in d ex  en .h tm l.
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Interview N um ber 9 , Interview N um ber 23, Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28. 
E uropean C om m ission  (2 0 0 0 n , p. 5 ) . S p eech  given by H erbert U n gerer o f  DG  C om p etition  o n  
‘Ensuring efficien t access to b ottlen eck  network facilities. T h e case o f  telecom m u n ication s in
the E uropean  U n io n ’. F lorence, 13 .11 .1998 .
474
T h e O N P fram ework ad opted  during the 1990s set ou t the con d ition s for access to an d  the  
use o f  specific types o f  networks an d  services. See D irective 9 2 /4 4 /E E C  o f  5 .6 .1 9 9 2 , D irective  
9 5 /6 2 /E C  o f  1 3 .12 .1995 , Directive 9 7 /3 3 /E C  o f  3 0 .6 .1 9 9 7 , D irective 9 8 /1 0 /E C  o f  2 6 .2 .1 9 9 8 . 
See C hapter Four for detail.
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local loop ought to be a central part of the new Telecoms Package.475 Initially 
this idea met with little enthusiasm in DG Information Society as the unit 
responsible for telecoms legislation did not consider an unbundling of the local 
loop a priority. The main interest of DG Information Society was to promote 
competition between networks and to realise the principle of ‘technological
476neutrality’. Given that in many member states, NRAs were introducing 
requirements for incumbents on local loop unbundling, DG Information 
Society showed itself reluctant to acknowledge a need for sector-specific 
legislation. It agreed with DG Competition that ‘urgent action is required to 
increase competition in the local loop’ (European Commission 1999c, p. 8), 
but preferred non-binding policy instruments (e.g. a Commission 
Recommendation) and the application of competition rules.
After the publication of the ‘1999 Review’, DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms continued to consult on the question of how competition in the local
477access network could best be achieved. Outside interests called for including 
an obligation to the access directive on incumbent operators to unbundle their 
copper local access network. In the course of consultations, DG Information 
Society and DG Competition agreed that as a first step the Commission would 
address a non-binding Recommendation to member states. The 
recommendation would identify action that member states could take to address 
insufficient competition in the local access network where an incumbent 
continued to dominate both the provision of voice telephony and the 
development of higher bandwidth services (European Commission 2()oof, p. 19-
47820). In February 2000, DG Information Society published a working
T his position  has b een  expressed  in  a num ber o f  sp eech es given by officials in  DG  
C om petition , for exam ple, sp eech  given by H erbert U ngerer o n  Local L oop  U n b u n d lin g , 
stating that ‘I believe that w e can safely exp ect that the issue o f  u n b u n d lin g  o f  th e local lo o p  w ill 
figure top  o n  the agenda o f  this year’s EU  telecom s review’. L on d on  Business Sch ool, 
14.6 .1999; sp eech  given by U n gerer on  ‘N ew  Priorities for telecom m u n ication s in  a com petitive  
world. Balance betw een com p etition  rules and sector specific regu lation ’, IIC 
T elecom m u nications Forum , Brussels, 6. /J .7 .1998; sp eech  given by U n gerer o n  ‘B eating the  
Bandwidth B ottlen eck ’ at ATM Year 1998 E urope C onference, L on d on , 16 .9 .1 9 9 8 .
476
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
477
Interview 27 , Interview N um ber 28. E uropean V oice , 1 0 .2 .2000 . Financial T im es, 1 7 .2 .2 0 0 0 .
478 T h e C om m ission p rop osed  that m em ber states took  steps to m andate in cu m b en t operators  
to  offer full u nb u n d led  local loop s by the en d  o f  2 0 0 0  u n d er cost-oriented, transparent and
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document (European Commission 200of) which defined the provisions of a 
possible Commission Recommendation on increasing competition in the local 
loop. In its Communication on the results of public consultations (European 
Commission 2000a, p. 25) the Commission noted that the availability of 
unbundled access to the local loop would increase competition and that it could 
help speeding up the introduction of high-speed internet access services. It 
therefore suggested that in addition to the measures already envisaged for 
access and interconnection, the Commission would propose imposing on 
operators with SMP an obligation to give access to unbundled elements of the 
local loop.
Mostly on the basis of their established working groups, the two DGs 
exchanged their views on the approach the Commission would take and on the
479content of the Commission Recommendation. Because the unbundling of the 
local loop marked an overlap between liberalisation and re-regulation, the two 
DGs agreed that they would share responsibility for preparing the
480Recommendation. Following a preparation process that lasted only a few 
months the Commission adopted a Recommendation on unbundled access to
481the local loop in May 2000. The Recommendation asked member states to 
adopt measures to mandate full unbundled access to the local loop by 31 
December 2000 and made propositions for pricing, technical conditions and 
collocation, transparency and the coordination of interested parties by NRAs.
Apart from consulting each other on the content of the Commission 
Recommendation DG Information Society and DG Competition discussed the 
possibility of proposing binding legislation. Following initial disagreement on 
the issue, the two DGs had arrived at agreement that a binding instrument was
non-discrim inatory term s and conditions. Pricing o f  u nb un dled  access to  the local lo o p  sh ou ld  
b e com p atib le with the aim  o f  fostering fair and sustainable com p etition  an d  provid ing  
investm ent incentives. A  possible R ecom m endation  w ould  ask NRAs to  d evote particular  
attention  to m easures a im ing at u nb un dling  the local lo o p  (E uropean C om m ission  200of, p. 19-
20).
479
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
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Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28.
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C om m ission  R ecom m endation  2 0 0 0 /4 1 7 /E C  o f  25 May 2 0 0 0  o n  u n b u n d led  access to  the  
local loop: en ab lin g  the com petitive provision o f  a full range o f  electron ic com m un ication s  
services in clu d in g  broadband m ultim edia and h igh-speed  Internet. O fficial Journal L 1 5 6 /4 4  o f
2 9 .6 .2 0 0 0 .
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• • 482in fact needed to effectively open the local network to competition. They 
decided that the Commission would not pursue the adoption of a 
harmonisation directive as too much time would be lost until before 
implementation due to the need to transpose it into national legislation. They 
arranged that the Commission would use a ‘fast-track’ procedure instead, 
drafting a Regulation for adoption by the Council and the European Parliament 
that would be directly applicable in all member states it would be addressed to. 
DG Competition and DG Telecoms did not find it difficult to work out the 
content of the Regulation. It would oblige dominant operators to make 
available their local network to third parties by 31 December 2000, following 
principles such as cost-orientation. In July 2000, after a fast decision-making 
process, the Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation on unbundled 
access to the local loop (European Commission 2000I) together with the 
adoption of the proposals for the harmonisation directives.483 The proposed 
Regulation obliged dominant operators to unbundle access to the local loop by 
31 December 2000 under transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions. 
NRAs were to be asked to ensure that prices for unbundled access to the local 
loop would followed the principle of cost-orientation, to adopt pricing rules and 
to resolve disputes between undertakings in a prompt, fair and transparent 
manner (European Commission 2000I, pp. 5-7). The adoption of the 
Regulation proved relatively uncontroversial in the Council and the European
484Parliament.
Updating die liberalisation directives
Apart from its activities to monitor the implementation of the existing 
liberalisation directives, to rule on mergers in the telecommunications sector 
and to consult with DG Information Society on regulatory proposals, DG
482
Interview N um ber 27, Interview N um ber 28. European V oice, 8 .6 .2 0 0 0 . 1 4 .9 .2000 .
483
Interview N um ber 19, 27, 28. A lso see  E uropean V oice, 8 .6 .2 0 0 0 . For a u sefu l sum m ary o f  
the draft regulation  see C om m ission Press Release, I P /0 0 /7 5 0 ,  1 2 .7 .2000 .
484
R egulation  N o  2 8 8 7 /2 0 0 0  o f  the European Parliam ent and o f  the C ouncil o f  18 D ecem b er  
2000 o n  u n b u n d led  access to the local loop . O fficial Journal, L 336  o f  3 0 .1 2 .2 0 0 0 , p . 4 . T h e  
E uropean C om m ission  had ad opted  an am en d ed  proposal in  N ovem ber 2 0 0 0  (E uropean  
C om m ission  2 0 0 0 m ).
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Competition engaged in efforts to update the existing liberalisation directives. 
From 1999 onwards the unit for ‘Liberalisation Directives, Article 86 cases’ had 
pursued the idea of repealing all previous Commission directives on telecoms 
and reducing the overall number of six liberalisation directives to one single 
measure. The reasoning behind this was to increase the legal clarity of and
485simplify legislation. Following the preparation and adoption of the Cable 
Ownership Directive (see section one), DG Competition undertook the drafting 
of a directive on ‘Competition in the Markets for Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services’. The plan was to publish a formal draft directive by July 
2000 to co-incide with the publication of draft directives on regulatory 
harmonisation.
The authority of DG Competition to prepare the repeal of the existing 
liberalisation directives was broadly accepted by other Commission DGs, 
including DG Information Society that endorsed the aim of clarifying and
486simplifying the existing framework. As regards the content of the directive, 
disagreement between DG Competition and DG Information Society concerned 
the definitions and aims contained in the new directive. In the course of their 
consultations, the two DGs concentrated on making the provisions consistent 
with those contained in the harmonisation proposals and to avoid unnecessary 
duplication. For example, DG Information Society asked DG Competition to 
use and make reference to the new terms of ‘electronic communications 
services’ and ‘networks’ rather than the ‘old’ term ‘telecommunications’. The 
two DGs also decided to delete several provision contained in the existing 
directives, for example the granting of derogation periods to certain member 
states. After an uncontroversial decision-taking process the Commission 
officially adopted the formal draft directive in July 2000, simultaneously with
S ee E uropean C om m ission (1 999c , p. 15). Interview N um ber 27 and 28. European  
C om m ission  Press Release, I P /0 0 /7 6 6 ,  12 .7 .2000 . U n p ub lished  C om m ission  d ocu m en t, ‘Objet: 
Im plication  d e  la ‘Review 1 9 9 9 ’ p our les directives con cu rren ce en  m atiere d e  
te lecom m u n ication s’, prepared by DG C om petition , dated  10 .1 2 .1 9 9 9 . Interview N um ber 27.
Interview N um ber 27. U np ub lished  C om m ission d ocu m en t, ‘Objet: Im plication  d e  la  
‘Review 1 9 9 9 ’ p our les directives con cu rren ce e n  m atiere d e  te lecom m u n ication s’, prepared  by 
D G  C om petition , dated  10 .12 .1999 .
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487the harmonisation proposals. The formal draft directive added no new 
obligations to the existing obligations placed on member states to liberalise 
networks and services and maintained the provisions that DG Information
• • 488Society and DG Competition considered necessary. In September 2002, the 
Commission adopted its ‘Directive on Competition in the Markets for 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services’ in a little-changed
4QQ
version.
Conclusion
Analysing the latest stage of legislative policy-making that took place on the 
administrative level of the European Commission revealed a remarkable extent 
of unity which correlated with high legislative outputs produced by the 
European Commission. The Commission managed to set a new policy agenda 
and develop an entire set of legislative proposals and instruments that served to 
consolidate and simplify the existing legal framework. Legislative policy-making 
was rapid and characterised by a high extent of consistency between initial 
propositions and the content of final proposals. This success story stands in stark 
contrast to the configurations of high administrative fragmentation and low 
legislative outputs observed for the audiovisual domain during the same period 
(see Chapter Six). The fact that the European Commission showed such a great 
capacity to prepare and propose legislation might seem surprising at first glance 
because there was more conflict between the participating DGs over defining 
the details of legislative provisions than there used to be during the first half of 
the 1990s (see Chapter Four). Examining the linkages between administrative 
fragmentation and legislative outputs revealed that this conflict did not hamper
N otice  by the C om m ission con cern in g  a draft directive o n  com p etition  in  the m arkets for  
electron ic com m unications services (2 0 0 1 /C  9 6 /0 2 ) .  O fficial Journal, C 9 6 , 2 7 .3 .2 0 0 1 , pp. 2-7. 
E uropean  C om m ission Press R elease, I P /0 0 /7 6 6 ,  12 .7 .2000 .
489
C om m ission  D irective 2 0 0 2 /7 7 /E C  o f  16 S ep tem b er 2002  o n  com p etition  in  th e m arkets 
for e lectron ic  com m unications networks and services. O fficial Journal, L 249  ° f  17.9*2002, pp. 
21-26. T h e  lo n g  gap betw een the ad option  o f  the form al draft d irective an d  its final version can  
b e exp la in ed  by the fact that the E uropean C om m ission  waited for the harm onisation  directives 
b ein g  ad op ted  first.
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the legislative efforts of the Commission because the DGs managed to 
accommodate and overcome it.
The crucial factor which continued to determine the administrative 
fragmentation of the Commission in the telecommunications sector and which 
contrasts with the audiovisual field was the small number of DGs. Only DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms (from 1 9 9 9  called DG InfSo) got actively 
involved in day-to-day policy-making. Moreover, the two DGs were in basic 
agreement on the primary objectives of legislation and on dividing authority for 
telecommunications issues (see Table 18). They agreed that the existing 
legislative framework needed consolidation and updating. DG Competition 
continued to promote liberalisation, whereas DG InfSo concentrated on 
regulatory harmonisation. As in previous years these different agendas 
corresponded closely to the responsibilities kept by each DG: DG Competition 
claimed authority for market opening and the application of general 
competition law and DG InfSo sought to refine and further develop re­
regulation. Hence there was little conflict on authority.
Table 18 Indicators o f administradve fragmentadon in the telecommunicadons sector from 
1997 to 2000
cable
ownership
directive
1999
Review
proposals for
harmonisation
directives
local loop  
u n b u n d lin g
liberalisation
directive
number o f 
DGs
two two two two two
differences 
on paradigm
low low low low low
com peddon  
for authority
low low low low low
overall level 
o f adm. 
fragm.
low low low low low
The low level of administrative fragmentation made coordination among DG 
InfSo and DG Competition relatively easy to manage. This might seem 
surprising at first because a closer look at the debates that shaped the 
relationship between the two DGs showed that they now differed more on the 
details of legislation than they had used to do. In particular, DG InfSo and DG 
Competition were less unified on how provisions would balance liberalisation 
and re-regulatory measures. In this context, the positions taken by the two DGs
2 4 2
differed somewhat from their established agendas as it was now DG InfSo that 
increasingly argued for a reduction of sectoral regulation and a greater reliance 
on general competition law, whereas DG Competition preferred to use 
regulation to achieve efficient market opening. However, because the two DGs 
shared a basic policy strategy and because they did not contend each others’ 
authority they were able to cope with these disputes, largely through their 
established activities of coordination.
Because there was still sufficient common ground between DG InfSo and 
DG Competition, they engaged in intense and efficient coordination. In this 
context, the preliminary consultations that took place in their established 
working groups and through personal conversation among officials provided a 
primary forum for debate. While other Commission actors were largely 
excluded from this arena, DG Competition and DG InfSo used it to negotiate 
and to arrive at compromises they both considered acceptable. Another 
important mechanisms of coordination was the division of labour organised 
between the two DGs. DG InfSo was primarily responsible for drafting 
consultative documents and for preparing re-regulatory proposals, and DG 
Competition concentrated its efforts on market opening and liberalisation. At 
the same time, the two DGs continued to collaborate consult each other. 
Through the intense use of coordinative activities DG Competition and DG 
InfSo were able to cope with controversy and to settle their conflict. Other 
Commission actors were then presented with detailed draft texts that reflected a 
high degree of unity between DG InfSo and DG Competition and that left few 
issues open to discussion. This enabled the Commission to produce high 
legislative outputs. Policy-making was fast and coherent and resulted in the 
proposition of several pieces of legislation that refined the existing legal 
framework and introduced a comprehensive regulatory package for the 
liberalised telecommunications market (see Table 19 and Table 20).
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Table 19 Legislative outputs produced by the European Commission in the telecommunications
sector from 1997 to 2000
cable
ownership
directive
*999
Review
proposals for
harm onisation
directives
local loop  
unbundling
liberalisation
directive
duration less than
twelve
months
less than
twelve
months
less than 
twelve months
less than
twelve
months
less than
twelve
months
consistency h i g h h i g h h i g h h i g h high
proposition 
o f legislation
y y y
deferment — — — — —
abandonment — — — — —
overall
legislative
outputs
high high high high high
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Table 20 Consultative documents, legislative proposals and legal instruments adopted by the
European Commission in the telecommunications sector between 1997 and 2002
year type o f  
docum ent
tide o f  docum ent DG  with form al
drafting
responsibility
1998 consultative
document
Commission Communication concerning 
the Review under Competition Rules o f the 
Joint Provision of Telecommunications and 
Cable TV Networks by a Single Operator 
and the Abolition o f Restrictions on the 
Provision o f Cable TV Capacity over 
Telecommunications Networks (European 
Commission i9p8d)
DG
Competition
legislative
proposal
Commission Notice (1998) concerning a 
draft Directive amending Directive 
90 /388 /E E C  in order to ensure that 
telecommunications networks and cable TV 
networks owned by a single operator are 
separate legal entities
DG
Competition
!999 legal
instrument
Commission Directive 1999 /6 4 /E C  o f 23 
June 1999 amending Directive 
90 /388 /E E C  in order to ensure that 
telecommunications networks and cable TV 
networks owned by a single operator are 
separate legal entities.
DG
Competition
consultative
document
Commission Communication ‘Towards a 
new framework for electronic 
communications infrastructure and 
associated services. The 1999 
Communications Review’ (European 
Commission 1999c)
DG InfSo
2000 consultative
document
Commission Communication on ‘The 
Results o f the Public Consultations on the 
1999 Communications Review and 
Orientations for the New Regulatory 
Framework’ (European Commission 2000a)
DG InfSo
legal
instrument
Commission Recommendation 
2000 /417 /E C  o f 25 May 2000 on  
unbundled access to the local loop: 
enabling the competitive provision o f a full 
range o f electronic communications services 
including broadband multimedia and high­
speed Internet
DG
Competition 
and DG InfSo
consultative
document
Commission Communication on 
‘Unbundled Access to the Local Loop’ 
(European Commission 200on)
DG
Competition 
and DG InfSo
legislative
proposals
■ Proposal for a Directive o f the European
Parliament and o f the Council on 
Access to, and Interconnection of, 
Electronic Communications Networks 
and Associated Facilities (European 
Commission 200oj)
■ Proposal for a Directive o f the European
Parliament and o f the Council on the 
Authorisation o f  Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services 
(European Commission 200oi)
DG InfSo 
DG InfSo
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■ Proposal for a D irective o f  the E uropean
Parliam ent and  o f  the C ouncil on  
Universal Service an d  U sers’ Rights 
relating to E lectronic C om m unications  
Networks and  Services (European  
C om m ission 2000k )
■ Proposal for a D irective o f  the E uropean
Parliam ent and  o f  the C ouncil on  a  
C om m on R egulatory Framework for  
E lectronic C om m unications Networks 
and Services (E uropean C om m ission  
2000h )
D G  InfSo  
D G  InfSo
2001 legislative
proposal
C om m ission N otice (2 0 0 1 ) co n cern in g  a 
draft D irective o n  com p etition  in  the  
m arkets for electron ic com m unications  
services
D G
C om petition
2 002 legal
instrum ent
C om m ission Directive 2 0 0 2 /7 7 /E C  o f  
1 6 .9 .2002  o n  com p etition  in  the m arkets 
for electron ic com m un ication s networks 
and  services
D G
C om petition
A conclusion which emerges from analysing this final stage of the Commission’s 
legislative policy-making in telecommunications and comparing it to the 
situation that was observed for the audiovisual field (see Chapter Six) is that 
while one may see plenty of reason to question established sectoral boundaries 
and speculate about a new ‘convergent’ communications and media sector, one 
must acknowledge that no such convergence has taken place as far as the 
European Commission is concerned. Both the administrative fragmentation and 
the legislative outputs produced by the Commission have followed sectoral 
patterns and it seems likely that they will continue to do so in the future. The 
following chapter presents the conclusion of the thesis and relates the empirical 
findings of the preceding chapters to the key conceptual issues and arguments 
raised in Chapter One.
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Conclusion
Inspired by the ongoing need to advance our understanding of how the 
European Commission operates and how its internal divisions affect the ways in 
which it sets policy agendas, formulates policies and takes decisions, this study 
has sought to uncover the conditions and patterns underlying the Commission’s 
legislative policy-making. This chapter summarises the key issues addressed in 
the thesis and relates them to the empirical findings. A first section presents the 
main conceptual questions and arguments linked with the notion of the 
Commission as a ‘fragmented’ institution. The second section relates them to 
the empirical findings of the study. This is followed by a third section which 
discusses the implications of these findings for conceptualising the Commission 
in a way which challenges our existing views of its role in the EU legislative 
process and raises implications for further research.
Re-conceptualising the European Commission
While the complexity, instability, fluidity and openness of the European 
Commission as an institution or organisational system have been widely 
acknowledged, we continue to know relatively little about what exactly is going 
on inside. The existing literature leans towards pointing out either the power or 
the inability of the Commission to fulfil its role as a motor of European 
integration. Depending on where we stand we may picture the Commission as a 
power-mad ‘competence maximizer’ or as a blocked policy-maker whose turf 
wars and administrative overload prevent it from efficient management and
490action. I have argued that most images of the Commission are not only
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S ee, for exam ple, C ini (2 0 0 1 ); H ix  (19 9 9 ); Laffan (1 9 9 7 );  M ajone (1 9 9 6 );  M oravcsik (1 9 9 3  
and 1998); Peterson  (1 9 9 9 ); Pollack (1 9 9 4  and  2003); Stevens (2 0 0 1 ).
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exaggerated, but also ignore the fundamental question how exacdy the 
Commission’s inner life affects its policy-making behaviour, particularly its 
variation across different policy areas. Why does the Commission sometimes 
appear a unified and determined policy entrepreneur, but dead-locked and 
paralysed some other time? How can this variation be linked with the fact that 
the Commission is not a single-minded actor, but an arena composed of a whole 
array of organisations and individuals?
Seeking to contribute to the EU policy process literature and, more 
specifically, to the literature that has emerged claiming that ‘fragmentation’ is a 
central feature of the Commission and substantially shapes its policy outputs, I 
have chosen to look inside the ‘black box’ of the Commission. While several 
contributors have acknowledged the variety of dimensions across which the 
Commission is ‘fragmented’, including factors such as culture, outside interests 
and personalities, less has been said about how exacdy such fragmentation
• • 491impacts on the Commission’s policy outputs and how it varies. Taking up the 
notion that fragmentation is an ever-present feature of the Commission and the 
ways it operates, the aim pursued in this thesis was to define a single, but 
fundamental aspect of fragmentation and to analyse in depth how it manifests 
itself. The focus of my study has been the organisational dimension of 
fragmentation occurring on the administrative level of the Commission. The so- 
called administrative arm of the Commission keeps responsibility for the 
preparation of legislative initiatives, a cornerstone of the Commission’s tasks
492 •and functions. The most defining principle characterising the administrative 
level of the Commission is the functional specialisation of different Directorates 
General (DGs).493
According to the principle of functional specialisation, different 
Commission DGs keep different tasks and functions that are usually linked to 
different policy sectors. Moreover, the DGs maintain distinct policy agendas and
491
See, for exam p le, Christiansen (2 0 0 1 ); Cini (2 0 0 0 );  E geberg (2 0 0 4 ); H o o g h e  (2 0 0 1 );  Page
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494preferences. Policy-making on the administrative level of the Commission is 
therefore characterised by a plurality of actors. However far from being 
autonomous, these actors find themselves in a situation of interdependence. 
This is due to several reasons, the most important being the cross-cutting nature 
of most legislative initiatives and the far-reaching specialisation of the DGs, that 
result in overlapping policy responsibilities. Furthermore, the Commission’s 
decision-making procedures require DGs to consult and to seek agreement 
from each other before they may pass on legislative files to formal decision-
495taking on the political level of the Commission. Fragmentation therefore 
creates a situation in which plurality and interdependence co-exist. In order to 
uncover and explain how this affects legislative policy-making I have 
conceptualised the process through which a group of Commission DGs engage 
in preparing legislation as a process of policy coordination.
The literature on policy coordination depicts decision-making in 
fragmented institutional environments as being characterised by the mutual
496interdependence of the organisational actors involved. Plurality and 
interdependence and the resulting complexity and uncertainty create a 
‘multiorganizational setting’ (Chisholm 1989, p. 5). Within this setting, 
organisational actors respond to fragmentation by engaging in a process of 
coordination. Used as an umbrella term, ‘coordination’ comprises a variety of 
activities designed to overcome conflict and to accommodate fragmentation, to 
facilitate collaboration and to build a consensus in order to make an institution 
capable of action.
With its notions of plurality and interdependence, the concept of policy 
coordination provides a useful way of conceptualising the European 
Commission and the interactions between the organisations and actors it is 
composed of. With fragmentation being an ever-present feature, legislative 
policy-making in the Commission always involves some degree of debate and 
conflict, for example on the details of EU legislation. Variation occurs in how
494
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actors manage this debate and whether they can overcome conflict. The major 
aim pursued in the empirical analysis has been to show that this variation 
crucially depends on the level of administrative fragmentation. The central 
research question has been how variation on administrative fragmentation 
affects the Commission’s legislative outputs, i.e. whether and how it proposes 
EU legislation. Administrative fragmentation varies across different policy 
domains and can be assessed by using three indicators: the number of DGs that 
actively engage in the preparation of legislation; the differences that exist 
between these DGs on the paradigm of legislation including the need for and 
the primary objectives of legislation; and their competition for authority. The 
legislative outputs produced by the European Commission may take on the 
form of consultative documents, formal legislative proposals or binding legal 
instruments and have been operationalised by using three indicators: the 
duration of the Commission’s legislative policy-making; the consistency of the 
Commission’s propositions; and the decision whether to propose legislation.
The empirical findings
Using a qualitatively oriented research design, I traced the evolution of central 
legislative initiatives taken by the European Commission to liberalise and 
harmonise the telecommunications and the audiovisual sectors from the early 
1980s to the year 2000. The two policy domains were chosen with a view 
towards their variation on the explanatory variable under study. Furthermore, 
the background conditions against which the Commission prepared legislative 
initiatives make the two sectors interesting subjects of a cross-sectoral 
comparison. During the past two decades, they both underwent fundamental 
technological, economic and regulatory changes. The preparation of EU-wide 
legislation was based on a combination of liberalisation and re-regulation which 
took account of the fact that the two sectors are essentially ‘cross-cutting’, i.e. 
touching on several issue dimensions (e.g. technological, economic, and the 
public interest). In other words, the European Commission addressed similar 
themes of legislation, notably liberalisation, a harmonisation of market 
conditions and the regulation of the so-called ‘public interest’. I analysed and
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cross-checked several sources of evidence: interviews, press reports, official 
documentation and unpublished documentary sources produced by the 
European Commission.
The empirical evidence demonstrated significant and enduring variation on 
both administrative fragmentation and legislative outputs across the two policy 
domains. As regards administrative fragmentation, the dominant picture was 
one of low fragmentation in the telecommunications sector and a tendency 
towards high fragmentation in the audiovisual domain. In telecommunications, 
two DGs (DG Telecoms and DG Competition) collaborated on the basis of a 
shared paradigm of legislation and an agreed division of authority for 
telecommunications issues (see Table 21). In the audiovisual field, a rather 
similar picture could be observed for the first phase of legislative policy-making 
during which the policy arena was limited to DG Culture and DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs. However, the situation changed quite 
fundamentally in the early 1990s when the number of DGs doubled to four, 
including DG Culture, DG Internal Market, DG Competition, and DG 
Telecoms. The four DGs disagreed on the paradigm of legislation and disputed 
each others’ authority for audiovisual issues. The Commission’s legislative 
outputs were high in the telecommunications sector, with legislative policy­
making being rapid, consistent and characterised by numerous decisions to 
propose legislation (see Table 22). They ranked considerably lower in the 
audiovisual field where, following relatively high legislative outputs during the 
1980s, the preparation of legislation tended to be a slow and time-consuming 
process characterised by inconsistencies, deferments and the abandonment of 
legislative initiatives, and with only few pieces of legislation being proposed.
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Table 21 Variation on administrative fragmentation in the audiovisual and telecommunications
sectors
p eriod  1984 -  1989 period 1990 -1 9 9 6 period  1997 - 2000
audiovisual
sector
telecoms
sector
audiovisual
sector
telecoms
sector
audiovisual
sector
telecoms
sector
number of 
DGs
two two three to 
four
two four to five two
differences 
on paradigm
low low high low high low
competition 
for authority
low low high low high low
overall level 
of adm. 
fragm.
low low high low high low
Table 22 Variation on legislative outputs produced by the European Commission in the 
audiovisual and telecommunications sectors
p eriod  1984[ -1 9 8 9 period  1990 - 1996 period  1997r -  2000
audiovisual telecoms audiovisual telecoms audiovisual telecoms
sector sector sector sector sector sector
duration short short long short h M l g short
consistency high high low high low high
proposition of 
legislation
y ( ✓ ) y ( ✓ )
deferment — — y — y —
abandonment — — y — y —
overall
legislative
high high low high low high
outputs
The empirical analysis was organised in three parts. The first part covered the 
initiation of legislation in the Commission which took place from 1 9 8 4  to 1 9 8 9  
(Chapter Three). The second part examined the period from 1 9 9 0  to 1 9 9 6  
during which the Commission refined and expanded existing legislation 
(Chapters Four and Five). The third part analysed the most recent phase of 
legislative policy-making completed by the European Commission thus far, 
reaching from 1 9 9 7  to 2 0 0 0  (Chapters Six and Seven).
The period 1984 to 1989
The European Commission did not initiate Community legislation in the two 
policy areas before the mid-1 9 8 0 s and started acting largely in response to
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technological and economic changes as well as regulatory reforms underway in 
several member states. In both domains, the central issue at stake was to realise 
a common market which would attract greater investment and promote new 
technologies and services. The European Commission proposed limited 
measures to open up markets to competition and to provide for a minimum of 
regulatory harmonisation. In the audiovisual domain, it prepared a directive on 
‘Television without Frontiers’ which combined elements of liberalisation and 
re-regulation, whereas in the telecommunications sector it drafted two 
Commission directives liberalising terminal equipment and value-added 
telecommunications services and proposed a re-regulatory proposal that centred 
on the Open Network Provision (ONP).
The empirical evidence demonstrated that in both policy domains the 
initiation of legislative policies was marked by low levels of administrative 
fragmentation (see Chapter Three). In each sector, two DGs took over the 
preparation of consultative documents and legislative proposals: DG Internal 
Market and Industrial Affairs and DG Culture in the audiovisual field, and DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms in telecommunications. There was either none 
or very little input of other DGs. While in each policy area, the participating 
DGs maintained different tasks and agendas on audiovisual and 
telecommunications policy respectively, they were in accordance on the 
paradigm of legislation, i.e. a combination of liberalisation and re-regulation, 
and on dividing authority. In the audiovisual field, DG Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs concentrated on liberalisation and market conditions and DG 
Culture focused on re-regulation in the name of the public interest. In the 
telecommunications sector, DG Competition was responsible for liberalisation 
and DG Telecoms dealt with re-regulation. Debate and conflict centred on the 
details of legislation, for example advertising limits in the audiovisual sector and 
access conditions for telecoms operators in telecommunications.
Since administrative fragmentation was low the DGs managed to solve their 
debates, mostly by relying on ‘informal’ routes of coordination. In this context, 
pre-consultations conducted in issue-related working groups and through 
personal contacts among officials were identified as being of primary 
importance in facilitating consensus. Contentious issues were usually solved
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during these consultations. Other Commission actors were largely excluded and 
later supplied with detailed draft texts on which there was a high extent of unity 
among the participating DGs. Furthermore the participating DGs engaged in a 
division of work. The voluntary arrangement of dividing different 
responsibilities between different DGs helped to further reduce conflict and to 
facilitate compromising. Together these coordination routes reduced debate 
and therefore the incidence of delays and substantial changes to legislative 
proposals. Legislative outputs were high, with policy-making being rapid and 
consistent and resulting in several positive decisions to propose legislation.
The period 1990 to 1996
Following the limited steps undertaken to liberalise and re-regulate the 
audiovisual and the telecommunications sectors during the 1980s, the 
Commission engaged in attempts to further develop and expand legislation in 
the early 1990s. In telecommunications, it prepared several liberalisation 
directives designed to fully open telecommunications networks and services as 
well as legislative proposals intended to establish a comprehensive re-regulatory 
framework. In the audiovisual field, the Commission concentrated on three 
major legislative projects each of which combined elements of market opening 
and re-regulation: legislation on television standards; legislation on media 
ownership and concentration; and a revision of the directive ‘Television without 
Frontiers’. In both policy areas, the preparation of legislative proposals and 
legal instruments was preceded by the drafting of consultative documents 
setting out policy priorities and timetables for future action.
In contrast to the similar levels of administrative fragmentation previously 
observed, the early 1990s saw fundamental differences emerge between the two 
policy domains. In the telecommunications sector, fragmentation continued at 
a low level (see Chapter Four). Legislative policy-making continued to be jointly 
undertaken by DG Competition and DG Telecoms. The two DGs were in 
accordance not only on the need for more far-reaching legislation, but also on 
its primary objective, i.e. a combination of further market opening with re­
regulation of market entry and user rights. Competition for authority was low
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since the two DGs accepted a distribution of authority: DG Competition took 
over the bulk of drafting work for liberalisation measures and DG Telecoms 
concentrated on re-regulation. Conflict between the two DGs centred on the 
details of the legislative initiatives, for example the timing of legislative 
proposals and how provisions would balance liberalisation with re-regulation.
Quite the opposite applied to the audiovisual field where administrative 
fragmentation quickly took a different direction (see Chapter Five). The 
number of participating DGs doubled from two to four, now including DG 
Telecoms and DG Competition in addition to DG Internal Market and DG 
Culture. These four DGs developed rather different policy agendas and their 
views on audiovisual legislation were not easy to reconcile - including those of 
DG Internal Market and DG Culture that now differed more fundamentally on 
the paradigm of legislation than they had in the 1980s. Not only were the 
details of legislation subject to dispute, but also its primary objectives and 
sometimes the very need for it  For example, the basic issue whether the 
European Commission should propose EU-wide legislation on media ownership 
was highly contentious among the DGs. The DGs also tended to compete for 
policy authority. For example, rivalry prevailed as regards the question which 
DG would control defining the re-regulatory provisions contained in the 
‘Television without Frontiers’ directive. The conflict over authority was fiercest 
between DG Culture with its traditional responsibility for audiovisual legislation 
and DG Telecoms that sought to increase its competence over communications- 
and media-related issues.
The empirical evidence revealed that the different configurations of 
administrative fragmentation prevailing in the two policy areas resulted in 
rather different scenarios of policy coordination. In telecommunications, 
coordination did not encounter serious difficulties. The units responsible in DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms intensified their collaboration and gradually 
turned their relationship into a partnership or alliance based on informal 
coordination modes. In order to improve the information flow between the 
units responsible and to further ease the building of consensus, the relevant 
units exchanged several staff. Debate was mostly solved in the context of 
informal consensus-building activities taking place in the working groups and
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through personal contacts that largely excluded other Commission actors. 
Legislative initiatives usually entered the obligatory procedures of policy-making 
only after the two DGs had agreed on most details of legislation. DG 
Competition and DG Telecoms also stuck to their division of work which 
allocated liberalisation issues to the former and re-regulation to the latter and 
served to further reduce conflict and debate. Due to the use of several 
coordinative activities the overall process of legislative policy-making was fast 
and changes to the Commission’s official strategy rare. The Commission 
prepared and adopted four liberalisation directives that fully opened 
telecommunications networks and services to competition by 1 January 1998, 
including public voice telephony. Furthermore, it drafted several proposals 
designed to establish a comprehensive re-regulatory framework that would cover 
a wide range of issues, including interconnection, interoperability, and universal 
service.
In contrast to the high legislative outputs produced by the Commission in 
telecommunications, the situation developed rather differently in the 
audiovisual field. Relationships between the DGs were characterised by rivalry 
and competition and coordination tended to be difficult. Due to the high levels 
of administrative fragmentation, informal consensus-building activities were of 
limited effectiveness to solve conflict over the details of legislation. Facing a 
situation in which there was little common ground, the relevant units were less 
able (and perhaps less willing) to negotiate a settlement. Coordination was 
therefore transferred to the more formal arenas of the European Commission, 
including the senior levels of the DGs, other administrative services, the cabinets 
and the College of Commissioners. The number of actors multiplied and with 
them increased the differences on the paradigm of legislation and the 
competition for authority. In these ‘crowded’ arenas, actors debated the very 
basics of legislation rather than detailed draft texts previously agreed on by the 
DG units. Hence, policy formulation was much more ‘politicised’ and more 
prone to delays and changes of direction than in telecommunications. 
Furthermore, communicating decisions between the different levels of the 
Commission and referring them back and forth for modification and re-drafting 
between the DG with drafting responsibility and other Commission actors was a
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time-consuming process. Fragmentation and conflict largely endured and
497resulted in low legislative outputs. The preparation process was slow and often 
took several years. The official position taken by the European Commission on 
whether and what kind of legislation to propose changed frequently. For 
example, whether the Commission would propose legislation on media 
ownership was subject to debate for more than six years and ultimately resulted 
in no legislative action at all. The deferment of the decision whether to propose 
legislation did in fact occur more frequently than the actual proposition of 
legislation and few legislative proposals were made: two proposals for directives 
regulating television standards and a revised proposal on ‘Television without 
Frontiers’.
The period 1997 to 2000
The latest phase of legislative policy-making completed by the European 
Commission thus far lasted fewer than five years but was characterised by major 
legislative initiatives in both domains. The period 1997 to 2000 saw efforts 
undertaken by the Commission to consolidate, clarify and refine existing 
legislation in both the audiovisual and the telecommunications sector, triggered 
by technological and market developments. In telecommunications, these 
efforts culminated in the adoption of the ‘2000 Telecoms Package’ which 
contained several draft proposals on re-regulation, followed by a Commission 
directive repealing all previous liberalisation directives. In the audiovisual field, 
legislative action revealed fewer visible results: apart from two proposals 
regulating so-called ‘conditional access’ systems for the reception and 
transmission of television services, no legislative proposals emerged - in spite of 
a long and intense agenda-setting process during which several legislative 
options and possible initiatives were discussed.
The levels of administrative fragmentation developed rather differently 
across the two policy domains and provided scope for significant variation. In 
the audiovisual field, administrative fragmentation reached even higher levels
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A n excep tion  was the secon d  phase o f  legislation  o n  television  standards w hich  was 
characterised by low  levels o f  adm inistrative fragm entation  that resu lted  in  relatively h igh  
legislative outputs (see Chapter Five).
than during previous years (see Chapter Six). Four, sometimes five Commission 
DGs participated in the preparation of legislative initiatives: DG Culture, DG 
Internal Market, DG Competition, DG Telecoms/InfSo, and DG Industry. 
These DGs diverged significandy on the need for and the substance of EU-wide 
legislation and competed for authority over audiovisual issues. The conflict 
between them reached its peak in 1997 when DG Telecoms pursued its 
‘Convergence’ initiative which implied the creation of a new regulatory 
framework ‘merging’ audiovisual with telecommunications regulation, an idea 
which was strongly opposed by other DGs, most fervently DG Culture that 
feared for its established authority over audiovisual legislation. The paradigm of 
legislation was also subject to heated controversies. For example, the 
participating DGs found themselves unable to agree whether the Commission 
should continue sectoral regulation or instead opt for an entirely new 
regulatory model. In contrast, the administrative fragmentation of the 
Commission in telecommunications remained low (see Chapter Seven). The 
setting of participating DGs was limited to DG Competition and DG 
Telecoms/InfSo that were united on the need for and the primary objectives of 
legislation and accepted a division of authority which assigned liberalisation to 
the former and re-regulation to the latter. Debate centred on the details of 
legislation, for example the timing of legislative proposals and how legislative 
provisions would balance the application of general competition rules with 
sector-specific regulation.
The empirical analysis illustrated how contrasting levels of administrative 
fragmentation related to different legislative outputs produced by the 
Commission in the two policy domains. Due to the high level of fragmentation 
policy coordination was difficult and intricate in the audiovisual field and 
rendered informal consensus-building activities largely ineffective. Because the 
distance between the DGs was too great to be overcome by informal 
coordination routes, controversial issues were mostly debated in the ‘formal’ 
arenas of the Commission where actors multiplied and conflict intensified. This 
made the coordination process more time-consuming and caused frequent 
changes of the Commission’s strategy. The preparation of legislative documents 
took considerably more time than foreseen and draft texts underwent many
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changes before a majority of Commission actors considered them acceptable. 
This became most evident in the context of the ‘Convergence’ initiative 
pursued by DG Telecoms which met with outright opposition from other DGs. 
The Commission eventually abandoned proposing a new regulatory model and 
instead confirmed to leave established models of sectoral regulation in place. 
After that, the dominant behaviour expressed by the Commission was 
institutional inertia. Because the DGs saw themselves unable to agree on the 
need for and the objectives of audiovisual legislation and continued to conflict 
over authority, they deferred decisions on whether to propose legislation or 
simply avoided initiating further legislative action. The DGs engaged in a policy 
of ‘mutual avoidance’ and stuck to their established sectoral activities and
498routines. For example, the revision of the ‘Television without Frontiers’ 
directive did not lead to a formal drafting exercise, but instead resulted in the 
adoption of several consultative documents that have been rather evasive on 
whether the Commission would propose legislation in the future, due to 
ongoing disagreement on the issue.
In stark contrast to the low legislative outputs produced by the European 
Commission in the audiovisual field, the telecommunications sector was 
characterised by more rapid and more consistent legislative policy-making that 
resulted in the proposition of several pieces of legislation. Policy coordination 
was greatly facilitated by the low level of administrative fragmentation. Between 
DG Competition and DG Telecoms/InfSo, slightly more conflict emerged over 
the details of legislation than during previous years, but the two DGs were able 
to resolve it because they agreed on the paradigm of legislation and did not 
seriously question each others’ authority for telecommunications issues. By 
means of informal consultations, the two DGs managed to sort out most of their 
differences before the dossiers reached other Commission actors. Together with 
an efficient division of labour these served to speed up the process of legislative 
policy-making and enabled the Commission to adopt legislative proposals that
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A n excep tion  was the preparation and adoption  o f  legislative proposals revising existing  
legislation  o n  television standards that resulted in  draft proposals regulating ‘con d itional 
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In this case, policy coordination  m et with few  difficulties and resu lted  in  the rapid and  
con sistent preparation o f  legislative proposals (see C hapter S ix).
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were mostly in line with previous announcements and commitments. The 
Commission adopted a large number of legislative proposals, including several 
consultative documents, re-regulatory proposals and two more liberalisation 
directives.
Fragmentation and coordination in the European Commission
The empirical findings unveil how different levels of administrative 
fragmentation translated into distinct settings of plurality and interdependence 
in the two sectors under study. A central conclusion that has emerged is that 
when trying to explain the policy-making behaviour of the Commission the 
matter is not whether there is conflict between the DGs engaging in the 
preparation of legislation, but whether and how it is resolved. While conflict 
and controversy are ever-present features of ‘multi-organisational’ settings like 
the European Commission, significant variation may occur on their degree. The 
focus being on administrative fragmentation, this thesis has defined it by the 
number of DGs, their differences on the paradigm of legislation and their 
competition for authority. Low levels of fragmentation usually enable the 
Commission to overcome internal conflicts and to take legislative action. In 
contrast, high fragmentation results in the persistence of dispute and debate 
and therefore lowers the Commission’s capacity to act. The different levels of 
fragmentation can be linked with the emergence of distinct scenarios of policy 
coordination that are characterised by different coordination paths or routes. In 
this context, it is useful to distinguish between ‘formal’ versus ‘informal’ 
coordination. A central finding was that these different routes vary in terms of 
whether and how intensely the DGs made use of them as well as their 
effectiveness to setde conflict and to cope with a given situation of 
fragmentation.
Informal routes of coordination are frequendy used by Commission DGs to 
facilitate the building of consensus. Such coordination is undertaken in the less 
formalised arenas of the Commission, for example by means of preliminary 
consultations that take place in issue-related inter-service working groups on the 
lower levels of the DG hierarchies or through personal contacts between
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officials, by means of exchanging staff or informally arranging a division of 
labour. Such consultations imply information exchange, bargaining, mutual 
pay-offs, and compromising and are aimed at building up trust and establishing 
long-term relationships. They provide an opportunity to discuss contentious 
issues in a small community and to find an answer to them before they enter 
larger arenas in which flexibility reduces and uncertainty increases, because 
actors multiply and more formal procedures must be observed. Due to the fact 
that the Commission’s rules of procedures leave considerable scope for the use 
of such consensus-building activities or ‘routines’, Commission DGs nearly 
always engage in some kind of informal coordination - but there is significant 
variation in terms of the extent to which they do so. It has been shown that this 
variation can be linked with the incidence of administrative fragmentation. Low 
levels of administrative fragmentation (i.e. smaller numbers of actors and little 
distance between them) entail a greater reliance of actors on informal 
coordination and therefore render coordination more flexible and relaxed. In 
contrast, high levels of administrative fragmentation leave such informal 
mechanisms less effective. The greater the plurality of actors, the smaller the 
common ground between them and the lower their ability and willingness to 
make concessions. The chances that an agreement can be found on an informal 
basis and that conflict be resolved are therefore seriously diminished.
In contrast to informal coordination, formal coordination modes centre on 
pre-defined procedures and rules. The most important routes identified in this 
study are hierarchical decision-making, the ‘coordinative’ functions maintained 
by the Legal Service and the Secretariat General, as well as the obligatory inter­
service consultations among DGs. These procedures constitute an essential part 
of all legislative policy-making insofar as actors must adhere to them to be able 
to put policy proposals forward to formal decision-taking. However, there is 
great variation on the extent to which they dominate the coordination process. 
Because high levels of administrative fragmentation render informal 
coordination routes less effective they prompt the use of formal ones at a much 
earlier stage of the coordination process. The use of such formal mechanisms, 
in turn, increases the plurality of actors each of which is likely to have its own 
positions and preferences. Due to the involvement of senior decision-makers in
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the DGs, other administrative services, the cabinets and so on coordination gets 
more complex and ‘politicised’. The fact that a greater number of and 
potentially more diverse positions must be reconciled and that decisions must 
be communicated back and forth between the different actors on different 
hierarchical levels makes the overall coordination process more time- 
consuming, more prone to changes and the actual proposition of legislation less 
likely.
For the two policy domains under study, two dominant coordination 
scenarios were observed. In the telecommunications, coordination mostly relied 
on informal routes, whereas in the audiovisual field, formal procedures 
dominated (see Table 23). In this context, the number of DGs appeared to be 
the most crucial factor affecting the emergence of the respective coordination 
scenarios. Throughout the empirical analysis, a greater number of DGs co­
varied with greater distance between them, i.e. more conflict on the paradigm 
of legislation and more competition for policy authority, whereas a smaller 
number seemed to correlate with less differences and less competition. Most 
importantly, the fact that the number of DGs in the audiovisual field doubled 
from two to four in the early 1990s created a central momentum of variation 
between the two policy sectors. This suggests that the decision made by a DG to 
join the preparation process is at least partly caused by a perception held in the 
DG that it must do so in order to realise its interests vis-a-vis other DGs. The 
number of DGs might therefore reflect conflict on both the paradigm of 
legislation and authority and therefore be a function thereof. Two hypotheses 
emerge from this. One is that a small number of DGs (i.e. a two-actor 
constellation), results in what one may call ‘bilateral’ policy coordination, a 
coordination scenario in which informal coordination routes prevail, serve to 
overcome conflict and therefore lead to high legislative outputs. The other is 
that a larger number of DGs (i.e. more than two) leads to ‘multilateral’ 
coordination and a scenario dominated by formal coordination routes. In this 
scenario, conflict persists or intensifies and therefore results in lower legislative 
outputs. Due to the limited scope and purpose of this study, particularly the 
small number of cases and the qualitatively-oriented research design, it is not 
possible to generalise on this matter. Hence further research would be helpful
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to assess to which extent the number of actors alone may determine 
fragmentation on the Commission’s administrative level.
Table 23 The dominant coordination scenarios in the audiovisual and telecommunications 
sectors
period  1984 -  1989 period 1990 -1 9 9 6 p eriod  1997 -  2000
audiovisual
sector
telecoms
sector
audiovisual
sector
telecoms
sector
audiovisual
sector
telecoms
sector
coordination
scenario
informal informal formal informal formal informal
The different patterns and scenarios of coordination that can be observed in 
the European Commission and the ways in which they are linked with 
fragmentation and policy outputs confirm the central assumptions of the 
theoretical literature on policy coordination. In order to identify and classify 
different coordination routes the literature distinguishes between ‘formal’ and
499‘informal’ coordination. Formal coordination centres on the principle of 
hierarchy and coercion, whereas informal coordination implies a variety of 
consensus-building activities that take place in less formalised arenas. The 
literature says that organisational actors often consider formal coordination of 
limited usefulness in producing coherent institutional behaviour and in 
realising their own goals because it tends to transfer conflict to other, possibly
500more ‘political’ arenas where it may intensify rather than being solved. In the 
meantime, organisational actors would face unwanted delays, uncertainty, and a 
waste of scarce resources (e.g. staff, time and energy). Organisational actors may 
therefore use alternative approaches to coordination, having at their disposal a 
number of informal routines designed to facilitate coordination, including 
bargaining, incremental or sequential decision-making, policy framing, 
improving information flows, and the building of alliances.501 Being problem- 
oriented and pragmatic, many of these activities are based on long-term
499
Alexander (1993); Chisholm (1989); Davis (1995); Hanf and Scharpf (1978); Hayward and 
Wright (2002); Lindblom (1965); Peters (1998); Scharpf (1997); Seidman (1980); Simon 
(1997)-
500
Chisholm (1989); Peters (1998); Scharpf (1997); Seidman (1980); Simon (1997).
501
In the literature, there is a variety o f terms characterising informal coordination, such as 
‘coordinating styles’ (Hayward and Wright 2002), standard operating procedures and routines 
(Allison and Zelikow 1999; Davis 1995), and ‘coordination mechanisms’ (Chisholm 1989; 
Seidman 1980).
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relationships and trust. Most importantly, they are deliberately used by
• • 502organisational actors. Informal coordination routes greatly facilitate the
• • 503coordination process, but high levels of conflict render them less effective.
Uncovering patterns of policy coordination occurring in the European 
Commission has served to establish and illustrate causal relationships between 
fragmentation and policy outputs. Given that no systematic work has previously 
been undertaken on policy coordination in the Commission, I concentrated on 
dominant and routine patterns rather than providing a comprehensive account 
of all possible coordination modes. Further research would be useful to uncover 
other coordination routes and to explain under what conditions they are used. 
The policy coordination literature lists a variety of possible routes, including 
issue-framing, sequential decision-making or alliances with external
• • 504constituencies. Increasing our knowledge of how coordination operates in the 
European Commission would not only foster our comprehension of how 
coordination operates in the European Commission, but also contribute to the 
theoretical literature on coordination and questions of a more general nature, 
for example under what conditions different coordination mechanisms are used 
and why informal coordination routes are more effective in managing 
coordination than formal ones.
Together, the concepts of fragmentation and coordination provide a useful 
lens to analyse the policy-making processes underway in the European 
Commission. Taking up the insights of contributions that view policy-making in 
the Commission as a pluralist process through which different organisations and 
actors engage in conflict and competition the thesis has conceptualised how
505fragmentation manifests itself and how it varies. Moving beyond the two 
empirical cases one may discern the Commission as a complex bureaucracy 
whose actions cannot be forecast simply by referring to its role as a ‘motor’ of
502
A lexan d er (1 9 9 3 ); C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 ); Davis (1 9 9 5 );  H an f and  Scharpf (1 9 7 8 );  Hayward and  
W right (2 0 0 2 ); L indblom  (1 9 6 5 ); Seidm an (1 9 8 0 ).
503
E.g. C hisholm  (1 9 8 9 ); Seidm an (1 9 8 0 ).
504
S ee, for exam ple, C hisholm  (1989); Davis (1 9 9 5 );  Hayward and W right (2 0 0 2 ); Seidm an  
(1 9 8 0 ).
505
See, for example, Peters (1991, 1994 and 2001).
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European integration or, alternatively, its fragmentedness. This implies to 
challenge existing notions of the European Commission, including that of a 
single-minded ‘competence maximizer’ and that of a ‘fragmented’ or 
incoherent policy-maker being largely incapable of action.506 Policy-making in 
the European Commission is nearly always characterised by conflict and 
fragmentation. It is not the presence of conflict and fragmentation as such 
which affects the Commission’s ability to prepare and propose legislation, but 
the ways in which they vary. The Commission can overcome low degrees of 
fragmentation and therefore be highly capable to act. In contrast, a high level of 
fragmentation makes it difficult to overcome conflict and debate and therefore 
makes the taking of action much more problematic or even impossible. 
Analysing the impact of administrative fragmentation is therefore important to 
enhance our understanding of variation in the Commission’s legislative 
capacities.
Moving beyond the European Commission, there are also lessons that may 
be drawn for our understanding of the overall process of legislative policy­
making in the European Union. EU policies may be the result not only of 
relations between the Commission and other actors (e.g. the European 
Parliament or the Council of Ministers), but also be affected by the processes 
that take place in the European Commission and therefore the variation on the 
Commission’s legislative capacity. The multitude of factors that affect EU policy­
making, for example member states and business interests, operate not only 
through established channels such as the Council and the European 
Parliament, but also through the Commission. Insofar as these factors can be 
expected to affect the fragmentation of the Commission, they impact on its 
behaviour. In order to enhance our understanding of the EU policy process we 
must acknowledge that the Commission is neither the ruthless activist that never 
tires of expanding EU authority and its own competences nor generally prone 
to inefficiency, mismanagement and blockage. Rather than fulfilling a pre­
defined part and pursuing a predictable agenda, it is capable of playing
506
E.g. Christiansen (2001b ); H ix  (1 999 ); Laffan (1 9 9 7 ); M ajone (1 9 9 6 );  M etcalfe (2 0 0 0 );  
Moravcsik (1 9 9 3  and 1998); Peterson (1999 ); Pollack (1 9 9 4  an d  2 0 0 3 ); Schm idt (1998a);  
Stevens (2 0 0 1 ); S tone Sweet and Sandholtz (1 9 9 8 ).
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different roles. While one may think of a variety of reasons that affect which role 
the Commission takes up in the given circumstances, it all comes to nothing if 
we do not take account of the fact that all these reasons must take the passage 
through its internal life. Only then can we understand what the Commission 
does - and what it does not do.
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Appendix
Sources o f Evidence 
European Commission documents
Each year, the European Commission publishes several tens of thousands of 
pages of text, all accessible to the public, that include a broad range of 
documents ranging from information memos to formal legislative proposals. 
These publications not only document the content of the European 
Commission’s policies, but also the progress that has been made in relation to 
them. They demonstrate changes in the European Commission’s policy 
strategies and serve as a useful indicator of the three dimensions of the chosen 
dependent variable (speed, consistency, and the decision whether to propose 
legislation). At the same time, one must be aware that such documentation, 
however detailed, only reveals what Commission actors want the public to know. 
For example, when the European Commission changes its policy strategy, it 
does not always give a full account of its reasons for doing so in its official 
documentation. Hence, the reading of the official documents had to be 
complemented by information from other sources.
For the policy initiatives under study, access to official documentation was 
generally good and a representative sample of documents was obtained for all of 
them, both in printed and electronic format. The sources of official information 
used were as follows.
1. Information sources monitoring the EU policy-making process, for 
example ‘Prelex’, ‘Celex’ and ‘Rapid’. These databases are provided for 
by the European Union and offer detailed information on the content 
and progress of legislative initiatives. For example, they document the
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chronology of a dossier, the participation of different DGs, and provide 
links to related procedures and legislative initiatives.
2. European Commission Work Programmes. These are published annually 
and list the European Commission’s official agenda, including details on 
policy proposals to be expected in the course of the year and their 
central aims. The complete reference to these documents can be found 
in a separate section of the Bibliography, whereas in the empirical 
analysis they are referred to in terms of authorship and the year the 
documents were published (e.g. ‘European Commission 1994c’).
3. Consultative papers published by the European Commission (so-called 
COM Documents). They provide detailed information on the policy 
priorities of the Commission for a given legislative initiative, outlining 
major aims and timetables, offering detail on the positions of outside 
actors et cetera. The complete reference to these documents can be 
found in a separate section of the Bibliography, whereas in the empirical 
analysis they are referred to in terms of authorship and the year the 
documents were published (e.g. ‘European Commission 1994c’).
4. Formal policy proposals and legal instruments adopted by the European 
Commission, usually accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in 
which the European Commission sets out the motivation for and the 
aims of harmonising legislation. The complete reference to these 
documents can be found in a separate section of the Bibliography, 
whereas in the empirical analysis they are referred to in terms of 
authorship and the year the documents were published (e.g. ‘European 
Commission 1994c’).
5. Press releases issued by individual DGs or Commissioners (often called 
‘MEMOs’). These are intended to inform the public about the time 
schedule and aims envisaged for a policy initiative. Usually they are 
supplied by the Rapid database provided for by the European Union 
institutions. Full references are stated in the footnotes in the empirical 
analysis.
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6. Speeches given by senior DG officials, cabinet members or 
Commissioners. They provide details on the positions taken in individual 
DGs and contain information as regards the aims and time schedules of 
legislative initiatives. Usually they are supplied by the Rapid database 
provided for by the European Union institutions. In the empirical 
analysis, full references are provided in the footnotes.
7. Statements and comments of Commission officials. Usually, they are 
made available as contributions in journals (e.g. Telecommunications Policy, 
Utilities Law Review) or in published conference reports. Strictly speaking, 
this kind of information does not constitute ‘official’ Commission 
documentation as it usually contains a disclaimer saying that the author 
expresses his/her personal view rather than an official Commission 
position. However, because the focus of this study is on the positions 
taken by single actors in the Commission rather than ‘the* Commission 
as such and because the officials who publish their views are the ones 
who actually draft policy proposals, I decided to use it as an additional 
source of official documentation. The complete references to these 
documents can be found in a separate section of the Bibliography, while 
in the empirical analysis the fact that an author is or used to be a 
Commission official is clearly indicated in the footnotes.
The empirical analysis also refers to other sources of official documentation, 
including the EC Bulletin and the Official Journal. These sources document the 
outcomes of the inter-institutional process, for example publishing the final 
policy instruments adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. They 
are not used as a source of evidence but serve the useful purpose of providing 
background information. Bibliographic references can be found in the 
footnotes.
Press reports
Information about the processes that precede the adoption of Commission 
documents and about the kinds of discussion that take place in the European 
Commission can be obtained from international newspapers documenting the
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European Commission’s activities. Three international newspapers cover policy­
making in the European Commission in detail: Agence Europe (a European daily 
dealing exclusively with EU Politics), European Voice (a European weekly 
covering EU news and analysis), and the Financial Times (international daily 
covering business and political affairs, including the EU). These newspapers 
contain interviews with and statements from Commissioners or DG officials, 
carry the comments of lobbyists on the European Commission’s behaviour, and 
cover the most central events surrounding the development of legislative 
initiatives. For the two policy sectors under study, the newspaper coverage was 
generally very good as they both represent high-profile business areas. For each 
policy initiative, a representative sample of press cuttings was obtained, both 
from archives and electronically. In the empirical analysis, reference to the press 
cuttings is made in the footnotes (e.g. ‘Financial Times, 24.2.1993).
Interviews
Between May 2002 and January 2004, I conducted 29 interviews, mostly with
508Commission officials (see Table 24). Having identified from the Commission 
organograms of the past two decades a number of key positions (e.g. Head of 
Unit, Advisor) in the relevant DGs, I chose interviewees with a view towards their 
involvement in the legislative initiatives under study. I also used a ‘snowballing 
technique’ by asking my interviewees to identify others I should see. The aim 
was to reach people having undertaken the actual drafting of legislative 
initiatives and those they coordinated with in other DGs as well as more senior 
officials who were responsible for providing direction and taking decisions. The
509officials I interviewed came from several ranks of the Commission hierarchy. I
M ost national newspapers d o  n o t deal with th e activities o f  the E uropean C om m ission  in
great detail (for detail see  d e  V reese 2 0 0 1 ).
508
I p ut forward 21 requests to possible interviewees; th ree individuals refused  to  b e  interview ed  
at all, m ostly citing tim e constraints. T h e overall resp onse rate was therefore q uite h igh . W ith  
som e interview ees, I con d u cted  m ore than o n e  interview  as they w ere closely involved  in
separate sets o f  m ajor legislative initiatives.
509
In the European C om m ission, there are five d ifferen t staff grades, the grade relevant for this 
study b ein g  the A-Grade, w hich has b een  called  ‘the policy-m aking and policy  m an agem en t  
grad e’ (N u gen t 2001 , p. 169). O ther grades are for translators and interpretators, 
adm inistrative, clerical and  secretarial staff as well as em p loyees undertak ing service an d  m anual
270
conducted interviews with officials from the following DGs: DG Competition, 
DG Education and Culture, DG Internal Market (now called DG Enterprise), 
and DG Telecoms (now called DG Information Society). The sample reflects at 
least three interviewees for each legislative initiative under study, usually two 
with officials from the DG with drafting responsibility as well as at least one with 
officials from other DGs participating in the preparation of legislation. I also 
conducted seven interviews with actors from outside the European Commission, 
mostly lobbyists and MEPs who were closely involved in the legislative initiatives 
under study and therefore able to provide detailed information on the debate 
observed in the Commission.
jo b s (for an overview see N u gen t 2001 , p. i6 8 f .) .  T h e A-Grade is d iv ided  in to  e ig h t p oints, 
reach ing from  A8 to A i .  Seniority increases down the scale. For exam p le, A i  is a d irector  
general or  equivalent, w hereas A 8 is an assistant adm inistrator. T h e officials I in terview ed  
in clu d ed  principal advisers (A 2), heads o f  u n it or  division (A 3), principal adm inistrators (A4- 
A 5) as well as assistant adm inistrators (A6-A8). S ee Table 24 for detail.
Table 24 List of interviewees
N am e Institu tion/
Company
510
Position (s) held N o . o f  
m eetings
D ate(s)
Pascal
Albrechtskirchinger
ZDF
(Zweites Deutsches 
Femsehen)
Delegate to the 
European Institutions
2 ° 7/ ° 5/ ° 2 
2 7 /0 1 /0 3
Roberto Barzanti European
Parliament
Member o f the European 
Parliament
1 0 3 /0 4 /0 3
Com elis Berben European 
Commission, 
DG Information 
Society
Assistant, Head o f Sector, 
Deputy Head o f Unit
3 2 2 /1 1 /0 2  
2 2 /0 1 /0 3  
2 2 /0 5 /0 3
U lf Bruhann European
Commission,
DG Internal Market
Head o f Division, Head 
of Unit, Adviser
2 0 8 /0 5 /0 2  
1 8 /1 1 /0 2
Bernard Clements European 
Commission, 
DG Information 
Society
Assistan t/Administrator 1 15 /0 5 /0 3
Costas Daskalakis European
Commission,
DG Education and 
Culture
Deputy Head o f  Unit, 
Head o f Unit
1 2 2 /1 1 /0 2
Andreas Hamann Landesanstalt fur
Kommunikation
Baden-Wurttemberg
Consultant 1 1 4 /0 5 /0 1
Christian Hocepied European
Commission,
DG Competition
Assistant/Administrator 
Head o f Unit, Head of 
Sector
4 1 9 /1 1 /0 2  
2 7 /0 1 /0 3  
2 2 /0 3 /0 3  
2 0 /0 1 /0 4
Suzanne Jessel-Picoury European
Commission,
DG Internal Market
Head o f Unit 1 o 7/ o5/°2
Angela Mills EPC
(European 
Publishers Council)
Executive Director 2 2 5 /0 9 /0 2
0 5 /1 2 /0 2
Peter Scott European 
Commission, 
DG Information 
Society
Head o f Unit, Head of 
Sector
2 2 2 /1 1 /0 2  
3 0 /0 1 /0 4
Aviva Silver European
Commission,
DG Education and 
Culture
Assistant/Administrator 2 1 9 /1 1 /0 2  
3 0 /0 1 /0 4
Carole Tongue European
Parliament
Member o f the European 
Parliament
1 2 7 /0 9 /0 2
Xavier Troussard European
Commission,
DG Education and 
Culture
Deputy Head o f Unit 1 2 2 /0 1 /0 3
Herbert Ungerer European
Commission,
Head o f Unit, Head o f  
Division, Adviser
1 1 8 /1 1 /0 2
510
The information refers to the position (s) held during the period under study.
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DG T elecom s and  
DG C om petition
Paul V erh oef E uropean  
Com m ission, 
DG Inform ation  
Society
H ead  o f  U nit, Adviser 1 2 2 /1 1 /0 2
A dam  W atson-Brown European  
Com m ission, 
DG  Inform ation  
Society
A ssistant/A dm inistrator  
H ead  o f  Sector
2 0 8 / 0 5 / 0 2
2 1 /1 1 /0 2
P hilip  W hitehead European
Parliam ent
M em ber o f  the E uropean  
Parliam ent
1 1 5 /0 1 /0 3
The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 3,5 hours, with the average length
511being one hour and 15 minutes. Interviews were semi-structured, following a 
set open-ended questions that centred on the course of policy development in 
the European Commission and the involvement of the interviewee, other 
officials and DGs. Due to the political sensitivity of the questions (including 
interviewees’ views on contested policy issues, officials’ behaviour in tricky 
decision-taking situations, and the actions taken by individual Commissioners 
and member states* governments), interviews were conducted on a non- 
attributable basis. Table 24 supplies the names and positions of the people I 
interviewed, including details on when and how often I saw them. In the 
empirical analysis, each interview is coded using numbers (e.g. ‘Interview 
Number 6’). As interviewees supplied highly confidential information, I did not 
tape the interviews, but took extensive notes during and shortly after each 
interview.
Unpublished documentary sources
I also used unpublished European Commission documents, such as internal 
working documents, info sheets, notes and correspondence (i.e. letters and 
electronic mail) exchanged between different Commission DGs, as well as and 
preliminary drafts of legislative proposals and documents. This material 
represented a useful source of additional evidence in those cases where other
511
O f the 29  interviews, 22 were con d u cted  face-to-face in Brussels. T h e rem aining interviews 
w ere con d u cted  o n  the p h on e, as the interview ees w ere e ith er too  in con ven ien d y located  for m e  
to  se e  them  or sim ply insisted  on  talking to m e over the p h o n e  outside regular office hours d u e  
to  tim e constraints. 21 interviews were con d u cted  in  English and e ig h t in  G erm an. Seven  
interviews w ere fo llow ed  up eith er by e-m ail or o n  the te lep h o n e to g e t  additional in form ation .
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sources did not provide all the detail I needed. It offered detailed information 
about the process during which Commission DGs prepared legislation, 
including their positions, disputes and the finding of compromises. Some of 
these documents were available on open access, following a written application 
to the European Commission and a rather lengthy delivery procedure.512 Some 
were supplied in confidentiality by my interviewees. In the interest of the 
persons supplying the documents, I chose not to quote from the material 
directly and to limit reference to providing the date and title or subject of the 
document as well as citing the DG from which it originates.
R egulation  1 0 4 9 /2 0 0 1  o f  3 0  May 2001 grants a right o f  access to European U n io n  
in stitu tions’ d ocum ents, in clu d in g  the E uropean C om m ission , to  any U n io n  citizen . T h ese  
d ocu m en ts in clu d e preparatory and internal d ocu m en ts p rod u ced  by the E uropean  
C om m ission.
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Acronyms
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CATV Cable Television
CEPT Conference Europeenne des Administrations des Postes et des
T elecommunications
DBS Direct Broadcasting by Satellite
DG Directorate General of the European Commission
DG III Directorate General Internal Market and Industrial Affairs
DG IV Directorate General Competition
DGX Directorate General Information and Culture
DG XIII Directorate Telecommunications
DGXVDG Internal Market and Financial Services
EBU European Broadcasting Union
EC European Community
ECOSOC Economic and Social Committee
EMS European Monetary System
EU European Union
HDTV High Definition Television
IT Information Technology
ITTF Information Technology Task Force
ITU International Telecommunications Union
MAC Multiplex Analogue Component
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NCA National Competition Authority
NRA National Regulatory Authority
ONP Open Network Provision
PAL Phase Alternating Line
PSB Public Service Broadcasting
PTO Public Telecommunications Operator
R&D Research and Development
SECAM Systeme Electronique pour Couleur avec Memoire
SEM Single European Market
275
SMP Significant Market Power
TEN Trans-European Networks
TEU Treaty on the European Union
VAN Value-Added Telecommunications Services
Glossary
Audience Share — criterion used to assess dominance in media markets by means 
of measuring audiences
Conditional access — access to communications services granted by operators 
providing these services, made conditional on a prior authorisation 
aiming at ensuring the remuneration of the service, for example by 
means of decoders or smart cards
Dz-MAC- see MAC
Electronic Communications -  a term used by the European Commission which has 
come to increasingly replace and combine existing terms such as 
‘telecommunications* and ‘broadcasting* in the late 1990s.
Equipment -  referring to both the network (lines and switches) and the terminal 
equipment (consumer devices) connected to these networks (e.g. 
telephones, modems, television sets).
HD-MAC- see MAC
Infrastructure — the network that carries telecommunications and audiovisual 
services, including copper wires, terrestrial transmission of broadcasting, 
satellites, broadband and cable television networks.
Interconnection -  referring to the conditions of access to networks granted by 
PTOs to users and competitive service providers including, for example, 
standards and interfaces, tariff principles and the provision of 
frequencies.
Interoperability -  the linking of facilities of different organisations providing 
telecommunications networks and/or services
Local Loop -  referring to the physical circuit between the customer’s premises 
and the telecoms operator’s local switch or equivalent facility in the local 
access network.
MAC -  Multiplex Analogue Component, a technical standard used for the 
transmission and reception of television broadcasting in the context of
so-called High-Definition-Television. In the 1980s, specifically European 
broadcasting norms were developed, called HD-MAC and D2-MAG.
Open Network Provision -  concerns the harmonisation of conditions for open and 
efficient access to and use of public telecommunications networks and 
services
PAL/SECAM -  the technical standards used for the transmission and reception 
of traditional free-to-air television broadcasting.
Significant Market Power -  concept used as a trigger to apply specific obligations 
to telecommunications operators with more than a distinct market share 
of specified markets (e.g. fixed telephony, mobile telephony).
Television Quota -  the placing of obligations on television broadcasters to 
transmit a minimum of productions of European and ‘independent* 
origin
Universal Service -  the provision of a basic telecommunications services (e.g. 
voice telephony) and a network access supporting these services at an 
affordable price
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